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A NOTE FROM INTERIM DIRECTOR
SUZANNE FIEDERLEIN, PH.D.
As we approach the end of 2020, I hope this finds you 
and your loved ones safe, healthy, and well. It has 
been an unusual time for us all, with so many of our 
events held virtually, including the eighteenth meet-
ing of the States Parties to the APMBC, the Second 
Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, and the Countering Explosive Threat and 
Demining Symposium, all of which I had the opportu-
nity to attend remotely. In a time of global upheaval, 
I am even more convinced of the importance of information exchange as we 
share our organizational expertise to broaden humanitarian assistance 
despite COVID-19. 
In this issue of The Journal, we feature articles on a broad range of top-
ics that signify the outstanding work HMA organizations foster in spite of the 
logistical, organizational, and funding challenges our sector faces at this time. 
Research and Development and Editorial. Presenting their award- 
winning Odyssey2025 Project, Mobility Robotics and Humanity and Inclusion 
(HI) discuss their use of drones and airborne IR thermography to find bur-
ied landmines under field conditions in the deserts of Chad. Additionally, 
Mobility Robotics and HI argue in their editorial the need for researchers 
to work in conjunction with HMA practitioners, highlighting the importance 
of maximizing the impact that research funding has on communities with 
explosive contamination. 
Empowering Local Capacity in HMA. UNMAS DRC present on their weap-
ons and ammunition management work to curb the proliferation of weapons 
and improve security in numerous regions. We also hear from the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Cambodia Mine 
Action Authority (CMAA), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) on their joint 
work to mainstream gender and diversity capacity among national mine 
action authorities. 
Balkans. The Marshall Legacy Institute (MLI) and ITF-Enhancing Human 
Security (ITF) present on their Mine Free Sarajevo project, utilizing land 
release methodology to clear nearly 8 million sq m of contaminated land in 
Sarajevo and its surrounding municipalities, while The HALO Trust (HALO) dis-
cusses their weapons marking and tracing program in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
highlighting the collaboration between the European Armed Forces in Bosnia, 
Pryor Marking, and the European Force in Bosnia. 
Information Management. From iMMAP, we feature two articles focus-
ing on their information management systems and tools in use in northeast 
Syria and Iraq, highlighting their ability to improve decision-making pro-
cesses, quality, and information sharing among actors working in the con-
taminated regions.
HMA and COVID-19. From the Mine Action Support Group (MASG), Wolfgang 
Bindseil and Ian Mansfield present a donor’s perspective on HMA funding and 
operations against the backdrop of the global pandemic. Facing significant 
challenges to funding and operations, the authors present the challenges dis-
cussed during a May 2020 meeting. 
IMAS. Roly Evans from the GICHD reviews the changes and improvements 
to IMAS 10.60 Safety & Occupational Health—Investigation and Reporting of 
Accidents and Incidents. Key updates include the importance of evidence in 
reporting, simplification of the reporting timelines, and a new system of dif-
ferent investigation levels, among others. 
Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE). The Swiss Foundation for Mine 
Action (FSD) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace -  Descontamina 
Colombia reviews their study of EORE activities between 2012 and 2019 in 
Colombia. 
Historical Perspective. And from CISR’s former director, Dr. Ken 
Rutherford, we have an article that looks at the use of landmines during the 
American Civil War, following the publication of his book, America’s Buried 
History: Landmines in the Civil War. 
In looking toward the Spring issue of The Journal, we are soliciting for 
a broad range of topics including Ukraine, the environmental challenges of 
HMA, battle area and urban clearance, the use of prosthetics, mobile and effi-
cient data collection methods, and commercial off-the-shelf tools for mine 
action, among others. We also want to continue to hear how organizations 
have adapted their operations throughout the global pandemic. For more 
information, please see The Journal’s Calls for Papers at https://www.jmu.
edu/cisr/journal/cfps.shtml. 
In closing, I wish you a safe and healthy 2021, one filled with more of the 
personal interactions that nurture us and that we all have missed in 2020.
Suzanne
A Note from the Interim Director
Time to Stem Lightweight Approaches and Focus on Real 
Minefield Data? By John Fardoulis [ Mobility Robotics ] and 
Xavier Depreytere [ Humanity & Inclusion ]
Mine Action in Times of COVID-19: A Donor’s Perspective 
By Wolfgang Bindseil and Ian Mansfield [ Mine Action Support 
Group ]
Operationalized Management Information Systems in Iraq’s 
DMA By Mark Steyn and Arie Claassens [ iMMAP ]
On-the-Ground Information Management Tools in 
Northeast Syria By Suleiman Nyamwaya and Joel Ndegwa 
[ iMMAP ]
International Mine Action Standard 10.60 Safety & 
Occupational Health – Investigation and Reporting of 
Accidents and Incidents: Notes on the Revised Second 
Edition By Roly Evans [ Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining ]
The Mine Free Sarajevo Project By Marija Trlin  
[ Mine Detection Dog Center ], Elise Becker [ Marsall Legacy 
Institute ], and Nataša Uršič [ ITF-Enhancing Human Security ]
Weapons Marking and Registration in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: A Model for a Regional Approach to SALW 
Life-Cycle Management in the Western Balkans
By Mike Newton [ The HALO Trust ]
Improving Security in the DRC Through Weapons and 
Ammunition Management By Beamie-Moses Seiwoh, Aurelie 
Fabry, Grégoire de Nantes, and Edison Pineda [ UNMAS DRC ]
Landmines in America’s Backyard
By Kenneth R. Rutherford, Ph.D. [ James Madison University ]
Strengthening a Sustainable National Capacity for Gender 
and Diversity Mainstreaming in Mine Action By Laura 
Biscaglia,* Ros Sophal,** Khun Sochenda,** and Lubna 
Sabeeh***  *[ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining ], **[ Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance 
Authority ], and ***[ Norwegian People’s Aid ]
Assessing Ukraine’s Victim Assistance Capacities 
By Kateryna Mashchenko, Tetiana Shymanchuk, Oleh Stoiev, 
and Nick Vovk [ Danish Refugee Council-Danish Demining 
Group ]
Explosive Ordnance Victims and Risk Education: Lessons 
Learned from Colombia 2012–2019 By Salomé Valencia,* 
Angela De Santis, Ph.D.,* Matt Wilson,* Sebastián Tovar 
Jaramillo,* Ángela Patricia Cortés Sánchez,**  Ana Jaquelin 
Jaimes Alfonso**  [ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action ],* [ 
Office of the High Commissioner for Peace – Descontamina 
Colombia ]** 
Proof: How Small Drones Can Find Buried Landmines in 
the Desert using Airborne IR Thermography 
By John Fardoulis [ Mobility Robotics ], Xavier Depreytere, Pierre Gallien, 
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TIME TO STEM LIGHTWEIGHT 
APPROACHES AND FOCUS ON 
REAL MINEFIELD DATA?
By John Fardoulis [ Mobility Robotics ] and Xavier Depreytere [ Humanity & Inclusion ]
O
ver the past twenty years thermal/long-wave infrared (IR 
or LWIR) imaging, also known as thermography, has pro-
gressed insufficiently from research to field deployment in 
the humanitarian mine action (HMA) sector. While preparing for air-
borne IR thermography fieldwork as part of the Odyssey2025 Project 
between Humanity & Inclusion and Mobility Robotics in Chad, a 
comprehensive literature study conducted by the authors to determine 
what was state-of-the-art knowledge indicated this trend. Background 
knowledge for this article is based on lessons learned during airborne 
thermal/LWIR imaging work from small drones in desert minefields 
during October 2019. Experience gained in locating temperature 
anomalies allowed authors to identify the position of thirty-year-old 
legacy buried anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines at in-situ mine-
fields using airborne IR thermography. 
From the literature reviewed, 
the authors identified a discon-
nect between thermography-related 
research projects and practical, real-
world HMA operations. The literature 
review also indicated that research 
topics have been duplicated without 
sufficient evidence to indicate if bur-
ied landmines could (or could not) be 
located under actual minefield condi-
tions using IR thermography as an 
enhanced survey technique.
BACK TO THE FUTURE
IR thermography technology has 
been available for many decades, with 
a “think we can” summary published 
by Bowman et.al1 in 1998 explaining 
the potential for the use of airborne 
cameras to identify color or tem-
perature differences of the ground to 
locate surface and buried landmines. 
Over two decades later, similar research 
articles covering known techniques con-
tinue to appear without substantially 
progressing usable research, and not 
moving forward to practical next steps.
DEFINITION OF THE “FIELD” 
Ambiguity exists regarding how to define the field, with some 
researchers’ outdoor tests at university or government/military facili-
ties labelled as controlled field tests. However, HMA considers field 
operations as those where real minefields exist or are suspected to exist 
in situ. Part of a Cambridge Dictionary definition states the field as “a 
place where you are working or studying in real situations, rather than 
from an office, laboratory, etc.”2 
Our definition of a controlled (static) field trial is the use of produc-
tion landmines with explosives intact but rendered safe with detona-
tors removed and buried within a 100 km radius of actual minefields. 
The reason for a 100 km radius is to closely match natural (geophysi-
cal) environmental and weather variables at in-situ minefields. Tests 
Figure 1. An example of thermal/LWIR data from real landmines in the desert captured by the author: (a) is a thermal 
image straight from the sensor; (b) is data exported, with every pixel indicating a temperature; and (c) and (d) are 
visualizations of the surface temperature anomaly created by a buried PMA-3 landmine. More research projects 
should be capturing field data like this.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
EDITORIAL
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at a university or government site in countries without real minefields 
should be identified as occurring at an outdoor laboratory, not field 
tests or field trials. With similarities to the concept of technology 
readiness levels, Table 1 provides a summary of research milestones 
(or levels of proof) required to determine if IR thermography might or 
might not be feasible at specific legacy minefield locations under actual 
field conditions. The outdoor laboratory trial ultimately has limited 
applications in the path to field deployment.
LACK OF VALIDATION
An apparent trend in thermography research projects is not pro-
gressing further than outdoor laboratory trials to later steps in the field 
(Table 1). Furthermore, Table 2 provides a summary of the literature 
examined by the authors, a review of forty-seven articles published 
over the last twenty-five years that discuss a range of elements affect-
ing the feasibility of locating buried landmines using thermography. A 
further six IR thermography research articles were reviewed by Makki 
et.al3, bringing the total to fifty-three articles reviewed. From the lit-
erature examined, only one project progressed to a static field trial. 
Column headings in Table 1 show the different steps in field research/
validation that establish enough proof for HMA actors to gain con-
fidence and justify investing in such a technology. From a practical 
perspective, HMA actors may view many of the articles reviewed as 
outputs from obscure academic experiments, lacking real-world cred-
ibility from a field perspective. Many of these articles were published 
in specialized academic journals, often intended for a limited audience 
of niche subject-matter experts, who fall short of connecting with real-
world HMA practicality, and without the authors’ understanding the 
larger picture.
Across the literature reviewed, the only project that captured IR 
thermography data at a real minefield was by Cremer et.al.4, during 
2005 in Cyprus. In a later article, Thành5 from Cremer’s team stated 
that thermography research projects were being run without any real 
minefield data. Their solution was to  deploy a cherry picker-style crane 
and United Nations minivan to collect data under actual field condi-
tions in Cyprus. In 2005, deploying a large mechanical boom was the 
best possible method for mounting heavy sensors at an elevated posi-
tion next to a minefield. The boom was connected to a minivan hous-
ing computing equipment that operated within the data processing 
constraints of the time. 
Data captured was then used by the same group to develop impres-
sive numerical models regarding how buried landmines interacted with 
the environment, Thành et al.5,6,7  These articles discuss how weather 
and environmental factors can affect the variability of results, elements 
that affect the strength and timing of temperature anomalies from bur-
ied landmines, mathematical modelling of factors in play, automated 
data processing, sensors, and the complexity of the underlying science. 
Learning from such work should be a starting point for any research into IR 
thermography for locating buried landmines because of the comprehensive 
approach undertaken. A point of difference is that Cremer and Thành et al. 
Figure 2. The CLEARFAST thermal/LWIR imaging system over a real minefield in 2005, a precursor to drone capabilities today.









Number of Real Mine Field Locations None None None Low Low Medium-High Very High
Temporal Resolution of Real 
Mindfield Data None None None
Medium-
High Medium High High
Accurate Weather Variables None Low Low High High High High
Accurate Environmental Variables None Low Low High High High Very High
Production Landmines None None None High High High Very High
Movement None Low High Low High High Very High
Optimal Operating Parameters None Low Low Low-Medium High High High
Table 1. Level of real-world proof (legacy in-situ minefields).
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also ground-truthed theoretical results against in-situ data recorded at real- 
world minefields. 
Since 2005, computing/processing power has increased exponen-
tially and sensors have grown smaller, to the point of fitting in the palm 
of your hand. Deployment of thermal/LWIR sensors over minefields 
became easier around seven years ago, when miniaturized units could 
be flown on small drones. However, articles continue to appear without 
any field data. 
A DISCONNECT IN THE 
SECTOR?
Let’s face it, setting up a sandpit at a 
university or government facility for 
outdoor laboratory trials is not very 
difficult. However, there are challenges 
in travelling to locations where legacy 
minefields exist, especially places of 
most interest for IR thermography—arid 
locations. Even so, this is not a valid 
excuse for a disconnect between research 
projects and HMA. 
A more holistic approach would be to 
include at least one HMA operator in the 
feedback loop and, ideally, for a national 
authority/mine action center (MAC) to 
share priorities for each country of inter-
est. The best approach is to gain spe-
cific information: coordinates for the 
location(s) of minefields, as well as a list 
of actual landmine models found in these 
locations. For example, certain mini-
mum metal anti-tank landmines could 
be prioritized along extensive stretches of 
closed roads in Afghanistan. Collaborating 
with HMA operators and MACs is vital in 
determining priorities. Linking practical 
innovation to beneficiary needs is how to 
make a difference in post-conflict commu-
nities affected by residual contamination, 
rather than conducting research purely for 
academic purposes.
RED FLAGS 
Hinting at a lack of understanding by 
researchers, the first red flag often observed 
is with the use of the words detection and 
survey. Both words carry very specific and 
different connotations regarding risk and 
operational parameters under interna-
tional and national mine action standards, 
i.e., in HMA, the phrase “landmine detec-
tion” means a near 100 percent detection 
rate with very few false alarms. Misuse of 
terminology can indicate signs of both a lack of understanding regard-
ing HMA processes and a lack of collaboration with HMA actors. The 
term survey is more general and does not always infer a near 100 per-
cent detection rate, e.g., non-technical survey.
The second red flag is a lack of and/or questionable data. The first test 
should involve the following questions: Which particular landmine 
model(s) were studied, and in what specific location(s)? 
A 2019 upgrade to the system appearing in Figure 2. Here, the author uses small drones to fly thermal/LWIR sensors 
over legacy desert minefields in Chad. Sadly, real-world thermal/LWIR data has been scarce since 2005.
Figure 3. Thermal/LWIR image of two rows of active PMA-3 landmines in-situ, captured by the author thirty years 
after the conflict.
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Table 2. Table representing a summary of twenty years of research using thermography to locate buried landmines.
Experiments of thermographic landmine detection with reduced size and compressed timexxiii Laboratory heating tests 2004
Improved Thermal Analysis of Buried Landminesxxiv Mathematical modelling & deep learning 2004
Parameterisation of non-homogeneities in buried object detection by means of thermographyxxv Laboratory tests 2004
DSTO Landmine Detection Test Targetsxxvi Dummy/surrogate landmine design 2005
Stand-off Thermal IR Minefield Survey: System concept and experimental resultsxxvii Real minefield data, deep learning 2005
Strength of landmine signatures under different soil conditions: implications for sensor fusionxxviii Complexity of soil properties 2005
Analysis of a thermal imaging method for landmine detection using heating of the sand surfacexxix Surface heating 2005
Thermal infrared identification of buried landminesxxx Soil, sensors, modelling 2005
Numerical and Experimental Investigation of Thermal Signatures of Buried Landmines in Dry Soilxxxi Soil and sensors 2006
Finite-Difference Methods and Validity of a Thermal Model for Landmine Detection With Soil Property Estimatesxxxii Sophisticated modelling, including the use of real minefield data from [3]
2007
Image processing of landminesxxxiii Sensor capabilities for route clearance 2007
Heat Transfer for NDE: Landmine Detectionxxxiv Deep learning 2007
A thermal infrared hyperspectral imager (tasi) for buried landmine detectionxxxv Manned aircraft deployment of sensors 2007
Signature Evaluation for Thermal Infrared Countermine and IED Detection Systemsxl Computer simulations 2008
Modeling of TNT transport from landmines: Numerical approachxxxvii Simulations, transport of landmine chemical signatures 2009
FPGA computation of the 3D heat equationxxxviii Hybrid hardware/software, infrared thermography 2010
Detection and characterization of buried landmines using infrared thermographyxxxix Image processing, numerical modelling, heat equation 2011
Passive infrared technique for buried object detection and classificationxl Simulations & numerical modelling 2011
Role of moisture and density of sand for microwave enhancement of thermal detection of buried minesxli Modelling & influence of ground moisture/water content 
2012
Remote detection of buried land-mines and IEDs using LWIR polarimetric imagingxlii Sensor design 2012
Soil moisture and thermal behavior in the vicinity of buried objects affecting remote sensing detection: Experimental and 
modeling investigationxliii Soil moisture, temperature transfer and environment
2013
Experimental Validation of an Active Thermal Landmine Detection Techniquexliv Heating tests and laboratory design 2014
Buried and Surface Mine Detection From Thermal Image Time Seriesxlv Time of day/night (diurnal cycle), deep learning 2017
Diurnal Thermal Dormant Landmine Detection Using Unmanned Aerial Vehiclesxlvi Time of day/night (diurnal cycle), small drones, sur-rogate objects
2018
Multi-Temporal IR Thermography For Mine Detectionxlvii Time of day/night (diurnal cycle) 2019
Title Topic Relating to Buried Landmines Publication Year
Characterization of diurnal and environmental effects on mines and the factors influencing the performance of mine 
detection ATR algorithmsi Surrogate design, time of day/night (diurnal cycle)
1995
Improved Landmine Detection Capability (ILDC): Systematic approach to the detection of buried mines using passive IR 
imagingii
Route clearance using LWIR on ground vehicles to find 
buried landmines 
1996
Hyperspectral infrared techniques for buried landmine detectioniii Soil and sensors 1998
Thermal Imaging for Landmine Detectioniv Microwave heating of the surface 1998
Sophisticated test facility to detect land mines[9]v Outdoor laboratory design 1999
Impact of soil water content on landmine detection using radar and thermal infrared sensorsvi Sensors and soil/sand/ground 2001
Modeling transient water distributions around landmines in bare soilsvii Soil and water transport 2001
Modeling transient temperature distributions around landmines in homogenous bare soilsviii Soil and environment 2001
Measurements and modeling of soil water distribution around landmines in natural soilix Laboratory tests, simulations, surrogate landmines 2001
An analysis of thermal imaging method for landmine detection using microwave heatingx Laboratory tests, heating and cooling 2001
Land mine detection in bare soils using thermal infrared sensorsxi Ground water/moisture time of day/night (diurnal cycle) 2002
CNN-based 3D thermal modeling of the soil for antipersonnel mine detectionxii Numerical modelling, deep learning 2002
Detecting and locating landmine fields from vehicle and air-borne measured IR imagesxiii Image processing, deep learning 2002
Image Processing-Based Mine Detection Techniques: A Reviewxiv Image processing, deep learning 2002
Thermal Analysis of Buried Land Mines Over a Diurnal Cyclexv Time of day/night (diurnal cycle) 2002
Littoral Assessment of Mine Burial Signatures (LAMBS) – Buried Land Mine/Background Spectral Signature Analysesxvi Sensors, spectral signatures, sand, soil, weather and  environment
2003
Fusion of polarimetric infrared features and GPR features for landmine detectionxvii Sensor fusion 2003
Effects of Thin Metal Outer Case and Top Air Gap on Thermal IR Images of Buried Antitank and Antipersonnel Land 
Minesxviii Numerical simulations
2003
Soil effects on thermal signatures of buried nonmetallic landminesxix Soil and environment 2004
Controlled field experiments of wind effects on thermal signatures of buried and surface-laid landminesxx Impact of wind 2004
A controlled outdoor test site for evaluation of soil effects on landmine detection sensorsxxi Outdoor laboratory design 2004
A review of satellite and airborne sensors for remote sensing based detection of minefields and landminesxxii Airborne sensors on manned aircraft, ground sign  indicators
2004
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Storyboards, goals, or outdoor laboratory tests with irrelevant bur-
ied objects tested in completely different weather and geophysical 
environments from actual field locations do not prove that you could 
employ the same methods and find buried landmines in specific post-
conflict locations. Field data that holds up to scrutiny is needed to pro-
vide confidence in the real world. 
A third red flag involves preparedness so as not to duplicate previous 
research. Questions to ask include
• Has a comprehensive literature review been performed? 
• What can researchers learn from previous efforts and how can 
these be incorporated to further knowledge?
• Have researchers worked in the field? Can someone be an 
“expert” and innovate without ever visiting a minefield?
Understanding practical real-world requirements and challenges is 
essential. How is research novel? In what ways can it overcome prob-
lems where similar previous research failed to reach field implemen-
tation? How transferrable are findings from pre-testing at outdoor 
laboratories to a particular post-conflict location? Visiting minefields 
helps researchers achieve a practical understanding of what the real 
world looks like. Many complex variables are actively at play, and 
omitting just one can result in a major research floor. Minefield visits 
can reveal quirks associated with the types of contamination present: 
the terrain, natural environment, and weather conditions in a spe-
cific location—these may not be clear from a desktop study. Claims 
are sometimes made that a certain research project will revolution-
ize HMA, but can this be said without practical empathy regarding 
how demining and survey staff work in each country, analogous to the 
phrase, “walk a mile in his shoes?” 
GARBAGE IN, GARBAGE OUT? 
Popular topics currently include the use of drones, and/or auto-
mated data processing, often both together. Computer algorithms need 
comprehensive training data to be effective, often thousands of data 
points as a minimum. Without data from real minefields, one could 
ask if the output might follow the old computing saying “garbage in, 
garbage out,” particularly if data does not contain accurate landmine 
anomaly signatures. How could one defend the validity of outputs 
without any ground truthing under actual field conditions? See the 
second flag in this regard.
CONFIDENCE IS ESSENTIAL IN A RISK-BASED 
CULTURE
And finally, no matter how sophisticated the research, can there 
be proof without field trials and validation? How can researchers be 
sure they have not missed a variable that renders their work untenable? 
Theory and hypothesis stacked upon theory and hypothesis does not 
mean that research will work in actual field conditions. Legacy mine-
field data is the end point, or perhaps it should be the starting point?
Therefore, the importance of real fieldwork, the significance of 
undergoing a literature review before starting your own research, and 
the need for researchers to work in conjunction with HMA operators 
are all essential, not only to those working in HMA, but—more impor-
tantly—to the post-conflict communities the sector strives to help.
John Fardoulis
Mobility Robotics
John Fardoulis is a scientist, remote-
sensing practitioner, aerospace engineer, 
and “methodology designer.” He was the 
specialist in small drone research, field-
work, and training on the HI Odyssey2025 
Project in Chad. Having worked in HMA, 
academia, and as a commercial drone 
service provider (with CAA accreditation 
in the U.K.), he is in a unique position to add value at every 
level of research and small drone operations. Fardoulis has a 
Bachelor of Business from the University of Western Sydney 




Xavier Depreytere joined Humanity & 
Inclusion (HI) in 2018 after working in 
industry as an automation project engi-
neer. He was in charge of the strategy 
and coordination of the HI Odyssey2025 
Project in Chad. Xavier holds a masters 
in biosystems engineering from the 
University of Mons, Belgium. 
Pre-requisites for research projects should include the following: 
• Researchers meet with HMA operators and MACs to produce a 
list of the most important priorities for an individual country.
• Provide funding for an HMA technical adviser to help mentor 
a project.
• Visit the field during initial scoping stages of each project and 
report back regarding how real-world conditions will affect 
methodology and to determine where field trials will take place.
• Concentrate on specific landmine models and practical HMA 
operating requirements.
• Implement a feedback mechanism to gain HMA scrutiny and 
peer review regarding if research proposals are novel, practical, 
and have the potential for real-world impact.
Ideally, donors and research councils should mandate the pre- 
requisites mentioned before granting funding and assess projects 
based on practical outcomes for affected communities, post-project 
completion.
 The only way to provide confidence for such a risk-averse sector 
such as HMA and to increase the uptake in the use of IR thermography 
in arid environments is with solid proof, which has been very light over 
the last two decades. Perhaps the impact of this editorial might be to 
stem lightweight approaches that continue today, foster practical col-
laboration with HMA actors, and divert energy toward capturing real 
minefield data.  
See endnotes page 64
THANKS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Belgian Directorate-General for Development funded the 
Odyssey2025 Project. Their gracious support helped to achieve many 
milestones, particularly furthering knowledge in methods regarding how 
to use small drones for the location of buried landmines.
8
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol24/iss2/1
ISSUE 24.2 @ FALL/WINTER 2020 9
MINE ACTION IN TIMES OF COVID-19:
A DONOR’S PERSPECTIVE 
THE ROLE OF MINE ACTION DONORS
S
ince the beginning of humanitarian mine action (HMA) in 
the late 1980s, the sector has relied heavily on donor support. 
Financial assistance continues to be the most obvious form 
of support for national authorities and mine action operators. Donor 
support to HMA has mainly remained in the range of US$450–500 
million per year for the past decade, peaking at almost US$700 million 
in 2017 as donors responded to the legacy of ISIS in the Middle East.1 
This has been a substantial commitment by any measure. The fund-
ing is provided through various channels, such as the Organization of 
American States and the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe, UN trust funds, ITF Enhancing Human Security, national 
authorities, or directly to (international) HMA nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other organizations like the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Donor funding covers 
the full range of HMA activities, including risk education, survey and 
clearance, stockpile destruction, victim assistance, advocacy, capacity 
building, and coordination.
Donors approach HMA in accordance with their own national 
strategies and priorities. A few donors view the landmine and explo-
sive remnants of war (ERW) issue as purely humanitarian. Whereas 
some pursue it from a development perspective, others view activi-
ties through a stabilization and peace support angle or the promo-
tion of international treaties as the most important factors. Several 
donors have published mine action strategies outlining their poli-
cies and priorities. These include the “Mine Action Strategy of the 
Swiss Confederation 2016–2022”2 and the German “Federal Foreign 
Office Humanitarian Mine Action Strategy within the framework 
of Federal Government humanitarian assistance,”3 both of which 
were finalized with the support of GICHD. Other donors use their 
broader humanitarian, development, or peace-building strategies to 
guide their HMA work.
In 1998, a core group of interested donors established an informal 
body called the Mine Action Support Group (MASG). Since its cre-
ation, the MASG has been an active forum for HMA donors and key 
partners to meet and discuss common issues. The MASG allows for 
an exchange between the HMA programs of the world’s major donor 
By Wolfgang Bindseil and Ian Mansfield [ Mine Action Support Group ]
Screenshot from a UNICEF presentation given on COVID-19 during a video call with participants.
Image courtesy of the authors.
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states about best practices and prioritization, coordination with UN 
agencies, and brings donors’ attention to issues where support for 
HMA is particularly needed. The MASG now consists of thirty-three 
donors, along with invited external observers including the United 
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), several international organi-
zations, and academia. The MASG normally meets twice a year, once in 
the context of the Mine Action National Directors and United Nations 
Advisers’ Meeting (NDM) in February, usually held in Geneva, and 
again in New York City in October at the time of the United Nations 
First Committee Session. The Chair of the MASG rotates every two 
years, and Germany assumed the Chair in January 2020.
Over the years, donors have also influenced the HMA sector in 
more ways than by just providing money. For example, MASG mem-
bers have called for the development of common sector-wide stan-
dards (e.g., International Mine Action Standards), hosted technical 
workshops and training activities, and actively participated in inter-
national and national level meetings. Donors, like Germany, strive to 
be true partners in the HMA process and are invested in the outcomes 
and impacts to be achieved by their funding and other support. Thus, 
when the COVID-19 pandemic hit the world in late 2019, it not only 
impacted operators, international organizations, and national authori-
ties, but also created new challenges for donors as well. 
THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON MINE ACTION
The global pandemic has greatly affected the HMA sector. In some 
countries, programs are suspended, international staff repatriated, and 
local lockdowns continue to affect national staff. While operators must 
cope with restrictions, donors’ strategic goals and objectives have to be 
revised as well. Staff protection became a particularly important issue. 
Working with beneficiaries in risk education or victim assistance, for 
example, creates new risks. Travel restrictions pose problems and incur 
cost increases for implementation, supervision, and coordination. 
After receiving advice from donors, operators, and UNMAS regard-
ing the need for an exchange on the unique situation brought about by 
COVID-19, Germany, as Chair of the MASG, arranged a global video 
conference on 27 May 2020. Over thirty donors participated in the 
conference, along with representatives from UN agencies, the GICHD, 
and four major international NGOs. The aim of the video call was to 
share experiences and challenges caused by COVID-19, particularly 
regarding the global pandemic’s impact on HMA donors, and to pur-
sue best practices in dealing with the situation. 
During the video call, NGOs outlined the effects of COVID-19 on 
their HMA field operations. These included the temporary closing of 
work sites, travel restrictions placed on staff, social distancing require-
ments affecting work procedures, and the need for additional personal 
protective equipment (PPE). NGOs requested that funding levels be 
sustained through 2020 and 2021, and that donors support increased 
flexibility with grants and project implementation if their activities are 
affected by COVID-19. The use of HMA resources, which were idled 
by pandemic-related program restrictions, to address the pandemic in 
impoverished countries was also raised. Most participants feared that 
the growing prevalence of COVID-19 in countries with HMA activi-
ties would dramatically increase the uncertainty of planning, thus 
increasing financial risks for operators and donors. Appealing to those 
donors funding UNMAS programs with delayed or suspended activi-
ties to approve a flexible approach, UNMAS sought to retain minimum 
operating capacity that would allow programs to start back to work as 
soon as conditions allowed. Also wishing to retain both their contrac-
tors and the national staff who depend on their salaries in this uncer-
tain time, UNMAS provided extensive, detailed information to several 
donors.
THE DONOR RESPONSE
For donors, the situation posed a dilemma, summed up by the repre-
sentative of Finland, Ms. Anni Makelainen, in the following way: 
It is difficult to find other projects (besides mine action) within our 
Ministry that are so heavily impacted by the restrictions of move-
ment and face difficulties to re-orientate their projects, i.e., propose 
any alternative actions. Continuing to pay salaries while no results 
are produced is, of course, not an easy equation when it comes to 
our funding regulations. On the other hand, discontinuing funding 
and terminating the contracts of the local employees is not a very 
sustainable alternative either.
Several major donors—Finland, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States—had already provided early guidance to their 
partner organizations. The representative of the United Kingdom said 
that they had advised partners of the following broad principles: 
We ask that partners make decisions based on the proportional-
ity principle, and with a view to ensuring the safety of their staff. 
Partners should consult closely with local and national health 
authorities to ensure that their decision-making is in line with 
wider guidance and is not adversely affecting the local response to 
COVID-19. While adhering to the principles of doing no harm and 
staff safety, we encourage our implementing partners to continue 
delivering planned demining operations where possible and appro-
priate. Ultimately our partners are responsible for implementing 
projects as planned, and it is for our partners to decide whether it 
is appropriate to continue delivering demining work. 
The United Kingdom then advised partners that they would guaran-
tee the salaries of their demining staff for up to three months, includ-
ing under forced lockdown. 
Stanley L. Brown, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Programs and 
Operations in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Mili-
tary Affairs, addressed the question of using HMA resources for other 
COVID-19 related activities, such as combining mine risk education 
with COVID-19 awareness raising activities or using idle demining 
vehicles for logistics or the movement of medical supplies to hospitals: 
Where our implementers are still working, we have advised 
that their focus should and must remain on demining operations. 
That said, where host governments are requesting the use of HMA-
funded assets, and it can be done in a reasonable and minimally 
disruptive manner, we will consider it. For example, in some cases 
we have authorized risk education and community liaison teams 
to simultaneously deliver COVID-19 related messaging while they 
go about their normal day-to-day work. Likewise, where demining 
operations have been suspended and we are still paying salaries 
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for workers and maintenance costs for vehicles, it may make good 
sense to employ these otherwise idle assets—with the proviso that 
those assets immediately be returned to demining operations as 
soon as operations can resume.
During the MASG video call, some common points emerged among 
the donor countries:
• As of mid-2020, no MASG member had cut funding to national 
authorities or NGO operators.
• Donors stressed the need for regular and proactive communica-
tions between them and their partners through virtual or other 
channels. Moreover, if there is a need to change original project 
documents, the funded partner should take the initiative and 
suggest alternatives.
• Donors showed flexibility in their responses if project targets 
could not be met or if project objectives needed to be adapted. 
However, none of the donors provided a blanket waiver to 
funded partners.
• Extensions to projects on a no-cost basis would generally be 
viewed favorably.
• Despite donors’ flexibility and desire to avoid having operators 
return unused funding, donors stressed that, ultimately, they 
were bound by their own national financial regulations and that 
these would take precedence if required. In case of prolonged 
restriction on project activities due to COVID-19, difficult deci-
sions would be unavoidable in the future.
Stakeholders agreed that the exchange was useful, and that 
COVID-19 will remain on the agenda of MASG meetings for the 
coming year.  
THE FUTURE
Between May and August 2020, most mine action programs were 
expected to restart all or some of their operations. However, not all 
field or donor programs could be completed as planned and some of the 
projects had to be postponed. This is also true for Germany, which cur-
rently adapts its contingency planning on a weekly basis. Additionally, 
the evolving pandemic raised new concerns. In several areas, the pan-
demic had not reached its peak. Additionally, the imminent threat 
of a second or third wave lingers. In August 2020, the World Health 
Organization reported that the global rate of COVID-19 infections was 
still increasing, and that the pandemic may well be underreported in 
war-torn and mine-affected countries.
Regarding the German experience, the pandemic has indeed con-
tinued to influence the course of mine action projects. One operator in 
Iraq developed a trial package to implement RE via remote methods. 
The package includes videos with risk education modules uploaded 
on the internet and a methodology to support the risk education ses-
sion through phone calls and sharing on e-materials. Remote QA tools 
were also developed. Several operators reported additional safety mea-
sures including the establishment of COVID-19 standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) that set out stringent hygiene procedures, holding 
meetings in virtual mode, introducing digital signatures to facili-
tate administrative processes, etc. Fortunately, but not necessarily 
expected, no further operations have been discontinued.
Obviously, the pandemic will continue to affect the work of donors 
and the MASG. This will be felt not least in the organization of con-
ferences, like the second regular MASG meeting, which was held 
virtually in October 2020). Here, like in other areas of HMA, we will 
continue to improve our ability to cope better with current and emerg-
ing challenges. 
Finally, because of COVID-19, the world is dealing with significant 
socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic and increased humanitarian 
needs in many regions, which likely will affect some donors’ ability 
to provide new funding. Thus, HMA will face increased competition 
from other humanitarian initiatives. The pandemic will also there-
fore impact the ability of HMA to contribute to the fulfillment of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), at least in the near term.
The authors hope that mine action donors remain committed to 
funding HMA as they have done for the past twenty years. In a broader 
context, a statement by the GICHD and the international NGOs 
summed up the current situation: 
We understand that the COVID-19 pandemic is bringing about 
formidable new challenges both at the level of public health and 
economy resilience, nationally and globally. Against this back-
ground, it is our sincere hope that ways will be found for the mine 
action sector not to be left behind. We are convinced that mine 
action continues to play a key role towards our common goal of a 
world in which human suffering is prevented and mitigated, and no 
one is left behind. 
See endnotes page 64
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OPERATIONALIZED 
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS IN IRAQ’S DMA
By Mark Steyn and Arie Claassens [ iMMAP ]
T
he Republic of Iraq remains severely contaminated with 
explosive ordnance (EO) according to the Landmine and 
Cluster Munition Monitor report 2019.1 Located in southern 
Iraq, the Iraq Directorate of Mine Action’s (DMA) Regional Mine 
Action Center South’s (RMAC-S) area of responsibility contains 
the most contaminated area in Iraq in terms of surface area. The 
region’s hazard areas recorded in the national mine action database 
(IMSMA) stood at 1,592 sq km by mid-July 2020, with the Basra 
Province alone containing 1.27 billion sq m of hazard area.2 This 
contamination predominantly originates from various armed con-
f licts in the region, ranging mostly from the Iran-Iraq War in the 
1980s to the 2003 Iraq War.1 The region has seen relatively little 
conf lict with Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which 
bodes well for regional security but means funding for conventional 
minefield clearance is limited. 
From a natural hazard perspective, the region is exposed to a range 
of natural and human-induced disasters, e.g., droughts, floods, sand-
storms, desertification, and various epidemics. Compounding the 
situation is the country’s poor economic situation, infrastructure, 
and unreliable internet connectivity. In addition to navigating the 
contamination hazards mentioned previously, RMAC-S is tasked 
with prioritizing land release activities based on, inter alia, the socio-
economic status, population vulnerability, and development sec-
tors’ activities that are restricted by the hazardous areas within each 
Figure 1. RMAC-S area of responsibility. 
Figures courtesy of Mark Steyn.
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district. The presence of minefields in the region’s large oil fields, on 
which the government relies heavily, further hampers the effective 
management of mine action resources available to RMAC-S.  
ROLE OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Timely access to relevant information is a key enabler for effective 
decision-making in any organization and even more so when these 
decisions affect lives and livelihoods. Since 2004, iMMAP has sup-
ported and developed the humanitarian mine action (HMA) program’s 
information management (IM) systems, delivered capacity building 
activities and facilitated coordination on IM, planning and prioriti-
zation between the DMA and other HMA actors in Iraq. Balancing 
the access restrictions and security requirements imposed by the gov-
ernment on the national mine action database contents, DMA’s activi-
ties created an array of information products that provided decision 
makers with easier access to data subsets, assisting with data analysis 
and the contextualization of the hazard areas. The previous system 
resulted in delayed responses from fully-taxed personnel when staff 
from RMAC-S operations are met with urgent requests for planning or 
mine action tasks submitted by implementing partners. The shortfalls 
of the national budget contribute to the difficulty of retaining skilled 
national IM staff, complicating the DMA’s operating capacity, and 
further delaying the output of (paper-based) field report submissions 
stemming from the problematic infrastructure.
To overcome the inherent inefficiencies related to complex data 
structures, data formats, resolution, and limited IM staff availability, 
RMAC-S’ management committed to the co-development and subse-
quent use of a common operating picture tool for regional use by the 
RMAC-S operations department. The initial design for the required 
solution focused on
• supplementing IMSMA data with relevant spatial data, includ-
ing mine action tasking data;
• providing tools for the use of offline imagery as a data source;
• conforming system maintenance to the existing operational 
workflows; and
• enabling operations coordinators to conduct mine action plan-
ning and task reviews with stakeholders, without IM staff sup-
port in the majority of activities.
Infrastructure unreliability, specifically electricity availability and 
the quality of internet connectivity, had a major influence on the tech-
nological design criteria of the solution.3 The RMAC-S  IM department 
made the decision to develop a desktop-based, standalone implemen-
tation of the first version of the tool. The remaining primary functional 
and non-functional requirements for the tool centred on
• low cost and low technology adoption;
• powerful functionality but ease of use, i.e., with a low learning 
curve; and
• low maintenance requirements still allowing for easy, periodic 
updates.
In October 2018, the RMAC-S “Field Map” application was rolled 
Figure 2. RMAC-S Field Map user interface.
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out for use by the RMAC-S operations coordinators with a planned 
expansion to the management staff following a six-month trial period. 
The effectiveness of the application, its ease of use, and achievement 
of the remaining functional and non-functional requirements led 
to an accelerated adoption by the RMAC-S operations manager that 
exceeded all expectations, culminating in the mandated use of the 
Field Map application announcement in January 2019.
Authored in the Esri ArcMap application and using the ArcGIS 
Publisher extension ArcMap, the RMAC-S Field Map application is a 
digital spatial data package that enables users to interact with, query, 
measure, markup, and print high-quality maps while maintaining 
data integrity in the Esri ArcReader software. The ArcReader appli-
cation provides users with the ability to view and print maps on the 
Microsoft Windows platform and only requires the Microsoft.Net 
platform to be installed before it is deployed. The software is included 
with ArcGIS Desktop and can also be downloaded for free from 
the Esri website. The decision to utilize a commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) solution, as opposed to the development of a custom applica-
tion, was anchored in the range of functionality already present in the 
application. Moreover, in combination with the desktop GIS software, 
it allows GIS-capable staff to quickly roll out an easy-to-use MIS tool 
with a low learning curve.
The RMAC-S Field Map application currently offers the following high-
resolution thematic spatial datasets for analysis within the application:
• Administrative boundaries
• Hydrological
• IMSMA data subsets in both polygon and point formats
• Infrastructure
• Oil and gas operations
• Points of interest
• Remote sensing 
• Topographic
An additional advantage of the Field Map application is that it 
offers an intuitive user interface consistent with the look and feel of 
many GIS applications, which allow for the transfer of GIS application 
skills to the new application. Inversely, the application also instils the 
required skills in non-GIS staff for basic spatial data interaction and 
operations that can then be transferred to desktop GIS applications.
In a country where HMA data management is extremely impor-
tant and often limits timely access to the required information, the 
RMAC-S Field Map enables staff to have a nearly 360-degree view of 
the primary information needed to make well-informed decisions for 
the benefit of affected communities. This makes it an invaluable asset 
to all RMAC-S staff involved in the management of the land release 
process. The impact of this application in increasing the efficiency of 
service delivery, along with the improved overall situational awareness 
of the RMAC-S operations staff, is best reflected with a review of one 
of the application use cases.
RMAC-S conducts annual planning and review exercises with 
HMA implementing partners and other actors. RMAC-S conducts 
typical sessions of this format over a two-to-three-day period, with the 
IM staff required to be present for the full session to assist with data 
presentation, analysis, and map production. In the second quarter of 
2019, a Ministry of Defense (MoD) official delegation arrived in Basra, 
Iraq, to conduct the annual planning exercise for a scheduled period of 
three days. The RMAC-S operations manager and his team completed 
all the required planning activities with the MoD delegation by the end 
of the first day. The Field Map application not only delivered cost and 
time savings, but improved relations between the stakeholders through 
enhanced communications, as well as fast and easy access to evidence 
needed for informed decision-making. 
Comments from RMAC-S Operations Manager, Haitham Fatah, 
illustrate the success of this operationalized MIS application:
… the application presents us [with] the capability to clarify tech-
nical discussions and decide on the recommended technical pro-
cedure directly in the presence of the beneficiaries and the HMA 
actors working in the area … being able to discuss and agree on the 
technical way forward with a task is also having a positive effect 
on the quality of the various field reports that we receive from 
our HMA partners, the error rate is significantly reduced, and as 
Operations, we see that as a direct result from the use of the Field 
Map application.
In looking toward future utilization of the RMAC-S Field Map 
application, users want a version for mobile devices that supple-
ments the desktop allocation map, leveraging the ArcGIS Enterprise 
platform’s web GIS functionality while providing operations coordi-
nators with field-based tools that minimize paper-based workf lows 
and improve data quality and the speed of business processes. A pro-
totype solution is in the final stages of development and will be field 
tested by the RMAC-S staff and refined for mainstream use by DMA 
in the near future.  
See endnotes page 65
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By Suleiman Nyamwaya and Joel Ndegwa [ iMMAP ]
M
ine action activities in northeast Syria (NES) started in 
early 2017. At the time, there was a clear need for coor-
dination, and members of the NES nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) forum’s implementing programs—including 
Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH)1 promotion, as well as pro-
grams representing Shelter, Cash, Health, and Food—experienced 
tremendous challenges working in a region heavily contaminated by 
ordnance with no information available on their locations and types. 
By the end of 2017, iMMAP filled this gap by providing a coordina-
tion support platform for humanitarian mine action (HMA) actors 
through the use of the Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA). To date, a geographic information system (GIS) 
portal, a Power BI dashboard, and an offline mobile data collection 
tool (MoDAC) are some of the tools used by iMMAP to support HMA 
actors working in NES.
MINE ACTION INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN 
NORTHEAST SYRIA
Through the HMA project, iMMAP provides information man-
agement (IM) support to its partners for the collection, analysis, and 
reporting on mine action data as well as capacity building. The project 
aims to increase the effec-
tiveness and availability 
of an overarching picture 
of HMA activities in the 
region through continued 
coordination and techni-
cal support to stakehold-
ers including NGOs and 
national authorities. Over 
the past three years, the 
online database recorded 
over 100,732 explo-
sive devices that were 
destroyed in the Ar-Raqqa, 
Al-Hassakeh, and Deir-
Ez-Zor provinces of NES.2 
These devices, which claim the lives of civilians and undermine efforts 
toward recovery, include anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines, 
land-based and air-dropped unexploded ordnance (UXO), and impro-
vised explosive devices (IEDs). They continue to be reported in signifi-
cant numbers across the region.
The NES HMA activities continue to see significant challenges due 
to limited demining capacity, a hostile security environment, and the 
absence of a national mine action authority (NMAA) to provide over-
sight and support to humanitarian actors.
Prior to the October 2019 Turkish Operation Peace Spring,3 there 
were six active partners in the Mine Action Sub-Cluster (MASC)4 con-
ducting contamination surveys, risk education (RE), clearance, and 
survivor assistance. The 2019 Turkish Operation Peace Spring and the 
onset of COVID-19 pandemic restrictions have reduced the number of 
international (30) and national (120) NGOs operating in NES in 2020. 
In NES, iMMAP operations provide
• contaminated and cleared area maps
• RE activities and beneficiary mapping
• records of devices encountered (numbers, description and geo-
graphical distribution)
• explosive hazard-related incident records/maps.
 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS USED IN 
NES
The Mobile Data Collection Tool (MoDAC). MoDAC simplifies 
data collection in the most demanding settings by ensuring better 
quality data is gathered quickly and more efficiently than using pen 
and paper, thereby reducing errors. 
MoDAC collects survey data, both online and offline and is com-
patible with Android, iOS, and many other devices. iMMAP devel-
oped the tool to enable mine action partners in Ar-Raqqa to record 
hazardous areas that require clearance services before the return of 
civilians to their homes, schools, and agricultural lands. The tool 
plays an essential role in the identification and effective clearing of 
several homesteads and schools in NES, where most mobile telephone 
towers have been destroyed and internet connectivity is limited or 
non-existent. MoDAC lets users collect data offline to be uploaded at a 
Figure 1. Explosive devices destroyed in Al-
Raqqa, Al-Hassakeh, and Deir-Ez-Zor provinces in 
NES (October 2017–October 2020). 
All graphics courtesy of iMMAP.
Backgroung photo of Al-Raqqa, Syria courtesy of TetraTech.
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later time once an internet connec-
tion becomes available.
Centralized Database for 
Humanitarian Mine Action 
(IMSMA) is used by HMA stake-
holders in NES to map areas that 
have been cleared and those that 
are still contaminated. The tool 
is highly customizable to suit the 
constantly changing IM needs 
(definition of data types, custom-
ization of data collection forms, 
workflow). After data processing 
and quality control, the informa-
tion is used to generate informa-
tion management products shared 
with all HMA partners.
GIS PORTAL AS A WEB PLATFORM FOR DATA 
SHARING
The NES GIS Portal is a full-featured mapping and analytics plat-
form initiated in late 2017 to improve communication and knowledge 
among MASC members, as well as between the MASC and NES NGO 
Forum Working Groups. The portal enables the sharing of interactive 
maps with partners via a 
web interface. It features
• secure storage and 
fast access to maps 
and data,
• optional GIS capa-
bilities for real-time 
imagery and large 
data processing,
• increased capabili-
ties with GIS server 
extensions, and
• enterprise geodata-
base (for geodata storage and management).
The platform is user-restricted due to the sensitive nature of infor-
mation it contains and in accordance with the provisions of the 
memoranda of understanding between iMMAP and MASC mem-
bers. However, the Map Gallery is open to the public. In summary, the 
GIS portal is a one-stop shop for a comprehensive understanding of 
suspected hazardous, cleared, and released areas as well as explosive 
ordnance RE activities. By clicking on a given point of the map, users 
open up a window (see Figure 4) containing useful information about 
that specific area such as province, district, sub-district, city, cleared 
area, organizations working in the area, number of devices destroyed, 
Figure 2. Current UXO and IED contamination and clearance activities in NES.
Figure 3. Sample message from 
MoDAC.
Figure 4. Example of an attribute pop-up 
window.
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Figure 5. Overview of HMA activi-
ties in NES.
Figure 6. Overview of clearance 
and land release activities in NES.
Figure 7. Overview of MRE activi-
ties in NES.
17
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 24.2
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2020
THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION18
Suleiman Nyamwaya
Humanitarian Mine Action Coordinator, Northeast Syria
iMMAP
Suleiman Nyamwaya is iMMAP’s Humani-
tarian Mine Action Coordinator for 
northeast Syria. In this role, he supports 
a coordinated approach to mine action 
operations by managing needs assess-
ment, gap analysis, and prioritization of 
response requirements. He holds a 
Bachelor of Science in civil engineering 
from the Military College of Engineering in Pakistan, and a 
Master of Arts in disaster management from the University of 
Nairobi.
Joel Ndegwa
NES Mine Action Information Management Officer
iMMAP
Joel Ndegwa is the Information Manager 
at iMMAP for the mine action project in 
northeast Syria. He has ten years’ expe-
rience with information management 
systems, both in the private and human-
itarian sectors. He has worked in Kenyan 
telecommunications infrastructure in the 
field of SMS and USSD and also worked 
with UNDP Somalia with implementing a contractor informa-
tion management system for the Somalia program. Ndegwa 
holds a Bachelor of Science in computer science from Moi 
University, Kenya.
number of risk education beneficiaries, etc. Furthermore, a long list of 
operational layers is available on the platform that users can display 
or hide. 
POWER BI DASHBOARD
iMMAP uses a Power BI dashboard to generate reports, share data 
with the organizations working in NES, and integrate seamlessly with 
existing applications. Power BI is a Microsoft cloud-based tool that 
simplifies data processing, analysis, and reporting for end-users.
In the context of NES where no NMAA is present, this dashboard 
enables clearance organizations to view areas of partner activity, thus 
avoiding duplication of efforts and promoting the efficient use of the 
limited available resources.   
iMMAP is an international not-for-profit organization that provides 
information management services to humanitarian and development 
organizations, enabling partners to make informed decisions that ulti-
mately provide high-quality targeted assistance to the world’s most vul-
nerable populations.
See endnotes page 65
Figure 8. Risk education beneficiaries in NES.
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INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION 
STANDARD 10.60
SAFETY & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH – INVESTIGATION 
AND REPORTING OF ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS
NOTES ON THE REVISED SECOND EDITION
By Roly Evans [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
I
n 2019, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) received permission from the International 
Mine Action Standard (IMAS) Review Board (RB) to update IMAS 
10.60, Safety & occupational health – Investigation and reporting of 
accidents and incidents. The first edition of the document, originally 
drafted in October 2001 and last amended in June 2013, included a 
number of areas where significant improvement was possible. In light 
of this, the IMAS RB established a Technical Working Group (TWG) 
in October 2019 to enable nominated representatives to feed into the 
drafting process. The original TWG included representatives from 
MAG, HALO, NPA, ICRC, HI, Afghanistan DMAC, Tetra Tech, CISR, 
PM/WRA, and independent members.1 In time, UNMAS and the mili-
tary representative on the IMAS RB joined the TWG.
The drafting team had a clear vision of how the original IMAS could 
be improved. Firstly, and possibly most importantly, the importance of 
evidence in the investigation process needed to be emphasized. In the 
old version, evidence was only mentioned three times. In the new ver-
sion, it is mentioned eighty-one times. As the new introduction clearly 
states, “an investigation involves the identification, collection, record-
ing and analysis of evidence.”2 Throughout, the document emphasizes 
the need to identify all relevant types of evidence: physical evidence, 
witness statements, and documentary evidence. The linking of factual 
statements to supporting evidence in report writing is also stressed. 
The document states that “investigators should be able to show not 
only that conclusions are strictly aligned with evidence but that all 
relevant evidence has been identified and collected in a competent 
A Technical Field Manager (TFM) from MAG completes his Evidence Log during an assessed site investigation during the GICHD Accident Investigation Course at the 
Regional School for Humanitarian Demining Lebanon (RSHDL) in June 2019. The primacy of evidence in the investigative process is one of the key changes in the new 
IMAS 10.60. 
Image courtesy of Ahmad Doghman.
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manner. Evidence shall be rigorously recorded and secured so that an 
investigation can be subsequently analyzed if required.” Even simple 
mechanisms can help with this process, such as the inclusion of a basic 
evidence log as an annex for the first time and the inclusion of basic 
forensic awareness procedures.
Another key improvement is the simplification of the reporting 
timeline following an incident or accident. The previous IMAS split the 
Initial Report for any incident or accident into two parts. This was con-
fusing, so a change was made to have three clearly separate reports. An 
Immediate Report will be generated in the minutes after an accident by 
the team on site, providing key details for the mobilization of support. 
Then, within twenty-four hours, the organization that experienced an 
accident or incident will produce an Initial Report, providing strictly 
factual information about the accident/incident known to date. Within 
ten days, a Lead Investigator will produce a Detailed Report, ideally 
mandated by an agreed terms of reference (ToR) from the National 
Mine Action Authority (NMAA). The aim of this Detailed Report is to 
provide a comprehensive analysis, rigorously supported by evidence, 
of what happened and why it happened. Another aspect of the timeline 
that was changed was the old stipulation that enabled the “demining 
incident detailed report” (also to be completed in ten days) to “precede 
a formal investigation.” Commencing an external investigation ten 
days after an accident or incident would, in all likelihood, inherently 
undermine such an investigation, since it would have little chance of 
effectively processing evidence from the scene. This is no longer the 
case in the new edition.
The new version also introduces a new system of different inves-
tigation levels. Internal investigations are now termed 1st Party 
Investigations. Those conducted by the NMAA, including Boards of 
Inquiry (BOI), are termed 2nd Party Investigations. Investigations 
completely independent of both the mine action organization in 
question, and the NMAA, are now termed 3rd Party. Ideally, acci-
dents involving either a fatality or serious injury would be subject 
to at least a 2nd or 3rd Party Investigation; however, the IMAS rec-
ognized this is not always practicable. In circumstances where no 
NMAA exists, mine action organizations may find that a 1st Party 
Investigation is the only means of investigation available. In such 
instances, mine action organizations shall fully record the circum-
stances in their internal ToR mandating the investigation. There 
is still scope for mine action organizations to conduct a 1st Party 
Investigation even when an NMAA has initiated a 2nd or 3rd Party 
Investigation. However, the 2nd or 3rd Party Investigation should 
A TFM from MAG records crater measurements in the course of an assessed site investigation during the GICHD Accident Investigation Course at the RSHDL in June 
2019. Post Blast Investigation including crater analysis was not included in this IMAS due to size limitations but could be a candidate for a supporting technical docu-
ment, such as a Technical Note for Mine Action (TNMA) in the future.
Image courtesy of Ahmad Doghman.
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have primary control of any accident site as well as all relevant phys-
ical and documentary evidence. In short, a 1st Party Investigation 
shall not compromise or interfere in any way with any ongoing or 
expected 2nd or 3rd Party Investigation. 
 This IMAS is the first to introduce concepts of causal analysis, albeit 
in a simple, straightforward manner. Causes are initially classified as 
immediate or underlying. Immediate causes tend to be those directly 
linked to the scene of the accident, such as behavior and worksite con-
ditions. Underlying causal analysis tends to look more at management 
and organizational factors. The inclusion of underlying causal analysis 
was one of the key developments in the drafting process. The intent 
is to encourage organizations to look beyond specific actions on site, 
and to focus on organizational and managerial factors that could have 
contributed to the accident or incident. Invariably, the explanations 
are complex and not only found on site or with the conduct of those 
immediately involved. Causal analysis is difficult, since inevitably it 
entails organizations looking closely at themselves and their ways of 
working. Nevertheless, there was significant support from the TWG 
for a greater emphasis on causal analysis; this good practice can now 
hopefully become standardized for all.
The locations of demining and mine accidents and incidents3 are 
usually dangerous places. They are also the locations where most of 
the physical evidence is found. Such locations have to be processed by 
individuals with suitable levels of training and experience. For the first 
time, IMAS 10.60 now lists preferred requirements for those conduct-
ing site investigations. While not listing specific qualifications, inves-
tigation requirements implicitly necessitate experienced and qualified 
personnel. The IMAS recommends specific accident and incident 
investigation training for those who might be called upon to fulfill 
such a task. As yet, there is no set of agreed competencies that such a 
course would potentially teach. It is possible that the development of 
such competencies could be recognized as a natural progression for 
this IMAS in the future.
Another area where the drafting team was particularly keen to see 
progress was the inclusion of Near Miss reporting. The term Near Miss 
refers to an incident that, while not causing harm, has the potential 
to cause injury or ill health. This definition was also added to IMAS 
04.10, Glossary of Terms. It might be described as a form of incident, 
although in this IMAS it is effectively treated as a separate category 
of event. Within other industries such as aviation, Near Miss report-
ing has been systematized for decades. Within mine action, possibly 
due to individuals and organizations being fearful of the consequences 
of admitting Near Misses, such reporting is limited. Some organiza-
tions have made significant efforts in this direction in recent years. For 
example, Tetra Tech has a mobile application that allows staff to elec-
tronically report Near Misses quickly and in a standardized format. 
The system is not abused as a means of undermining the chain of com-
mand and has engendered important internal improvements. Near 
Miss reporting is mandated by a should statement in the new IMAS 
draft; it is not a shall requirement. At present, mine action organiza-
tions and NMAAs are encouraged to set up credible Near Miss report-
ing that does not penalize those who are willing to admit fault. In the 
future, it is hoped that such an approach becomes commonplace.
The TWG also addressed the language used for report writing. 
Individuals can often intend slightly different meanings to adjectives 
that describe a level of confidence in an assertion. For example, what 
is likely for one report writer might just be possible for another. In 
an attempt to at least start addressing this subjective approach, the 
IMAS introduced standard confidence levels. Five levels, with associ-
ated percentages, are suggested by means of a should statement. These 
are Certain (>90%), Likely (75%–90%), Possible (40%–60%), Unlikely 
(10%–25%), and Remote (<10%). The use of such language for indica-
tive probability does not, of course, preclude a subjective approach by 
any report writer. However, it may be seen as a step toward making 
the language used by report writers more objective. A future revision 
of this IMAS might look at the percentage levels so that the complete 
percentage range is covered.
Other new aspects of the IMAS include a short section on cogni-
tive bias. The intent here is to improve awareness among both inves-
tigators and organizations about the universal potential to exhibit 
some form of cognitive bias. A number of organizations already have 
good peer review procedures for their accident and incident report-
ing, including the use of external expertise. It is hoped that, within 
the confines of applicable data protection legislation, and subject to 
suitable non-disclosure agreements, such reviews become increas-
ingly standardized.
A TFM from MAG conducts a fingertip search of a small crater looking for evidence 
in the course of an assessed site investigation during the GICHD Accident Investi-
gation Course at the RSHDL in June 2019.
Image courtesy of Ahmad Doghman.
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While full implementation of the IMAS will take time, the GICHD 
is already mindful of how the document may evolve when it comes to 
potential amendments. For example, greater clarity is possible when 
distinguishing between the should requirement to report Near Misses 
and the shall requirement to report incidents. Some have requested 
revised percentages for the confidence levels used. The format of the 
Detailed Report could be developed further. A number of the TWG 
members are keen for a central repository for accident reporting to be 
mandated by an amended IMAS in the future. If work progresses on 
establishing such a database, it can then be assessed by the IMAS RB. 
As with all desired amendments, the drafting must balance the need 
to make valid changes with the need not to overburden field operators 
with ever-increasing requirements. Hopefully an acceptable balance 
can be found that ensures this IMAS will serve, rather than hinder, 
those who implement it. In any case, it is likely that this IMAS will 
be amended in some way relatively soon. The standard 12–18-month 
review for all new IMAS, recently introduced by the RB, provides the 
ideal opportunity for this, as is intended.
The causal analysis section of the document is already a candidate 
for minor change when the next IMAS amendment is conducted. Lead 
Investigators at present only should be able to conduct causal analysis. In 
the future, this might change into a shall requirement. The factors for both 
immediate and underlying causes could also be revised. For instance, the 
addition of a specific equipment factor would add clarity rather than this 
factor being included within a more general title of “worksite conditions.”
Roly Evans is an Advisor in Land Release 
and Operational Efficiency in the Risk 
Management Division at the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD). He has worked in the 
fields of survey, clearance, EOD, and 
physical security and stockpile manage-
ment in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, 
South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
This article briefly summarizes some of the main changes to IMAS 
10.60. The previous IMAS of 8,504 words became a new one of 13,790. 
This involved not just new material but a thorough revision of the 
existing text. Essentially this is almost an entirely new document. It is 
now one of the longest IMAS in the series. While it represents a sig-
nificant change for the mine action sector, it is a change supported by 
the main industry actors represented on the IMAS RB, with no votes 
against the second edition of the document. This IMAS has already 
been adopted by key operators such as MAG, who have fully updated 
their Accident Investigation standard operating procedures accord-
ingly. The overall aim is for the sector to improve collectively, so that 
we discharge our responsibilities to field staff by learning as much as 
practicable when an adverse event occurs. The drafting team hope that 
this IMAS, at least in part, contributes to achieving that aim.  
See endnotes page 65
Roly Evans
Advisor in Land Release and Operational Efficiency
GICHD
A student takes his final evidence layout images during an assessed task on the GICHD Accident Investigation Course, Thun, Switzerland, August 2020.
Image courtesy of Edison Pineda.
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By Marija Trlin [ Mine Detection Dog Center ], Elise Becker [ Marshall Legacy Institute ], and Nataša Uršič 
[ ITF-Enhancing Human Security ]
M
ine Free Sarajevo is one of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s most 
important land release projects of the last decade. By the 
beginning of 2021, the project aims to clear Sarajevo and 
its surrounding municipalities of Vogošća, East Stari Grad, Stari Grad, 
and Novi Grad of landmines. 
Multiple partners are working together as part of the Mine Free 
Sarajevo project, implementing mine clearance operations, coordi-
nating activities, and promoting the project. ITF Enhancing Human 
Security (ITF) is the prime grantee managing all clearance, media, and 
coordination activities. The Mine Detection Dog Center (MDDC) in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is serving as the project clearance operator, 
deploying manual deminers, equipment, and other key personnel to 
conduct clearance activities. The Marshall Legacy Institute (MLI) is 
serving as project facilitator, providing monitoring and evaluation and 
promoting it through media and public relations activities. The work is 
funded by the United States. 
Mine Free Sarajevo was launched on 4 April 2019 at Sarajevo City 
Hall, where Sarajevo Mayor Abdulah Skaka hosted US Ambassador 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina Eric Nelson, municipality mayors, project 
partners, and representatives of the media to announce the begin-
ning of the field operations. The project is a major step toward freeing 
Bosnia and Herzegovina from its legacy of war and allowing citizens 
to focus on the future. Additionally, the project is significant in that its 
clearance activities cross entity borders and are connecting both the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. 
PROJECT BACKGROUND
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the most mine-contaminated coun-
try in Europe. According to data from the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Mine Action Center (BHMAC), the total size of suspected hazardous 
areas (SHAs) in the country is approximately 1,000 square kilometers 
or 1.97 percent of its total surface area. A general assessment of the 
impact of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO)—including cluster 
munitions—in 129 cities and municipalities in the country identi-
fied that around 1,400 communities are affected by these items. The 
contaminated micro-locations directly affect the safety of more than 
half a million inhabitants, which is around 13 percent of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s total population.1
This hidden danger has very real consequences. Since the end of 
the war, 1,149 people have been injured and 617 people have died as 
a result of mine accidents as of the end of 2019. Many of them were 
deminers—since the start of humanitarian demining operations in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 there have been 133 demining acci-
dents with fifty-three deminers killed and eighty injured through 
the end of 2019. 
Deminer removing a mine sign in Trebevic.
All images courtesy of ITF.
Background photo of Grbavica, a suburb of Sarajevo, in March 1996.
Photo courtesy of Wikipedia.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAND RELEASE IN BOSNIA 
AND HERZEGOVINA
Mine Free Sarajevo utilizes land release, which is widely recognized 
as a cost-effective and safe way to release large SHAs by combining 
technical and non-technical survey and clearance methods. After more 
than two decades since mine action started in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
efforts now focus largely on implementing land release projects. Tarik 
Šerak, who has been a specialist for the BHMAC since 1997 and is cur-
rently the head of the organization’s mine action department, is one of 
the professionals responsible for introducing this method and present-
ing it to the key players in mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Tarik and BHMAC began using land release in 2011, after being 
tasked to find improved and more efficient methods of addressing 
large mine-contaminated areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The pilot 
project was introduced in 2013, when the organization was involved 
in implementing new land release methods as defined by the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).2 Guided 
by the recommendations and the framework provided by International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS),3 BHMAC created national land release 
procedures and standards in cooperation with GICHD specialists.  
BHMAC officially adopted three chapters of the national mine 
action standards that are harmonized with the IMAS, and later 
added two more chapters of standard operating procedures address-
ing non-technical survey and monitoring as well as quality control 
of land-release tasks. The process of creating national standards is 
ongoing, as they are being revised and updated with new informa-
tion and experiences. Gradually, the country’s government and non-
governmental organizations have started working according to the 
newly adopted methods.
The concept of land release is focused on starting with confirmed 
hazardous areas (CHAs) and expanding the search until there is no 
longer evidence of mine contamination.2 Ideally, land release proj-
ect areas should have a minimum size of two million square meters 
because the concept is to connect all the remaining and relatively small 
pieces of SHAs into one larger area that can then be released by tech-
nical and non-technical methods to communities for their safe use. 
The advantage of this method is that the majority of SHAs are treated 
by non-technical methods, additional analysis, and data collection in 
the field, while the technical methods are used only for CHAs. The 
situation in the field varies from one case to another in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. BHMAC usually calculates up to 8 percent of the total 
size of the land release project to be treated with technical methods, 
because only 2–3 percent of the territory in land release projects is 
typically contaminated with mines and UXO. All of these are recom-
mendations provided in the operational plan. However, any additional 
data obtained are analyzed jointly by BHMAC and MDDC, and are 
taken into account in order to achieve the goal of land release. All 
of these are recommendations from the operational plan. Demining 
teams first start with a targeted investigation of locations and then pro-
ceed with a systematic investigation until there is no longer evidence or 
information of potential danger. IMAS defines targeted investigation 
as “the investigation during technical survey of certain areas within a 
SHA/CHA that are more likely to contain mines/ERW.” IMAS further 
defines a systematic investigation as “a systematic process of applying 
technical survey in a SHA/CHA. It is typically used where there are 
no areas within the SHA/CHA that are more likely to contain mines/
ERW, than others.”4 
The final step in each land release project is a jointly signed dec-
laration, in which all parties, including the municipality as the final 
user, accept that all efforts have been made and the area is safe to be 
released to the community. The communication between the imple-
menting organization (MDDC), the national authority (BHMAC), and 
the mine-affected community is especially important in land release. 
The community, as the final user of the land, needs to be confident that 
the project was successfully completed, and that the area is safe for use.
LAND RELEASE AND THE MINE FREE SARAJEVO 
PROJECT
The Mine Free Sarajevo project consists of several land release tasks, 
which include SHAs and CHAs in four municipalities in the Sarajevo 
region. Some municipalities have one, while others have two or even 
three land release projects to implement in order to make them mine-
free. Field operations started in the Municipality of Stari Grad in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the project will be com-
pleted when the Municipality of Vogošća, also in the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, is cleared.
Created by BHMAC, each land release project has its own opera-
tional plan, which consists of a set of detailed documents issued to 
Deminer in a search lane.
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I was born and raised in Sarajevo, and to me this project means 
a lot. Sarajevo is a city with many different cultures and nationali-
ties. When the project is fully completed, and the goal of Sarajevo 
Free of Mines finally becomes a reality, we will be able to live and 
move without the fear of being injured by mines, live together and 
leave the past behind us. I am a mine survivor and I live [a] life 
with disability due to mines. I would be the happiest person if my 
country one day becomes free of mines.
~ Selma Gušo, mine survivor, MLI Survivors’ Assistant Award 
recipient for her work empowering fellow women survivors.
When Vogošća becomes a mine-free community, numerous devel-
opment opportunities will open up, ranging from a boosted economy 
in the old industrial zone to tourism in the rural areas. Opportunities 
for housing construction are also opening up, as well as the construc-
tion of local roads, which are a precondition for any further develop-
ment. In communities that have been directly endangered, the safety 
and possibility of using and enjoying locations that were previously 
inaccessible is slowly but surely returning. 
Mayor Edin Smajić emphasizes the 
importance of clearing SHAs, noting 
that residents, farmers, hikers, cyclists, 
and others have repeatedly encoun-
tered risky areas in their daily activi-
ties and have had to organize their 
lives and pursuits with this threat in 
mind. All of this was a particular bur-
den for the protection and rescue 
organizations, given that the danger of 
mine incidents was present for over two decades. The mayor also 
emphasized development projects that were stalled due to contamina-
tion in Vogošća.
MDDC as the field implementing partner. These operational plans are 
working documents that contain maps and photos, available mine-
field records, points of entry for the demining teams, interviews with 
informants, and other important technical details and requirements. 
MDDC as an organization implementing field activities needs to take 
into consideration all relevant information, including interviewing 
reliable informants, and perform technical survey of the designated 
area and clearance activities. The end result is an entire area released 
for safe and productive use.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF VOGOŠĆA IN THE 
FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Of the four municipalities covered by Mine Free Sarajevo, Vogošća 
is among the most mine-affected. The mayor of Vogošća, Edin Smajić, 
is committed to the goal of making his municipality mine-free. The 
commitment and involvement of local authorities, as well as the coop-
eration with all stakeholders involved in the demining process, is 
extremely important for its success. The mine situation in the Vogošća 
area can be characterized as complex. During the war, Vogošća found 
itself on two confrontation lines running through settlements and the 
industrial complex, lines that also moved closer to the neighboring 
Municipality of Ilijaš and left behind significant contamination. 
After the war, a large number of inhabitants of the municipality 
lived in constant danger posed by mines. From 1996 to 2019, as many 
as seventy-five demining projects were completed in the municipal-
ity, clearing a total area of 1,663,864 square meters through technical 
survey and other methods. The Mine Free Sarajevo project, along with 
another US-funded project, Land Release Project Kremeš, will allow 
for an additional release of 5,767,165 square meters of land. These 
numbers illustrate how demining operations have accelerated via new 
approaches to releasing SHAs. 
Map courtesy of Google Earth.
Mayor Edin Smajić.
25
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 24.2
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2020
THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION26
The Mine Free Sarajevo project is something that has really 
facilitated and accelerated all of our efforts so far and we have 
finally seen the end—or the crown—of all of our demining activi-
ties: Vogošća free of mines as part of the entire project. Something 
that certainly makes everyone proud, especially me as the Mayor, 
is the final return and putting into operation of the former SHAs. 
The development of our local community continues. I express my 
sincere gratitude to the donor in the realization of this project—the 
United States of America.
~ Edin Smajić, Mayor of Vogošća
THE MUNICIPALITY OF EAST STARI GRAD IN 
REPUBLIKA SRPSKA
The mayor of East Stari Grad, Bojo Gašanović, also takes pride in this 
project, noting that it is a highlight of his years-long mandate in office. 
East Stari Grad spreads along the longest borderline between the two 
entities making up Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. Since 1996, there have been 
twenty different demining tasks completed in this municipality, releas-
ing a total of 500,000 sq m of land. The Mine Free Sarajevo project will 
now release an additional 500,000 square meters of SHA in this munici-
pality, making it completely mine free. 
Currently, many roads in East Stari Grad still travel through the 
SHAs, and the surrounding households are “trapped” between mine-
fields. The municipality also has important development projects that 
were stopped due to mine contamination, especially industrial and 
tourist projects. Resorts and other tourist attractions cannot operate 
without first resolving the hazard of ERW, including on and around 
Trebević Mountain; however, part of the mountain remains contami-
nated with mines. 
Soon, Trebević Mountain and the rest of East Stari Grad will be 
cleared, and the mine warning signs removed, no longer diminishing 
the natural beauty of the mountain or causing fear and anxiety among 
visitors. Mayor Gašanović is proud to be part of this positive success 
story and happy to finally be able to say to local residents that they will 
soon be able to live safely. 
When I heard about the Mine Free Sarajevo project initiative 
and the implementation of land release projects in four municipali-
ties, I felt true happiness. The city I love and live in will finally be 
safe. Our mountains will be safe and I love these mountains. I am 
grateful…to everyone involved in this project.
~ Mirsad Mirojević, mine survivor, Director of the Sitting 
Volleyball Club Fantomi in Sarajevo
CONCLUSION
Vogošća and East Stari Grad are just two municipalities that will be 
mine-free by the end of the Mine Free Sarajevo project. The comple-
tion of this project will further spur interest in clearance and land 
release activities focused on making all of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
mine-free. Therefore, the project has even more far-reaching conse-
quences: the productive use of once-contaminated land and social and 
economic development. However, above all else, the project will allow 
its residents to live safely. The impact of humanitarian mine action in 
the country is truly enormous. 
See endnotes page 65
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WEAPONS MARKING AND 
REGISTRATION IN 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: 
A MODEL FOR A REGIONAL APPROACH TO 
SALW LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT IN THE 
WESTERN BALKANS
By Mike Newton [ The HALO Trust ]
T
he dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the subsequent Balkan Wars of the 1990s left 
large quantities of weapons and ammunition in poorly man-
aged stockpiles and in the hands of state actors, non-state actors, and 
civilians. The widespread proliferation of small arms and light weap-
ons (SALW) across the Western Balkans has led to a widely acknowl-
edged problem concerning the diversion of weapons from police and 
military stockpiles for illicit use in Europe and elsewhere. The diver-
sion of SALW due to poor physical security and stockpile manage-
ment (PSSM) practices is a driver of armed violence, criminality, and 
stunted economic growth.
Following a national regulatory assessment with Small Arms 
Survey (“the Survey”) in 2017, The HALO Trust (HALO) has worked 
with the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) and the 
European Force in Bosnia (EUFOR) to professionally mark and regis-
ter a state military stockpile of approximately 63,000 assorted SALW 
of over 280 different types. The project comprises a three-way partner-
ship between HALO, the AFBiH, and the UK-based company Pryor 
Marking Technology. However, the backbone of this unique project is 
not the marking process per se but the highly comprehensive database 
and record-keeping system, produced through research and the cata-
loging of the AFBiH SALW inventory.
With Bosnia and Herzegovina as a case study, this article discusses 
HALO’s needs-based approach in establishing the AFBiH Weapons 
Marking and Registration project, a first of its kind in the Western 
Balkans. It analyzes how the project’s success can be emulated in other 
countries across the region to bring about a sustainable solution to the 
problem of illicit SALW proliferation and diversion through technical 
expertise, collaboration, and national ownership. 
A REGIONAL APPROACH TO SALW MARKING AND 
REGISTRATION
HALO developed its project in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
enhance the implementation of both politically- and legally- 
binding regional and international frameworks relating to the mark-
ing and registration of SALW. At the international level, HALO’s 
work supports the UN Firearms Protocol, the UN Programme of 
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA), and the 
European Firearms Directive. In addition, the project directly relates 
to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically SDG 
16 and its targets and relevant indicators 16.1, “significantly reduce 
all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere,” and 16.4, 
“by 2030, significantly reduce illicit/arms f lows.”1
At the national level, HALO’s work in Bosnia and Herzegovina falls 
within the country’s normative and political framework on arms con-
trol, including the EUFOR-coordinated “Ammunition, Weapons, and 
Explosives (AWE) Master Plan”2 and the government’s SALW Control 
Strategy (2016–2020).3 But how does this fit into the regional plan?  
This project directly contributes to the Franco-German Initiative 
for the Western Balkans and the regional “Roadmap for a sustainable 
solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons (SALW) and their ammunition in the Western 
Balkans by 2024,”4 coordinated by the South Eastern and Eastern 
Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SEESAC). The Franco-German Roadmap stipulates seven 
goals, the majority of which are to be met by 2024.5 They relate to sub-
stantially reducing the supply, flow, and numbers of illicit SALW in the 
region while reducing the risk of proliferation and diversion. 
The Roadmap is concerned with the illicit use and diversion of fire-
arms from both civilian and police possession and the strengthening 
of state institutions to address and handle the problem at the legislative 
and policy levels. A key example of a shortcoming the HALO proj-
ect can address is the inconsistencies in the marking and registration 
of weapons seized and confiscated by police. The BiH Marking Law 
“does not require that weapons are marked at the time of their seizure 
or confiscation,” nor does it state categorically that weapons already 
in police and military ownership must be marked.6 As a result, good 
record keeping and tracking of these weapons is difficult. Strong insti-
tutions and faith in them is a key component of making the project a 
success, but there must be demonstrable, tangible outputs. The AFBiH 
project is a steppingstone to achieving buy-in from stakeholders and 
Background photo: Marking weapons in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Photo courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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donors, and with the right support, can supplement human security 
and development efforts across the region.
A SYSTEM TAILORED TO STAKEHOLDER NEEDS
The marking and registration of weapons is “an essential prerequi-
site for limiting the diversion and illicit proliferation of SALW.”7 In 
order to develop a system that addresses diversion, a tracing element 
must be present through a registration and record-keeping function, 
making a weapon traceable through its entire life cycle. This function 
requires the development of a database so that the stockpile owner can 
establish and maintain a reliable inventory of weapons. This marking 
and registration system enables the tracing of weapons back to the 
point at which they were diverted from their stockpile.
HALO and the Survey established specific parameters for the AFBiH 
system during the preparatory phase of the project in 2017 through 
comparative analysis of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Marking Law 
and other relevant BiH legislation, with technical guidelines includ-
ing the now defunct International Small Arms Control Standards 
(ISACS) and, since then, the more recent Modular Small Arms Control 
Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC). Equally, HALO and the 
Survey measured the technical requirements for the record keeping 
components of the project against the relevant national and interna-
tional frameworks, including the International Tracing Instrument 
(ITI). 
Identifying the specific stakeholder requirements was essential in 
developing the bespoke system prior to any marking taking place. 
The Bosnian Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Relations (MoFTER), the AFBiH, Ministry of Security, and 
EUFOR participated in the preparatory phase. HALO held over thirty 
meetings and workshops with representatives from each of the stake-
holder groups, ensuring collective agreement on each key aspect of 
the database. Based on this assessment, 
HALO and Pryor developed a flexible, 
tailor-made data-capture solution. This 
ensured that the physical marking pro-
cess and the database met the needs of 
the national stakeholders, both in the 
immediate and longer term. 
A SUSTAINABLE SOLUTION 
THROUGH COLLABORATION 
As per the aforementioned frame-
work assessment, HALO, the Survey, 
and EUFOR determined that the system 
needed several key characteristics to 
make it sustainable, effective, and in-line 
with international standards such as the 
MOSAIC relating to the particular mark-
ing standards and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, the ITI with regard to record 
keeping and data management.
Inventory and weapons catalogue. 
Pryor and HALO built the database and 
record-keeping system from the ground up to allow for the input of 
large amounts of non-marking data in order to assist the AFBiH with 
broader inventory management. The database enables the AFBiH to 
include qualitative information on SALW life-cycle aspects such as the 
serviceability and condition of items. It also allows for the uploading 
of images of weapons, enabling the armed forces to develop a compre-
hensive weapons catalogue. 
The catalogue upon which the database was built can be used to aid 
in the establishment of similar projects in other Balkan countries. This 
would reduce both start-up costs and the time required to establish a 
workable database in line with stakeholder wishes, ensuring that phys-
ical marking and registration can begin quickly. External monitoring 
and evaluation also allows for lessons learned to be implemented for 
future projects, increasing efficiency and effectiveness.
Security. Ensuring system and data integrity is paramount to 
developing any data management system. Two issues arose and were 
addressed during the creation of the database: (1) the establishment of 
different authorization levels for users, both across the armed forces 
and at the ministerial level, and (2) the need to record individual user 
actions, allowing for tracking patterns of behavior by a specific user. 
The integrity of the marking and registering process was engineered 
to reduce the margin for error as much as possible. Thanks to the com-
prehensive weapons catalogue that forms the backbone of the database, 
a supervised operator can select from several preset, drop-down fields 
with selectable options pertinent to a particular weapon. For example, 
if the operator selects a specific weapon, the selectable caliber option 
will be limited to that particular weapon. Every factory serial field must 
be manually filled in twice, and the system does not allow fields to be 
copied and pasted, eliminating as much human error as possible from 
the marking process. Furthermore, every entry into the system and 
every edit is recorded.8 Any deleted entries can be recovered thereby 
Team Coordinator (TC) Renata carrying out quality control on a marked M16 as AFBiH staff look on.
All images courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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safeguarding against any errors, accidental or intentional. 
The database is run through Pryor’s bespoke software and is 
connected directly with the marking machine and its control unit 
through USB. Once the database issues a number and the opera-
tor has filled in all required drop-down fields, the marking happens 
immediately. The identifying marks applicable to that weapon can-
not thereafter be duplicated or changed. Efforts to erase marks will 
only serve to potentially damage the weapon because the marking 
trace, when the mark has been stamped into the weapon, can be seen 
under x-ray and retrieved. 
In partnership with EUFOR, HALO conducted complementary 
training on weapons serviceability and storage management, which 
will enhance the physical security of the AFBiH stockpile. In addition 
to marking the weapons themselves and their corresponding regis-
tration, the system allows for greater ease of stockpile management 
through the use of barcodes and data matrices. The chore of stock- 
taking can be relatively painless when marked and registered weapons 
are stored in sealed containers labelled with a complex mark that can 
be quickly and easily scanned, providing an operator with informa-
tion instantaneously.
Accessibility. The system permits specific users to have different 
authorization levels, from the unit level up to the relevant ministries. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the system is configured such that a basic read 
and print function is available to those within the military concerned 
with unit-level logistics and PSSM. At a higher level, a write function 
allows select users to add information for record-keeping purposes 
without amending the marking data, enabling these users to request 
a movement of weapons from one location to another. The Chief and 
Deputy Chiefs of the Joint Staff hold the highest level of access along-
side representatives from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Relations, 
who are able to authorize such a move, 
or in other circumstances, export, write 
off, or destroy weapons. Every deci-
sion is recorded within the system and 
is fully traceable, ensuring transpar-
ency in the handling and movement 
of SALW, and accountability for those 
authorizing such actions.
Pryor, HALO, EUFOR, and the 
AFBiH are currently looking at what the 
final infrastructure of the system will 
look like and have not yet confirmed 
exactly which representatives from 
which ministries will have the high-
est level of access. However, once the 
marking and registration component of 
the project is complete, the information 
held on separate registries at the mark-
ing locations will need to be merged 
onto a single database operating on a 
cloud-based system from a centrally 
managed server. This will allow live 
viewing and access along with real-time tracking and record keeping. 
The beneficiary government should choose the structure of the final 
system once variables such as connectivity, broader information tech-
nology infrastructure, and the routine  availability of electricity are 
taken into consideration. 
Sustainability. Pryor provided training for HALO personnel and 
those working as team coordinators who oversee and manage the daily 
marking and registration. In turn, the AFBiH marking teams who 
carry out the technical inventory as well as the marking and registra-
tion itself are trained using the “train-the-trainer” approach. This is 
done through previously trained AFBiH personnel who conduct the 
training for new marking team members with assistance from HALO 
and EUFOR staff. 
Project sustainability is often determined by levels of funding. While 
marking team coordinators are HALO staff and funded through bilat-
eral grants, members of the AFBiH comprise the marking teams. It 
should be noted that the system itself is not reliant on funding but does 
require personnel with a working knowledge to maintain it. So long as 
there remains a commitment to fund trained personnel, this life-cycle 
management system is sustainable. To that end, once the marking of 
the AFBiH stockpile is completed, HALO will continue to engage with 
stakeholders to help ensure a smooth transition to full-state ownership 
of the system.
Crucial to the sustainability of such a system is consideration of 
the gendered effects relating to diverted and illicit firearms. While 
this subject itself is beyond the scope of this article, any SALW life-
cycle management projects should observe gender as a key consider-
ation. MOSAIC 06.10 states that “ensuring that gender is adequately 
integrated into all stages of a small arms control initiative is essen-
tial to assuring its overall quality.”9 Of the four team coordinators 
TCs Samir and Renata checking the depth of marks on an M16.
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employed by HALO in Bosnia and Herzegovina, two are women and 
two are men. As men comprise the majority of the AFBiH marking 
teams, HALO and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) will carry out a joint project once COVID-19 
restrictions permit that aims to raise awareness of the gender-based 
dynamics within the AFBiH teams. A gendered, regional approach to 
SALW programming in the Balkans would benefit not only national 
stakeholders but would also drive positive and progressive develop-
ment throughout the region.
Integration and data sharing. As the building blocks of the data-
base software are Microsoft development tools and backend database 
platforms, not only does this mean the system has been developed 
using trusted and robust tools, it also offers flexibility and opportunity 
for an intuitive information exchange should future integration with 
other national, regional, or international information management 
and sharing systems be required. However, it is of the utmost impor-
tance to recognize the sovereignty of each beneficiary government as 
well as the political and cultural sensitivities prevalent throughout the 
Western Balkans. As such, the ITI states that “the choice for record 
keeping is a national prerogative.”10
While there might be the temptation for stakeholders to shy away 
from acknowledging potential shortcomings in their SALW man-
agement systems, the prevention of diversion and the upholding of a 
sustainable marking and registration system requires an understand-
ing of the problem, the means to address it, and the willingness to be 
transparent. Transparency is as much a political issue as it is a techni-
cal one, and the introduction of new processes often need to be accom-
panied with a positive shift in organizational culture in order to allow 
that process to succeed. There might be a hesitation to engage in data 
sharing due to a perceived lack of benefit either in the material sense 
or because there can be a tendency to view relationships as zero-sum. 
The utility of integrated registries across the Western Balkans is not 
a new idea. In 2016, a feasibility study stated that “failing to take action 
now on the subject of linking SALW registries will miss a significant 
opportunity to capitalize on the regional enthusiasm for collabora-
tive working.”11 As the database and the information contained within 
belongs to the beneficiary government, the approval of the exchange 
of information would need to be unanimous. The fact remains that 
increased transparency and an integrated regional approach to data 
management are essential to its success.
FUTURE CHALLENGES
Currently, HALO in Bosnia and Herzegovina has marked and reg-
istered 95 percent of the military stockpile. The project is on track for 
completion by the end of 2020. However, there needs to be an under-
standing from stakeholders and implementing partners alike that the 
challenges of successfully maintaining these systems begins at the 
point of project completion. For all the effort that has gone into sup-
porting the implementation of a highly workable system, the measure 
of success will be in its sustainability.
Where possible, HALO looked to similar projects in an effort to 
learn from their successes and challenges. The sharing of knowledge 
and practices across the SALW sub-sector of PSSM, for example, is 
not yet systematically practiced. In the Balkans, this is in part due to 
underdeveloped stakeholder relationships and a poor understanding 
of what different partners could achieve and at what cost. National and 
regional projects could therefore be targeted more effectively. 
In pursuing a regional solution, there is a risk of implementers, 
whether they be non-governmental or inter-governmental entities, 
pursuing interventions that are too narrowly focused in scope to have 
any real impact or too shallow so as to merely pay lip-service to the 
tenets laid out in the Franco-German Roadmap. In the AFBiH project, 
HALO has identified a cost-effective and tangible solution, which has 
the potential to scale across the region. 
CONCLUSION
A regional approach in the establishment of sustainable and gender-
sensitive marking and registration programs is an essential component 
of an effective life-cycle management program necessary to achieve a 
successful, long-term solution to the problems associated with diverted 
and illicit SALW in the Western Balkans. Although each constituent 
nation will have its own requirements to which such a project can be 
tailored, the principles that have ensured the success of the AFBiH 
project in Bosnia and Herzegovina can and should be applied to SALW 
interventions throughout the region. The sustainability of such proj-
ects rests on three factors: the political will to see them implemented to 
completion, funding, and the provision of continued support by capa-
ble implementers. With that in mind, the future holds opportunities as 
well as challenges. Donors are increasingly looking for tangible results 
in the Western Balkans and the well-coordinated partnership between 
the private, military, and humanitarian sectors in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina provides a model to support and emulate.  
See endnotes page 65
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IMPROVING SECURITY IN THE 
DRC THROUGH WEAPONS AND 
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
By Beamie-Moses Seiwoh, Aurelie Fabry, Grégoire de Nantes, and Edison Pineda [ UNMAS DRC ]
S
ince its independence in 1960, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) has undergone significant political turmoil. The 
resurgence of armed conflict since 1996 has displaced thou-
sands across the country and resulted in proliferation and misuse 
of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), which remains a serious 
concern. The diversion of SA/LW and ammunition from state-owned 
stockpiles is linked to poor or insufficient weapons and ammuni-
tion management (WAM) capacity, practices, and procedures, and 
has been identified as a major cause of illicit arms and ammunition 
proliferation in the DRC.1 The trafficking, accumulation, and mis-
use of SA/LW and related ammunition pose a systemic and pervasive 
threat to peacebuilding and hampers long-term socioeconomic devel-
opment.2 Installation of weapon storage solutions as well as the provi-
sion of WAM training, as implemented by the United Nations Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS), is helping to improve the security situation 
in the DRC. Moreover, these activities support the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) mandate 
to establish a protective environment for civilians in conflict-affected 
areas. Additionally, it is in alignment with the National Action Plan for 
Control of SA/LW in the DRC 2018-2022 (NAP 18-22), implemented 
by the National Commission for the Control of SA/LW and Reduction 
of Armed Violence (CNC-ALPC).
In 2018, the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes 
Region aimed to establish the nexus between fragility3 situations and 
the illicit proliferation of SA/LW in the DRC, and examine how this 
correlation has impacted on livelihoods and human development. This 
assessment attributed the proliferation of SA/LW to the protracted 
armed conflict and violence that led to the formation of militia groups, 
weak border controls, and the porosity of national and territorial bor-
ders. A study carried out in Eastern DRC in 2010 (where approximately 
300,000 illicit firearms were in circulation at the time) by the Groupe 
de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la sécurité (GRIP),4 con-
cluded that SA/LW are key drivers and enablers of conflict. In a 2018 
study, Small Arms Survey (SAS) estimated that 945,784 unregistered 
firearms were in circulation throughout DRC in 2017.5 These wide-
reaching problems contribute to an insecure environment (including 
food insecurity in the most rural areas) with an elevated rate of armed 
violence; displacement of populations as a result of internal conflicts, 
namely territorial conflicts (among pastoralist communities); and 
armed conflict in neighboring countries, creating significant chal-
lenges for the host6 communities’ populations and authorities. 
In an effort to combat the threat of SA/LW proliferation, the DRC 
has committed to regional and international instruments such as the 
Kinshasa Convention,7 the Nairobi Protocol,8 the UN Programme of 
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (PoA),9 and the Arms 
Trade Treaty (ATT).10 The DRC works with partners, including the 
MONUSCO and UNMAS, to strengthen its national SA/LW frame-
work through WAM. 
Weapons secured by the Congolese National Police in safes provided by UNMAS 
at a sub-commissariat in Karisimbi, Goma. 
All images courtesy of Katrin Stauffer, external M&E Specialist provided to UNMAS DRC 
by the Swiss Armed Forces, 2019.
Background image courtesy of  Katrin Stauffer.
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In line with international standards, UNMAS in DRC supports the 
reinforcement and enhancement of national security actors’ capacity 
for effective WAM in support of the government’s effort to limit and 
control the circulation of SA/LW and associated ammunition in close 
cooperation with the CNC-ALPC.11 Additionally, UNMAS assists in 
• improving the security protocols relating to state-held weapons 
through the assessment of Congolese National Police (PNC) 
commissariats and sub-commissariats;
• installation of weapons storage solutions;
• marking of weapons;
• training designed to safeguard and manage the SA/LW and 
ammunition of the national security and defense forces, namely 
the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(FARDC) and the PNC; and
• destroying surrendered weapons, in support of national disar-
mament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. 
RECENT INITIATIVES 
Between July 2018 and May 2020, UNMAS worked to reduce the 
proliferation, trafficking, accumulation, and misuse of SA/LW and 
ammunition in Tanganyika, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri prov-
inces. Going forward, UNMAS is committed to further developing 
an SA/LW incident database to gather information on how the con-
struction and installation of armories, weapon safes, containerized 
commissariats (i.e., containers that have been converted into police 
stations for the PNC with secure weapons storage capability), and the 
relevant WAM trainings contribute to an overall improvement of the 
security situation in the DRC. 
The changing deployment strategies of the national security 
forces—based on ongoing conflicts—is a challenge that is likely to 
persist in the future. With the installation of weapon safes and com-
missariats, UNMAS actively seeks to address these circumstances and 
responds with “protection through projection,” a flexible and compre-
hensive MONUSCO approach combined with increased mobility and 
a proactive posture facilitating both police and military interventions. 
An external evaluation12 conducted in 2019 on UNMAS DRC SA/LW 
activities highlighted that containerized commissariats have a direct 
impact on the security situation, as they increase physical presence on 
site and improve the mobility and agility of the PNC. By expanding 
MONUSCO early warning systems that can detect emerging violent 
hotspots, UNMAS provides police with the ability to leverage their 
increased physical presence and mobility to intervene quickly and 
quell rising tensions before they escalate, providing physical protec-
tion to civilians.
Assessing needs for storage solutions. UNMAS conducted weapon 
storage needs assessments for the PNC and FARDC in the provinces 
of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, and Haut-Katanga. As a result, 230 
locations were furnished with 975 rifle safes, 202 pistol safes, thir-
teen containers for sub-commissariats, and seven armory containers 
enabling the safe storage of over 17,000 weapons. 
Ensuring national sustainability of WAM storage facilities. 
UNMAS developed and delivered a training package on safe and effec-
tive WAM to 1,164 armorers and ammunition storekeepers, including 
forty-three women, from national security and defense institutions.
Marking and registration. Following UNMAS training, and 
under the leadership of the CNC-ALPC, FARDC and PNC teams have 
marked and registered over 18,00013 state-held weapons in Ituri and 
Tanganyika provinces as of November 2020. MONUSCO is coordi-
nating efforts with the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in 
the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/
Marking and numbering of Congolese National Police weapons at sub-commissariat in Karisimbi, Goma.
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WRA) to support the CNC-ALPC. These efforts directly contributed 
toward the NAP 18-22 objective’s deadline of 2022.
LESSONS LEARNED 
Knowledge Management. After adopting the Nairobi Declaration 
Protocol in 2004, DRC conducted surveys in order to design the NAP 
18-22 for SA/LW. These surveys were neither renewed nor consistently 
reviewed. As a result, it was difficult to quantify the impact of the poli-
cies and programs implemented over the past decade. Moreover, these 
surveys were outdated and unable to fully reflect the nature, extent, and 
challenges created by SA/LW proliferation. Therefore, to support the 
DRC in further strengthening its WAM framework, the CNC-APLC, 
the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 
and UNMAS organized a national consultative process to conduct a 
baseline assessment14 of national WAM institutions and methods in 
the DRC, which was instituted and completed in 2016.
Strengthened national institutions. The CNC-ALPC’s dependency 
on external donors reduces its operational capacities, and the low 
political backing of other governmental institutions limits its capac-
ity to leverage the international assistance necessary to achieve their 
goals. Thus, any attempt to support the DRC in clearly defining base-
lines and targets for a roadmap on the implementation of the NAP 
18-22 should be closely coordinated with CNC-ALPC to better assess 
their needs and strengthen their ability to design programs and moni-
toring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms.
DRC’s commitment and ownership. The CNC-ALPC plays a pro-
active and constructive role in coordinating the M&E working group 
to implement NAP 18-22 for SA/LW control activities, which aim to 
prevent, combat, and eradicate illicit proliferation, 
trafficking, accumulation, and misuse of SA/LW and 
ammunition. 
Increased coordination. While the effects of 
uncontrolled SA/LW proliferation vary between 
provinces, there are regionally interconnected dimen-
sions. The initiatives advanced by the NAP 18-22 M&E 
working group or by the local/international counter-
parts, while helping to respond to isolated incidents 
often fall short of addressing the common regional 
needs. Increased coordination among NAP 18-22 key 
stakeholders and M&E working groups would ensure 
that efforts are consistent with the needs and priori-
ties set out by the national authority.
FORWARD LOOKING FOR UNMAS 
Collaborating with relevant partners and the 
broader peacebuilding process. UNMAS empha-
sizes cooperation, particularly with regard to joint 
data collection, which facilitates better cross-sectoral 
monitoring. UNMAS also identifies strategic areas 
for collaboration, focusing on volatile environments 
such as Beni Territory. This increases human security 
where needed most but also facilitates comprehen-
sive data collection and lessons learned with regard 
to the impact of joint activities by conducting small-scale, high-impact 
case studies. 
Maximizing the cost-benefit ratio to safeguard solutions. In addi-
tion to weapon safes and container commissariats, which are flexible 
and cost-effective solutions, still simpler solutions like weapon racks 
are to be promoted as they are even more adaptable to the chang-
ing deployment plans of the national security forces. UNMAS seeks 
cost-effective methods to deliver weapon storage containers to allow 
an increase in the physical presence of security staff, which leads to 
reduced criminality and violence. 
Long-term management strategies for installations. UNMAS 
relinquishes ownership of storage facilities once they are operational. 
Nevertheless, case studies15 and recent SA/LW impact evaluations 
show that the long-term management of installations—including 
maintenance, repair, and resupply of spare parts—could be drasti-
cally improved by the national security forces responsible for these 
facilities. The M&E consultant provided by the Swiss Armed Forces to 
evaluate SA/LW storage facilities recommended that UNMAS provide 
increased support to ensure facilities remain in good working order. 
Aside from discussions with national security forces on how to best 
manage and maintain the installations, UNMAS can make a difference 
by conducting systematic follow-up inspections after installations are 
in place. By detecting misuse or inadequate upkeep of physical security 
measures early, UNMAS can better identify additional required train-
ing and is currently reinforcing its partnership with United Nations 
Police to implement such inspections.
Reconsidering WAM training strategies and providing WAM 
materials. The frequent turnover of WAM-trained personnel—due 
Non-functional weapons collected and prepared for destruction by Police Nationale 
Congolaise at the sub-commissariat in Karisimbi, Goma.
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to the changing deployment plans of national security forces—is an 
ongoing challenge. UNMAS intends to implement a more integrated 
approach including developing self-study materials and WAM tem-
plates such as registration and inventory books, and weapon security 
or identification booklets. Through detailed needs assessments, this 
will require the PNC and FARDC to better coordinate the training 
needs and deployment plans of trained personnel to ensure at least two 
WAM trained personnel are deployed in a commissariat or FARDC 
facility. To address relevant requests for additional booklets, UNMAS 
aims to provide laminated and resistant posters for all duty stations. 
In December 2020, UNMAS will also develop self-learning material 
to national security forces to fill the gap until those National Security 
Forces receive proper WAM training or in case of rotation, in areas 
where weapon storage solutions are in place. 
CONCLUSION 
With the inclusion of SDGs 1 and 1616 in the 2030 Agenda, the avail-
ability and misuse of SA/LW have a recognized negative impact on 
sustainable development and reduction of poverty. Activities to fight 
the illicit trade of SA/LW in the DRC should be strengthened, particu-
larly the establishment of a roadmap based on CNC-ALPC/UNMAS 
joint assessments17 of FARC and PNC needs and regarding joint data 
collection to facilitate better cross-sectoral monitoring. SA/LW activi-
ties are key to improve the security environment and contribute to the 
protection of civilians in conflict-affected areas. This increase in the 
perception of safety has strengthened the local community’s confi-
dence to move about without fear and to conduct their daily activities 
including fetching water and accessing local markets and other key 
infrastructure. Although this improved perception of safety is based 
on the mere noticeable presence of national security and defense 
forces, the local population also registered an apparent improvement 
in the professionalism of FARDC and PNC when dealing with weap-
ons and ammunition. 
See endnotes page 65
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34
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol24/iss2/1




ew realize the world’s first widespread deployment of land-
mines took place during the American Civil War (1860–1865). 
At the start of the Civil War, the disparity in military man-
power, materiel, and weaponry between the North and South was sig-
nificant. The gap widened in the Union’s favor as the war progressed, 
forcing the Confederate war industry to innovate and improvise. That 
was especially true with landmines. As the conflict progressed, land-
mine warfare advanced commensurately, and both tactics and tech-
nology evolved to include innovative types of design and deployment. 
During the war’s later years, Confederate soldiers used both command- 
detonated and victim-activated landmines more frequently to defend 
and to protect static positions, including cities.1  
At the outset of the Civil War in April 1861, the United States war 
strategy emphasized the occupation of key Southern harbors, the con-
quest of the Mississippi River to divide the enemy, and the establishment 
of a naval blockade around the Confederacy. Within a few years, the 
Union had established a fairly tight blockade along the coast, and it was 
no longer possible for the Confederacy to export cotton in large quanti-
ties. The South’s “white gold” failed to produce the income needed to help 
prevent the depreciation of its currency and fund the war effort. 
The South’s economy was based on agriculture, and there were few 
industries capable of producing the war materials the Confederate gov-
ernment needed to fight the war ahead; thus, it had no choice but to 
seek more creative ways to fight, including leveraging low-cost weap-
ons with minimal material input. One of the solutions to holding key 
pieces of Southern territory was the development of landmines from 
a variety of artillery shells, with increased technological ingenuity 
adapted to local circumstances. Confederate soldiers eventually con-
figured spur-of-the-moment landmines in a relatively ad-hoc manner. 
Details were rarely written down, and most of what was recorded was 
destroyed near the end of the war to avoid the possibility of some lead-
ing advocates being charged as war criminals. The simplicity and cost-
effectiveness of landmines made their continued use attractive. Today 
we call these buried or hidden artillery rounds improvised explosive 
devices or IEDs.2
Despite the expanding development and use of landmines, many 
American military officers, both Confederate and Union, looked 
upon them with intense disfavor. Landmines were disparaged as the 
“tools of cowards or offenses against democracy and civilized war-
fare.”3 Opposition within the Confederacy’s high command, especially 
by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston and Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, abated as 
the war progressed and Confederates became increasingly desperate 
to defend their shrinking territory. The arguments against landmine 
use—at least on the Confederate side—dissipated relatively quickly, 
and mines came to be viewed as a legitimate, highly-effective, low-cost 
weapon and methodology of war. 
In 1863, the Confederate high command and Congress allocated 
US$100,000 to establish the Army Torpedo Bureau, which became the 
world’s first institution devoted to landmine warfare. Led by Brig. Gen. 
Gabriel Rains, a creative and innovative military engineering officer, 
the bureau offered a new and prophetic philosophy of modern, techno-
logical landmine warfare. The organization itself was relatively decen-
tralized. Typically, a single officer (or sometimes two) would oversee 
Landmine exploding among Union troops at Yorktown, VA.
Sketch courtesy of A.R. Waud, Harper’s Weekly, May 24, 1862.
By Kenneth R. Rutherford, Ph.D. [ James Madison University ]
Background image courtesy of Thomas Nast, Harper's Weekly , September 20, 1862.
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landmine deployment, implementing tactical plans involving the use 
of home guard units, members of the public, and slave laborers. In such 
cases, the men of the Torpedo Bureau had wide discretion in how they 
deployed mines. Once given an order to use landmines, lower-ranking 
Confederate officers and their troops were able to improvise, usually 
in a spontaneous act of self-preservation, with adequate time to deploy 
the mines against often overwhelming Federal forces. The result was 
the varied deployment of increasingly sophisticated explosive devices 
and innovative landmine warfare tactics near fortifications and on 
main invasion routes.
It wasn’t until the following year, in 1864, however, that landmines 
became truly reliable in the field. The Confederacy’s efforts were aided 
by the invention of the Rains fuse, the innovative engineering tech-
nology of the Fretwell-Singer torpedoes, the creation of the Torpedo 
Bureau, and the industrial manufacturing of landmines as opposed to 
improvising them on the fly.
The Confederates developed two ways to detonate a landmine: victim- 
activation and command-detonation. Victim-activated (also known 
as contact-detonated) mines were the easiest to detonate because vic-
tims inadvertently triggered them. They were made by coupling a shell 
and a percussion cap or, later in the war, a purposefully-manufactured 
detonator. In a postwar memoir about his combat experience, Union 
surgeon S. W. Gross described the victim-activated landmines as 
simply large shells arranged with levers connected with a percus-
sion fuze and sunk below the surface of the ground in the supposed 
path of an assailing party. A pressure of the foot upon the concealed 
lever was sufficient to explode the shell, resulting in effects similar 
to the bursting of a like projectile under ordinary circumstances.4 
 As the first and only head of the Torpedo Bureau, 
General Rains invented a pressure-sensitive fuse that was 
much more reliable than previous designs. The Rains fuse 
could be dialed to various pressures but was eventually 
stabilized at seven pounds.5 Victim-activated landmines, 
including many with the Rains fuse, were used to reinforce 
defensive devices in such fortifications as Battery Wagner, 
South Carolina; Fort Blakeley, Alabama; Fort McAllister, 
Georgia; Spanish Fort, Alabama; the forts at Chaffin’s 
Farm, Virginia; and places such as Jackson, Mississippi, 
and Williamsburg and Yorktown, Virginia. They were 
utilized less successfully between Kinston and Goldsboro, 
North Carolina, in March 1865.
The second type of landmine—which was infrequently 
used—was a command-detonated device (see Table 1). These 
were activated by human control through a priming charge 
with an electrical current or pull wires that would cause a 
friction-sensitive mixture to ignite. This system required 
some manner of connection between the person firing the 
device and the device itself. Although they gave the operator 
more control, use of command-detonated landmines faced 
several challenges, including a lack of materials, faulty tech-
nology, and inadvertent cutting of the wires by artillery fire 
or other means. In this friction-primer system, a wire was 
pulled through a small tube (usually copper) filled with an explosive 
substance (usually fulminate of mercury) and small grain black pow-
der, which, in turn, created a spark that ignited the powder; the main 
charge of black powder was then ignited.6 
Thirty-two lb landmine, Confederate Army, American Civil War, Fort McAllister 
(GA) State Park Museum, 1864.
Command Trip Wire Pressure Nuisance Delay
Battery Wagner  (SC) X
Jackson (MS) X X
Fort Blakely (AL) X X
Fort Esperanza (TX) X
Fort Fisher (NC)i X
Fort Gilmer (VA) X
Fort Harrison (VA) X
Fort Johnson (VA) X
Fort McAllister (GA) X
Fort McDermott (AL)ii X








Port Hudson (LA)iv X X
Spanish Fort (AL) X X
Williamsburg (VA) X X
Yellow Tavern (VA) X X X
Yorktown (VA) X X X X
Table 1. Tactical landmine uses during the American Civil War.
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PRISONERS OF WAR
As a countermeasure to landmines, Union commanders marched 
prisoners of war (POWs) ahead of their own troops to identify or deto-
nate landmines deployed by other Confederates or Southern sympa-
thizers (see Table 2). Landmine warfare outraged Union generals such 
as Philip H. Sheridan and William T. Sherman, and Federal officers 
frequently took revenge by ordering Confederate soldiers to dig up the 
landmines. If they refused, they risked execution. In at least six post-
fighting situations, Federal forces pressed POWs to clear their own 
landmines, with occasionally fatal results.7
One of the incidents where Confederate POWs were forced to clear 
their own mines took place in Georgia. After capturing Atlanta on 
2 September 1964, Union Major-General William Sherman drove deep 
into Georgia, destroying the state’s resources and the will of its people 
to fight as he made his way to the important coastal city of Savannah. 
“I can make the march,” Sherman wrote, “and make Georgia howl.”8  
Confederate President Jefferson Davis pressured his generals in 
Georgia to use landmines as way to obstruct “roads by every practi-
cable means” to delay Sherman’s march for as long as possible.9 As a 
result, many of Sherman’s soldiers “were killed or horribly mangled, or 
both, by torpedoes [victim-activated landmines] buried near the sur-
face of the roads, railroads and paths, and at all places where men were 
likely to march.”10
The manner of the wounds enraged Sherman. “This was not war,” 
he fumed, “but murder.” He ordered Confederate prisoners brought 
up “from the rear of the brigade,” told his “soldiers to get a proper dis-
tance away,” and “directed the prisoners with picks and spades to find 
the other torpedoes.” According to Sherman, he “made them march 
in close order along the road, so as to explode their own torpedoes, or 
to discover and dig them up. The Rebel prisoners, he wrote, “begged 
hard, but I reiterated the order, and could hardly help laughing at their 
stepping so gingerly along the road, where it was supposed sunken tor-
pedoes might explode at each step, but they found no other torpedoes 
till near Fort McAllister [near Savannah].”11 
UNEXPLODED LANDMINES AND CIVILIAN 
CASUALTIES
Throughout the long war, Confederate soldiers seized stockpiles 
captured on battlefields or collected unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
from within their own defensive perimeters in order to use the mate-
rial as their own ordnance or to convert it into landmines. Sometimes 
these unexploded shells were “shipped to an arsenal for refitting with 
copper time fuse adapters and sometimes resorted and/or converted 
from shell to case shot.”12 
Surprisingly, few civilian casualties were caused by landmines, 
either during or after the war.13 A possible reason is that most land-
mines were laid away from crowded inhabited areas.14 In fact, most 
Civil War landmines were used at forts that are some distance from 
today’s urban areas. Many of the forts were purposefully constructed 
away from the cities they were used to protect—they were designed 
to provide a first-tier defense so cities could buy time “for the trans-
portation of more defensive forces and/or the ‘calling out’ of a militia 
defensive force.”15 
Some of the unrecovered UXO inflicted civilian casualties. A Union 
prisoner being held in a Charleston jail, for example, witnessed UXO 
clearance casualties:
I saw two men and a Negro boy who had been killed while unearth-
ing one of our shells. They tried to break off the copper ring with an 
axe! The thing burst, tearing them to pieces. I hear that several boys 
have been killed in this way—they pay dearly for their stupidity.16
For a few decades after the war, landmines killed and injured 
Southerners as they walked through woods or flower-filled fields once 
defended by Confederate infantry.17 Thankfully, civilian casualties 
from this type of ordnance and landmines were low during and after 
the Civil War. From 1958 through 2006, for example, there were only 
two known fatalities due to disarming Civil War ordnance.18
After the American Civil War ended in 1865, Americans would 
not deploy landmines on a widespread basis for seventy-six years 
until World War II. Unfortunately, the deadly legacy of landmines 
would become a global humanitarian crisis by the end of the 20th 
century, killing or maiming more than 26,000 people per year, pri-
marily civilians.19
INSURGENCY
One of the notable aspects of landmine use during the Civil War 
was their lack of employment by guerilla or insurgent forces (although 
Location
Confederate POWs 
forced to clear 
landmines immediately 
after the fighting ended
Confederate POWs forced 
to march at head of 
Federal columns on known 
landmine infested roads
Jackson (MS) X
Fort Blakeley (AL) X





Port Hudson (LA) X
Spanish Fort (AL) X
Yellow Tavern (VA) X X
Yorktown (VA) X
Table 2. Prisoners of war clearance operations chart.
Plaque commemorating Confederate landmines near Fort McAllister, Georgia His-
torical Commission.
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some may well have wanted to use them). Most likely this was because 
the Confederate Army kept the limited number of landmines solely 
for its own purposes. Improvised landmine production involving the 
conversion of artillery shells was simply too time consuming and bur-
densome for guerilla forces, who were usually on the move.
MINE WARFARE: A LASTING LEGACY
By the end of the Civil War in 1865, the Confederates had devel-
oped the technical forerunners of many modern landmine and fuze 
types. Other landmine-related innovations included their deployment 
to cover retreating forces, the use of nuisance mines to inflict casualties 
behind enemy lines, and the creation of various types of improvised 
and manufactured landmines.
Despite the Confederacy’s efforts, landmines did not change the 
outcome of a single major battle, although they did delay pursu-
ing Federals and gave Confederates time to escape at Yorktown and 
Williamsburg, Virginia, and Jackson, Mississippi. Even in the pres-
ence of minefields, Union troops managed to carry out several success-
ful assaults by digging trenches across the fields, including at Battery 
Wagner outside Charleston, South Carolina.20
This article is based on my book, America’s Buried History: 
Landmines in the Civil War, which further details how landmine devel-
opment and the tactics of employing them began and evolved during 
the Civil War, and how the war’s progression mirrored mine develop-
ment on land and sea. As strange as it sounds today, it was an alliance 
of a few professionally trained soldiers, ill-equipped home guard units, 
businessmen, and Masonic members who developed and improved the 
use of landmines across the Confederacy—a harbinger of future war-
fare in countries around the world.
Landmines and their antecedents, especially those with origins in 
the American Civil War, have been widely used through both world 
wars and in many modern conflicts. After the American Civil War 
ended in 1865, Americans would not deploy landmines on a wide-
spread basis for seventy-six years until World War II. Their prolific use 
continues to kill and maim thousands of innocent victims every year. 
In 2019, according to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, 
fifty-nine countries—each having more than 100 square kilometers of 
contaminated land—still reported having landmines: Afghanistan, 
Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, 
Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen.21 Those used in the 20th and 21st centu-
ries have caused tens of thousands of civilian casualties. The resulting 
international outrage transformed into a highly-effective global move-
ment to ban landmines and made finding, clearing, and destroying 
mines a multimillion-dollar business. 
See endnotes page 65
Foreground: Confederate Percussion Mine. Five percussion primers. Conical tin 
case, 17.25” long. Captured by Federal forces in Richmond, VA, in April 1865 during 
the Confederate evacuation of its capital city.
Middle: Confederate Percussion Mine. Fretwell-Singer type. Tapered tin case, 
13.5” x 0.48”. Spring loaded hammer on rod at top. Acquired in operations against 
Richmond and Petersburg, May 1864–April 1865. Presumably made in the Confed-
erate mine factory in Richmond, VA.
Back Right: Confederate Friction Mine. Tin cylindrical case, 17” x 11” pierced by 
iron rod through axis terminate by ring bolts at either end. This specimen cap-
tured at Richmond during Confederate evacuation of its capital city. April 1865.
Image taken in the basement archival storage at West Point Military Museum.
A Rains Fuse, Richmond (VA) National Battlefield Park Headquarters.
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STRENGTHENING A SUSTAINABLE 
NATIONAL CAPACITY FOR 
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
MAINSTREAMING IN MINE ACTION
By Laura Biscaglia,* Ros Sophal,** Khun Sochenda,** and Lubna Sabeeh*** 
*[ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ],  
**[ Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority ], and ***[ Norwegian People’s Aid ]
S
ustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, “Peace, justice and 
strong institutions,” promotes building effective, accountable 
institutions to ensure peaceful and inclusive societies for all. 
This incorporates strengthening relevant national institutions, includ-
ing through international cooperation and capacity-building initia-
tives.1 For the purpose of this article, capacity development is defined 
as a process to improve performance at the individual, organizational, 
and broader system levels.2 When an organization carries out a project, 
it is also important to consider the implications of each planned action 
on women, girls, boys, and men of different ethnicities, religions, lan-
guages, disabilities, education levels, and other diversity factors. Gender 
and diversity mainstreaming means considering all relevant factors in 
every project activity as a way to make sure that the concerns, needs, 
priorities, and experiences of all project beneficiaries are included in 
the project’s design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.
In the context of mine action, strengthening national capac-
ity for gender and diversity mainstreaming leads to more effective 
and inclusive operations, which consider the different information, 
requirements, and preferences of all members of explosive ordnance 
(EO)-affected communities. It is also expected to promote equal 
opportunities, through ensuring that mine action laws, policies, and 
practices are inclusive and non-discriminatory.3
This article presents achievements in gender and diversity main-
streaming in the mine action sector, both at the individual and orga-
nizational level. The Cambodia Mine Action Authority (CMAA) and 
the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) Mine Action and Disarmament 
Programme in Iraq are examples of good practice. Also discussed is the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining's (GICHD) 
Gender Focal Point (GFP) Capacity Development Programme’s contri-
butions to the gender and diversity mainstreaming work of the previ-
ously mentioned organizations.
STRENGTHENING GENDER AND DIVERSITY 
MAINSTREAMING CAPACITY 
National mine action authorities/centers (NMAA/Cs) and operators 
are increasingly showing a commitment to gender equality and inclu-
sion through the adoption of gender and diversity-related policies, 
strategies, and action plans, as well as mainstreaming capacity efforts. 
Within the Royal Government of Cambodia, one such organization 
showing a commitment is the CMAA. The CMAA adopted a robust 
strategic approach to promote gender equality and inclusion through 
the Gender Mainstreaming in Mine Action Plan 2018-2022 (GMMAP), 
which includes ambitious targets for the program. The CMAA also 
established a Gender Team, which implements the GMMAP, and is 
looking to further develop its own gender and diversity mainstream-
ing capacity and that of mine action operators in Cambodia, including 
through capacity development agreements with NPA and the GICHD. 
Another example of good practice in the sector is NPA’s Mine Action 
and Disarmament Programme in Iraq. In 2019, NPA Iraq established 
a Gender and Diversity Coordinator and implemented a number of 
interventions, including conducting gender analyses in EO-affected 
communities benefitting from NPA’s operations: training staff on the 
importance of gender mainstreaming in mine action; establishing a 
network of GFP personnel and a gender-based violence (GBV) inci-
dents reporting system within the organization; and conducting sur-
veys on the conditions of women working in operations teams. 
Despite these examples of good practice, several challenges remain. 
Depending on the context, social and cultural norms can hinder the 
recruitment of women and members of marginalized groups, such as 
persons with disabilities and members of minority religious and/or 
ethnic groups, in both office and operational roles. Specific additional 
security threats may also apply to these groups, such as a heightened 
risk of sexual and GBV. At the organizational level, a lack of authentic 
management commitment to diversity and inclusion, such as not chal-
lenging or holding people accountable for discriminatory policies and 
Khun Sochenda providing training on gender mainstreaming in survey and clear-
ance to CMAA’s quality management team.
Photo courtesy of the Cambodian Mine Action Authority.
Backgound photo: A team of female deminers in Cambodia.
Photo courtesy of NPA.
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practices, can significantly impede gender and diversity mainstream-
ing efforts.4 Furthermore, the absence of a clear institutional approach 
that formalizes measures to promote gender equality and inclusion in 
strategy, operations, and employment means that gender and diver-
sity mainstreaming is not carried out in a systematic and accountable 
manner across all levels of an organization. Another challenge is that 
although a gender- and diversity-focused position or team is often 
established, it may lack direction and well-defined responsibilities, or 
is not allocated adequate financial resources to fulfil its mandate due 
to a low priority or other constraints. At the individual level, one of the 
factors that most hinders gender and diversity mainstreaming efforts 
is a lack of skills to both conduct and apply gender and diversity analy-
ses to ensure mine action activities are effective and inclusive.
OVERVIEW OF THE GICHD GENDER FOCAL POINT 
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
In order to strengthen the gender and diversity mainstream-
ing capacity of NMAA/Cs, operators, and other partners, in 2019 
the GICHD developed and carried out its first global GFP Capacity 
Development Programme, which is expected to be completed in 
early 2021. The program seeks to reinforce the positive achievements 
described previously and address some of the remaining obstacles. The 
premise of the program is that a single training course is not enough to 
establish sustainable national and country-program capacity. Instead, 
the development of an individual trainee’s skills must coincide with 
organizational change to facilitate a systems-based approach that can, 
with sufficient resources and authority, contribute to individual and 
organizational transformation. 
The GICHD decided to concentrate on the role of GFPs for three 
main reasons. First, more clarity was needed from NMAA/Cs and 
operators on the roles and responsibilities of GFPs, as well as on the 
qualifying criteria to take up this position. Second, the GICHD iden-
tified a skills gap in the mine action sector for gender equality and 
inclusion programming where field-level decisions are taken. Third, 
GFPs were expected to be generally more available to take part in lon-
ger training courses focused on gender equality and inclusion than 
other staff members. 
The role of a GFP is to promote gender equality and inclusion in 
their organization by advocating, advising, and supporting staff. 
While the title of the position could suggest that the focus is only on 
gender, in fact the GICHD believes that it must encompass work on 
diversity more broadly of which gender is only one among many rel-
evant considerations to take into account. Furthermore, while ultimate 
accountability for the results of gender and diversity mainstreaming 
efforts lie with management, a GFP has a crucial role in supporting 
this work. Because those designated as GFPs within an organization 
are not necessarily experts in gender equality and inclusion, participa-
tion in the Capacity Development Programme can play a pivotal role 
in equipping them with the relevant knowledge and skills to perform 
the GFP tasks.
The “Introduction to Gender and Diversity in Mine Action” 
e-Learning course equips learners with knowledge of where and 
why gender and diversity matter in mine action. By making the 
e-Learning a mandatory step in the capacity-development process, it 
ensures that participants have the same basic understanding of key 
definitions and concepts. These include how gender norms and diver-
sity considerations can impact on mine action activities, as well as the 
characteristics of a gender- and diversity-sensitive approach to mine 
action, especially in community-facing activities. This is followed by a 
ten-day intensive face-to-face training that equips participants with 
the skills required to effectively mainstream gender and diversity 
in the organization’s policies, systems, and practices. In this sec-
ond phase of the Capacity Development Programme, participants 
develop or reinforce skills ranging from how to mainstream gender 
and diversity in national mine action strategies or standards, stan-
dard operating procedures, and data collection forms, to building 
the capacity to ensure inclusive employment systems and practices.
Following the face-to-face training, participants complete up to four 
assignments during the remaining year of the program, in which they 
apply the knowledge and skills they acquired on the course in their 
own workplace. These assignments are adapted to the unique work 
situation and responsibilities of each trainee and the identified gender 
and diversity mainstreaming priorities of the organization. During 
this phase of the program, a member of the GICHD supports the train-
ees, providing technical advice to complete the assignments. 
Finally, in the last stage of the program, the GICHD invites partici-
pants to take part in an online workshop, during which they have the 
opportunity to present their organizational gender and diversity main-
streaming work plan, provide updates on what they have achieved, dis-
cuss challenges faced, and identify next steps to continue to promote 
gender equality and inclusion within their 
organization. Participants in the current 
program include representatives from twelve 
organizations, representing both NMAA/Cs 
and international operators’ headquarters 
and country programs. 
Figure 1. Overview of the Gender Focal Point Capacity Development Programme 
objectives and outcomes.
Figure courtesy of the authors.
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Figure 2. The 18-month Gender Focal Point Capacity Development Programme adopts a blended learning 
approach comprised of four main activities. 
Figure courtesy of the authors.
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GFPS ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Anyone working to mainstream gender and diversity considerations, 
be it a GFP, a full-time manager or advisor, or a working group, must 
have a clear role and specific responsibilities. Based on consultations 
with a number of NMAA/Cs and operators, the GICHD developed rec-
ommendations on what these responsibilities should include. However, 
these should always be adapted to the work of the NMAA/C or operator 
to ensure that they are relevant and realistic in a specific context. The 
organization’s management must endorse the GFP’s responsibilities 
and clearly communicate to staff how the GFP’s role will be integrated 
with the work of other units/teams in the organization. 
Prior to participation in the GFP Capacity Development Programme, 
the CMAA’s Gender Team had a network of GFPs deployed in differ-
ent units/teams across the institution. However, since the Gender 
Team did not have terms of reference (ToR) endorsed by management, 
they faced a number of challenges. These included implementing the 
GMMAP 2018-2022; the availability of dedicated staff trained on gen-
der mainstreaming; and the lack of capacity to conduct gender and 
diversity analysis.5 With technical assistance and support from the 
GICHD as part of the Capacity Development Programme, the Gender 
Team has now developed a ToR for these GFPs.6
There are already positive examples of how the ToR supports the 
Gender Team to achieve its objectives and reinforces the support pro-
vided through the CMAA-GICHD capacity development action plan. For 
example, the Team now has a more prominent role in decision-making 
processes with management personnel. The Team has also recently par-
ticipated in technical reference group meetings, including one on survey 
and clearance. Moreover, efforts to promote parity of women and men 
participating in events are paying off. For example, in July 2020, the 
head of the CMAA Gender Team presented on “Gender Mainstreaming 
and Diverse needs in practice in Cambodia” at the Intersessional Meeting 
of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). 
In the case of NPA’s Mine Action and Disarmament Programme 
in Iraq, the organization had already created the position of Gender 
Equality and Diversity Coordinator and allocated resources to sup-
port gender and diversity mainstreaming efforts. As the organization 
was working on defining a job description for the position, partici-
pation in the GFP Capacity Development Programme came at an 
opportune moment. Indeed, NPA Iraq believes that the support pro-
vided by the GICHD sustained the organization’s ability to adopt a 
ToR that integrates the full range of tasks that a GFP in mine action 
should perform. NPA Iraq also developed a work plan, which led to a 
more structured approach to mainstreaming gender and diversity in 
its internal procedures, and established a network of GFPs in all the 
program’s field locations. These GFPs have different roles and respon-
sibilities compared to the Gender Equality and Diversity Coordinator. 
Specifically, they support the Coordinator in the delivery of training 
courses, reporting allegations of GBV, and maintaining a database in 
which these complaints are systematically recorded.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY ANALYSIS
Gender and diversity analysis is a tool for understanding how the 
cultural, social, and economic differences between women and men 
from diverse groups influence their opportunities and roles in society. 
In mine action, the main goal of such an analysis is to be able to plan 
and tailor activities to make them more effective and inclusive. At a 
minimum, gender and diversity analysis should involve desk-based 
research to understand more about demographics at the local level. 
In addition, the analysis should identify decision-making capacity, 
property rights and ownership, division of labor and livelihood activi-
ties, barriers to participation, mobility patterns and access to services, 
direct and indirect communication channels, and finally the socioeco-
nomic and humanitarian impact of EO on different groups. 
In the case of the CMAA, the Gender Team is using its coordina-
tion role to encourage Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) and 
operators to conduct gender and diversity analyses to inform opera-
tions. The CMAA is now planning to develop a gender and diversity 
analysis checklist to support the MAPUs and operators to conduct this 
essential activity and use the findings to tailor activities to the needs of 
different groups. The development of the gender and diversity analy-
sis checklist is expected to contribute to SDG 10 by putting in place 
a framework ensuring that mine action operations in Cambodia are 
inclusive and non-discriminatory.3 It will also enable the CMAA to 
demonstrate how it is implementing Actions 29 and 33 of the Oslo 
Action Plan, through ensuring that community-facing mine action 
activities are “…sensitive to gender, age, disability and that take the 
diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities…” 
are taken into account.7
In the case of NPA Iraq, the organization had already planned to 
conduct a gender and diversity analysis of Anbar, one of the districts in 
which the program operates. NPA Iraq’s Gender Equality and Diversity 
Coordinator had previously worked on several field surveys and need 
assessments related to gender mainstreaming and women's empower-
ment programs. However, the coordinator had not yet completed a 
gender and diversity analysis for a mine action project. Therefore, the 
GFP Capacity Development Programme provided an excellent oppor-
tunity to build on her existing skill set and strengthen her capacity to 
conduct gender and diversity analysis for mine action. Participation 
in the program helped NPA Iraq identify information requirements 
NPA Iraq conducting a focus group discussion with women from a local commu-
nity in Rawa City, Iraq. 
Photo courtesy of NPA Iraq.
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and create forms for field-level data collection in Anbar District. Both 
desk-based and field-level research are complete and NPA Iraq is in the 
process of analyzing the findings to ensure an inclusive approach to 
activities in Anbar.
LOOKING FORWARD
A sense of ownership is created by focusing efforts on strengthen-
ing sustainable gender and diversity mainstreaming capacity at the 
national and country-program levels. It also contributes to interna-
tional and national frameworks by ensuring that mine action organi-
zations promote peaceful and inclusive societies for all. This enables 
mine action programs to not only achieve more with the resources they 
have at their disposal, but also to better adapt programs, projects, and 
activities to reflect the real needs and priorities of all beneficiaries in 
the area of operations. 
Ultimately, strengthening the capacity to mainstream gender and 
diversity in mine action organizations positively influences national 
capabilities in two ways. First, it promotes gender equality and inclu-
sion in EO-affected communities by challenging traditional gen-
der norms. Second, it contributes to improving the quality of mine 
action projects and activities, which allow beneficiary communities 
to receive higher-quality services that are inclusive, effective, and 
tailored to the needs and priorities of all affected groups, including 
those in positions of vulnerability, thus spreading the benefits of mine 
action more equally.
The purpose of the GFP Capacity Development Programme is to 
enable and strengthen the efforts of NMAA/Cs, operators, and other 
NGOs in their work by providing them with the knowledge, tools, 
and skills to achieve their own objectives over time. This is why the 
program adopted a staged approach spanning eighteen months and 
which, in addition to training, provides sustained support to the GFPs 
to achieve the stated goals of their organizations. 
The first global GFP Capacity Development Programme will soon be 
followed by a second program specifically targeted at GFPs from 
Arabic-speaking countries. CMAA and NPA Iraq are only two out of 
twelve organizations that are currently participating in the first global 
GFP Capacity Development Programme. The program has led to the 
creation of a community of practice trained on gender and diversity 
mainstreaming, comprised of members who rely on each other’s expe-
riences and expertise. Ultimately, the ongoing efforts to strengthen the 
capacity to mainstream gender and diversity in mine action organiza-
tions are expected to improve the effectiveness of mine action policies, 
programs, and operations by ensuring that the contributions, con-
cerns, and needs of all members of EO-affected communities are 
acknowledged and addressed in an inclusive manner. 
See endnotes page 66
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ASSESSING UKRAINE’S VICTIM 
ASSISTANCE CAPACITIES
By Kateryna Mashchenko, Tetiana Shymanchuk, Oleh Stoiev, and Nick Vovk 
[ Danish Refugee Committee-Danish Demining Group ]
S
ix years into the protracted crisis, explosive ordnance (EO) 
contamination continues to affect Ukrainian communities. 
Consequent to the conflict between the government of Ukraine 
and the so-called de facto authorities in the Donetsk and Luhansk 
regions, EO affects an estimated 7,000 square kilometers of land in 
government-controlled areas (GCAs).1 Even without complete data 
from the non-government-controlled areas (NGCAs), Ukraine ranks 
among the five most affected places in the world for EO casualties.2 
But for EO victims3 the path forward remains fraught with difficul-
ties. According to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS),4 
victim assistance (VA) requires a long-term commitment, a responsi-
bility that state institutions bear. The present article, encapsulating an 
assessment conducted in 2018 and 2019,5 highlights the crucial inca-
pacities of the primary VA duty-bearers in Ukraine and puts forth the 
corresponding lessons learned.
The needs of child EO victims are at the center of our analyses 
of local VA capacities. Danish Refugee Council-Danish Demining 
Group’s (DRC-DDG) internal database6 shows 2,060 casualties (result-
ing from 1,126 incidents) from June 2014 to September 2020; 151 of 
these were children. Picking up, tampering with, and playing with 
EO—behaviors characteristic of children—is the third most frequent 
known cause of EO casualties in Ukraine. Children from poverty-
stricken regions are regularly attracted to EO in order to sell them 
for scrap metal or souvenirs.7 The impact of hostilities on educational 
infrastructure remains on the rise: some fifty conflict-related incidents 
have been reported in 2019. When compared to 2018, this constitutes 
a nearly 200 percent rise.8 The presence of military forces within a 
1-kilometer radius of educational facilities as well as the infrastruc-
tural destruction caused by the ongoing conflict forces some children 
to cross the EO-ridden contact line every day to attend classes.9 
Although full clearance is years away, Ukraine is making tangible 
progress. It has joined important mine action- and VA-related conven-
tions and ensures basic rights to its population through its constitu-
tion (and related social protection laws).10 Ukraine has also adopted the 
Law of Ukraine “On Mine Action,” hereinafter referred to as the mine 
action law (MAL), on 6 December 2018. Ukrainian Parliament has 
recently adopted an amendment to MAL (Draft Law No. 2618, adopted 
on 17 September 2020). However, as of December 2020, it has not yet 
been signed by the President of Ukraine.11 To a certain extent, inter-
agency communication and coordination on VA exist with social pro-
tection units, sanatoriums, rehabilitation centers, and regional-level 
hospitals currently serving as essential VA intermediaries. Ukraine is 
also steadily implementing the state-wide inclusion reform (i.e., “The 
New Ukrainian School”), improving access to education for children 
with special educational needs. Finally, the government is open to and 
cooperative with the international mine action community. As a result, 
DRC-DDG was able to holistically assess the remaining VA gaps.
The assessment took international policies and guidelines as the 
theoretical background for its research. These included the UN 
Policy on Victim Assistance in Mine Action12 and the United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) Guidance on Child Focused Victim 
Assistance.13 DRC-DDG used these as a framework for the design 
of the assessment, thereby covering the following topics: laws and 
policies, data collection, emergency and continuing medical care, 
Child EO victim in Svatove, Luhansk region.
Image courtesy of © UNICEF / Filippov / 2019.
Background image: Child EO victim in Svatove, Luhansk region.
Image courtesy of © UNICEF / Filippov / 2019.
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more in-depth study was beyond reach. The lack of a nationally-
owned, EO-casualty database additionally hampered the iden-
tification of potential interviewees. Regardless, the DRC-DDG 
assessment—supported by the German government and United 
Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF)—continues to 
be the only review of national Ukrainian VA capacities.
GAPS IN UKRAINIAN NATIONAL VA CAPACITIES
Laws and Policies. The root cause for many VA incapacities 
emerges from the underdeveloped legal environment. For any 
national provision, governments are required to adopt necessary 
laws, secure budgets, and develop policies, regulations, and pro-
cedures. For VA in Ukraine, this is yet to become the case. For 
years, the Ukrainian response remained ad hoc, uncoordinated, 
and misaligned with best practices from abroad. Not until late 
2018, did the government adopt MAL;19 as of December 2020, its 
implementation remains troublesome. For VA, two significant 
challenges exist in the Ukrainian legal framework: unenforced 
existing provisions and gaps within them. 
The current version of MAL provides for a number of services 
to EO victims but lacks the crucial legal documents, by-laws, and 
procedures for its implementation. For instance, MAL secures 
rights to medical, psychological, professional, and social assistance 
for all EO victims;20 however, there is no complex system or pro-
tocol for the general provision of VA at the state level.21 Officials 
are obliged to act exclusively as defined by national regulations.22 
Thus, EO victims either receive assistance at the discretion of local 
administrations, or simply do not. Many crucial legal documents 
(e.g., a national mine action strategy) are also missing. Finally, by-
laws (i.e., procedures, orders, and directions) required to provide a 
framework for a national mine action authority and national mine 
action center are absent. Crucial gaps in the existing legislation are 
likewise commonplace. 
Even where the current MAL is implemented and necessary pro-
cedures are adopted, certain gaps weaken the state’s VA capabilities. 
For one, there is no provision on data collection. Unless defined in 
MAL, such data collection is both legally controversial and halts the 
coordination of responsible state bodies. Furthermore, MAL does not 
prescribe the adoption of a national mine action strategy or an action 
plan; without these, national VA is undermined. What is more, the 
state allocated a budget line for mine action activities only in 2019 
and 2020 (approximately US$185,000). While a separate line on “spe-
cialized assistance on prosthetics and rehabilitation” (approximately 
US$1 million) was included, it is insufficient for the needs of the ben-
eficiaries. Such a lagging legal environment is the common theme for 
many of the national VA capacity gaps discussed next.
Data Collection. The problematic EO casualty data collection is 
not limited to Ukraine as mirrored by examples in countries such as 
Afghanistan,23 Bosnia and Herzegovina,24 and Vietnam.25 Similarly, 
the establishment of a reliable and complete EO casualty data col-
lection system in Ukraine is in process. Currently, Ukraine has 
no central agency in charge of the latter, neither is it mentioned in 
MAL. The state capacity to evaluate the scope of required assistance 
Figure 1. Accumulated Data on VA Assessment in Ukraine.
Figure courtesy of © DRC-DDG.
rehabilitation, psychological and psycho-social support, and socioeco-
nomic inclusion (focusing on education). For this article, we found it 
pertinent to also share drawbacks and lessons learned about conduct-
ing VA assessments. Finally, we have adjusted the terminology of the 
article to conform with IMAS 13.10 Victim Assistance (First Edition), 
published earlier in 2020.14 
METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS
The two-stage assessment employed a mixed-method research 
approach, including secondary data analyses as well as qualitative and 
quantitative research tools. In the first stage (2018), the team used a 
questionnaire (with multiple choice, open-ended, yes/no, and Likert-
type questions)15 for household interviews with parents or caregivers of 
child EO victims and semi-structured key informant interviews (KIIs) 
for institutional VA stakeholders. Although difficult to locate EO vic-
tims due to stigma, fear, and the lack of a database recording casualty 
data, snowball sampling16 was used to reach fifteen parents or caregivers 
of seventeen child EO victims (from one to seventeen years old) while 
duty-bearing VA service providers (n = 52) were gathered from three 
levels: national, regional, and local.17 For triangulation, secondary data 
analyses were performed using institutional and internal DRC-DDG 
sources as well as a desk review of related reports from other humanitar-
ian and development organizations. The second stage (2019) focused on 
national educational capacities for child EO victims. Here, too, house-
hold and KIIs were utilized to contact fifty-four interviewees (twelve 
children, twenty-two teachers, and twenty caregivers) using a purposive 
sampling18 (see Figure 1). For both stages, the two regions of Luhansk 
and Donetsk were chosen due to the frequency of child EO accidents (see 
Figure 2). Although the assessment aimed to be comprehensive, certain 
limitations are noteworthy.
Capacity assessment was constrained by timeframes and wide geo-
graphical spread, availability and quality of data, as well as demograph-
ics. Each stage of the assessment lasted for three months; however, 
the conflict-affected areas stretch over 427 kilometers. The nature of a 
small-sized team, as well as safety and logistical issues, meant that a 
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Figure 2. Reported child EO casualties in Ukraine (June 2014 - September 2020).
Figure courtesy of © DRC-DDG.
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is further thwarted by the fact that healthcare facilities did not iden-
tify EO injuries under the International Classification of Diseases26 
at the onset of the conflict (only in 2018 was a protocol introduced 
obliging them to do so). As a result, EO victims injured before 2018 
face difficulties proving the cause of injury when trying to obtain sup-
port. Without a comprehensive victim information system (VIS), it is 
likewise impossible to accurately quantify the cost of conflict-related 
disabilities to individuals, the economy, and society at large. The state 
is hence not only limited in ensuring compensation and assistance for 
the current EO victims but also in accurately evaluating VA needs for 
the future.
Emergency and Continuing Medical Care. While emergency care 
is oftentimes provided at local and district levels, it is the expense of 
continued medical care and a lack of specialists and equipment that 
remain problematic and disproportionately affect rural areas. The 
majority of interviewed victims requiring continuing medical care had 
to transfer to regional hospitals; lacking external support, many EO 
victims and their families continue to struggle with such transitions. 
Moreover, there exists a general shortage of specialists and equipment 
to treat EO-related traumas in conflict-affected regions. In some of the 
assessed cases, this led to errors in treatment and the deterioration of 
victims’ conditions. But as noted by the World Health Organization 
(WHO), for the EO victims and their families it is currently “impos-
sible to assess the quality and capacity of medical facilities in Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions because of subjective perceptions of quality.” The 
biggest deficiencies have been identified in rural areas due to the long 
distances that need to be travelled to access adequate medical facili-
ties. This is further exacerbated by the fact that most EO accidents in 
Ukraine occur in rural areas among a population that is more eco-
nomically fragile.27
Rehabilitation. Rehabilitation in Ukraine has gaps in individual 
planning, full-cycle prosthetic provision, informational awareness, 
and state-assigned budgeting. All EO victims with physical disabilities 
interviewed received an individual rehabilitation plan (IRP), inform-
ing them of access to rehabilitation facilities and prosthetic services. 
Yet, these plans have rarely been made concrete in practice. EO victims 
also faced difficulties receiving relevant rehabilitation due to omis-
sions or inaccuracies in IRPs. Thus, no interviewed EO victim was 
availed the full cycle of prostheses: preparation, adjustments, main-
tenance, and replacement. The procedures for obtaining such assistive 
devices are not interlinked. As a result, prostheses provided to chil-
dren are exclusively cosmetic rather than functional. While functional 
prostheses would provide children with increased mobility, they are 
more costly and require periodic changes. Their provision and appli-
cation is also highly specialized and tailored. Fitting would require 
multiple trips to regional hospitals, making it even more inaccessible 
for low-income families. Additionally, a reluctance among social pro-
tection specialists to fully inform families of rehabilitation services is 
customary due to a lack of funding. “If the government aims to save 
money, there will obviously be less incentives to inform families of 
the available services,” stated an interviewed child protection expert. 
Finally, state funding for the rehabilitation of children is limited. As 
reported by social protection specialists, the amount provided by the 
government is normally enough to cover one rehabilitation session 
annually; however, a child usually needs four. 
Psychological and Psycho-Social Support. Ukrainian child EO 
victims are not supported by an established system of psychological 
aid or qualified professionals, with distrust for such services preva-
lent among the population. While MAL asserts rights to psychologi-
cal and social aid to every EO victim, the majority of them fall short 
of its full extent. Of the seventeen assessed cases, only eight received 
psychological support. It was rendered either as generic psychological 
assistance or therapy at a hospital, emergency psychological counsel-
ling post-accident, or as psychological therapy in sanatoriums during 
rehabilitation, at their schools, or by a non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGO). Without an established system of psychological aid, reha-
bilitation and other psycho-social assistances are provided solely from 
local resources. As expressed during our interviews with national and 
international NGOs and governmental stakeholders, the latter lack 
the requisite professional capabilities, as most psychologists operating 
in eastern Ukraine do not have experience in counselling trauma and 
are uncertain of their ability to provide such counseling. A further 
problem is the distrust of psychological counselling, caused by both 
the underestimation of psychological risks and burdens as well as the 
costs of such services. It is, therefore, common for families (as well as 
doctors, teachers, and social workers) to be prejudiced against psy-
chological assistance, underreport their need for it, and reluctantly 
recognize it as a priority. “He became more reserved and aggressive 
… No, we are not going to contact a psychologist, we do not need it,” 
mentioned one mother.
Socioeconomic Inclusion. The assessment focused particularly 
on the educational environment to identify gaps in child EO victims’ 
socioeconomic inclusion. While most of child EO victims continued 
with education within one-to-three months after the incident (30 per-
cent and 25 percent of interviewees, respectively), those with more 
severe injuries had to drop out due to ongoing medical care for at least 
six months to more than a year. Some children faced additional diffi-
culties in their learning due to loss of skills as a result of severe traumas 
or amputations. Likewise, legislation remains to be fully implemented 
providing children with disabilities the same opportunity as their 
peers without disabilities. Despite a state-wide inclusion reform in the 
educational system, teachers from conflict-affected areas still reported 
a lack of knowledge, skills, and information on working with children 
with disabilities and no relevant training on inclusion in schools. 
Consequently, teaching staff and administrators are sometimes not 
ready or unwilling to include children with disabilities in their classes. 
Moreover, there are few (extracurricular) activities for child EO vic-
tims due to the absence of afterschool activities at schools, generally, 
and the lack of conditions and accessible facilities for children with 
disabilities, specifically.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VA CAPACITY BUILDING 
IN UKRAINE
Laws and Policies. Improving the legal environment for VA will 
necessitate amending MAL and its corresponding legal documents, 
assigning an evidence-based budget, and bolstering the legal support 
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to the state. Functional changes to MAL include, inter alia, develop-
ing a legal status for EO victims, introducing the necessary procedures 
at all VA stages, and establishing specialized state bodies to lead the 
national VA response.28 More data-driven budget allocations would 
also be crucial. Lastly, it would be beneficial to dedicate adequate 
resources to legal VA (and mine action) capacities within the gov-
ernment to identify further gaps in legislation and help develop the 
required legal acts. 
Data Collection. There is an acute need to put into place a stan-
dardized and centralized collection of EO casualty data given the 
many issues that arise from its absence. For this, a state policy should 
be developed and integrated with clear terms and with a distribution of 
responsibilities among the relevant stakeholders—as is the case in, for 
example, Cambodia. Such a database should be sex, age, and disability 
disaggregated, including causes of injuries and incidents from earlier 
stages of the conflict. It is important to include data on incidents that 
have taken place in NGCAs to ensure that victims have access to assis-
tance in GCAs. As a result, it would be possible to amalgamate, verify, 
and report on the incident data via a centralized database and populate 
a VIS. Statistical information from such a national database should be 
available upon request to all relevant mine action and VA stakeholders. 
This will help better identify EO victims, assess the complexity and 
extent of VA needs, and aid further analyses.
Emergency and Continuing Medical 
Care. Emergency and continuing medical 
care for EO victims in Ukraine requires 
capacity building of medical staff, supervi-
sion of EO victims, and allocation of funds 
for travel expenses. To boost the specialist 
knowledge of doctors, a coordinated plan 
for their capacity enhancements ought to 
be developed and implemented. Training 
will need to be registered and monitored for 
refreshment and assessment of continued 
needs. Since families tend to put less prior-
ity into continued medical care, individual 
supervision of EO victims by medical staff is 
highly recommended. Medical staff should 
be aware of cases where ongoing treatment 
is required, and efforts should be made on 
both sides (caregivers and medical insti-
tutions) to ensure that child EO victims 
receive all necessary care. Due to frequent 
long-distance travel required for continu-
ing treatments, the allocation of state funds 
could bring much-needed financial relief to 
EO victims and their families.
Rehabilitation. In terms of reha-
bilitation, we recommend an improved, 
full-cycled, tailor-made, and needs-
based VA system. The current model5 
should be replaced by an improved ver-
sion in the provision, care, and main-
tenance of prostheses, aligned with international 
experience and featuring a broader array of technologies. Furthermore, 
a full-cycle, coordinated methodology for the registration and follow- 
on care of EO victims ought to be put into place and linked with 
records from other types of assistance provided (i.e., psycho-social, 
financial). The rehabilitation for EO victims also needs to be personal-
ized. Patients should be supported from the initial injury all the way 
through recovery to exiting the system. A dedicated case manager 
should act as a focal point for each family so the process is streamlined 
and lessens the burden on the EO victims. Finally, EO victims need 
to receive equal prioritization for treatment as those injured by other 
means: support should be needs- rather than cause-based. 
Psychological and Psycho-Social Support. Psychological and 
psycho-social support requires coordination, governmental strategies, 
awareness raising and advocacy, as well as a needs-based approach. 
Lessons learned from other countries29 would be useful in developing 
a coordinated support system for EO victims in Ukraine. A dedicated 
governmental strategy and an allocated budget would ensure access to 
higher quality psychological treatment. To counteract the reluctance 
for this support, more awareness raising and advocacy of its impor-
tance in the post-traumatic treatment process should be garnered 
among national duty-bearers (especially schools in eastern Ukraine) 
and the general public. Lastly, ongoing counselling and psychological 
Child EO victim in Svatove, Luhansk region.
Image courtesy of © UNICEF / Filippov / 2019.
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support for EO victims should be identified as part of the overall 
rehabilitation and social inclusion plan for each victim and regularly 
reviewed throughout their path to recovery. 
Socioeconomic Inclusion. The four main recommendations for 
improvements in the social and economic inclusion of EO victims 
are special approaches to education, capacity building of teachers, 
disability-centered extracurricular activities, and awareness raising. It 
is necessary to specify the particular learning objectives for EO victims 
comparative to their peers without disabilities; to establish individual 
training or online learning during their treatment; and to ensure their 
greater involvement in programs befitting their needs, including voca-
tional assistance to enhance their employability. Since the response of 
teachers to the needs of EO victims fundamentally affects the qual-
ity of education and the environment at schools, supporting programs 
(such as inclusion training) for teachers and children ought to be 
implemented to build their technical and practical capacities. Regular 
awareness raising for parents, children, communities, and state rep-
resentatives to broaden their knowledge on appropriate attitudes 
towards children with disabilities would also be beneficial. “People on 
the bus would avert their eyes upon seeing them so my children asked 
me to buy them balaclavas,” explained a parent of child EO victims. 
For the conflict-affected Donetsk and Luhansk regions, further efforts 
are likewise required in the development of specialized extracurricular 
programs as well as sporting and recreational facilities for EO victims 
and other people with disabilities.
CONCLUSION: FUTURE VA ASSESSMENTS
 Taking into account various international policies and guidelines, 
the assessment of Ukraine’s VA looked at (1) gaps in the underpinning 
legal environment, (2) data collection, (3) emergency and continuing 
medical care, (4) rehabilitation, (5) psychological and psycho-social 
support, (6) and socioeconomic inclusion. However, given the limita-
tions of the present assessment, more in-depth studies are recom-
mended for particular segments of VA in the future. For example, it 
would be pertinent to assess the socioeconomic impact of accidents on 
child EO victims. The formative years in which child EO victims expe-
rience the incidents call for the identification of educational, career, 
and life prospects of children post-accident. Moreover, a more detailed 
look at the psychological impact of the armed conflict on the entire 
social strata would inform VA specialists how to better address 
psycho-social and psychological consequences. A further inquiry into 
the rehabilitation, prosthesis, and orthotics systems is likewise deemed 
key, especially for alignment with IMAS on VA (including physiother-
apy, assistive devices, and occupational and speech therapy). 
Additionally, we recognize that future assessments of medical capaci-
ties ought to be conducted by medically-qualified personnel and 
benchmarked against good practices as illustrated elsewhere. 
See endnotes page 66
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I
n Colombia, the use of anti-personnel mines is the result of 
more than sixty years of armed conf lict. The Office of the High 
Commissioner for Peace1 - Descontamina Colombia (OACP-DC 
by its Spanish acronym), the current national mine action author-
ity (NMAA) in Colombia, recorded 11,828 explosive ordnance (EO) 
victims between 1985 (when victim data recording started) and 
2019.2 Furthermore, Colombia is one of nine countries where new 
anti-personnel mines are still being emplaced by non-state armed 
groups,3 which presents a challenge for the mine action sector.   
The aim of explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) is to reduce 
the risk of accidents by raising awareness and promoting safe behav-
ior among EO-affected communities,4 which also helps to strengthen 
Characteristics Category Number Percentage
Gender Women 114 5.8%
Men 1,844 94.2%
Age Below the age of 18 268 13.7%
Above the age of 18 1,690 86.3%
Activity Public Force 964 49.2%
Proximity 225 11.5%
Eradication of illicit crops* 173 8.8%
No information 123 6.3%
Collecting food, water, or wood 85 4.3%
Walking on a usual road 85 4.3%
Playing 70 3.6%
Agriculture 63 3.2%
Public Force activities 42 2.1%
Handling 41 2.1%
Looking after animals 35 1.8%
Cleared area 18 0.9%
Walking on dirt roads (shortcuts) 10 0.5%
Hunting and fishing 9 0.5%
Maintenance of infrastructure 7 0.4%
Demining work 4 0.2%
Working at home 4 0.2%
Impact Killed 1,706 87.1%
Injured 252 12.9%
Total 1,958
Table 1. Sociodemographic characteristics of explosive ordnance (EO) victims 
in Colombia, between 2012 and 2019.
Table courtesy of Office of the High Commissioner for Peace-Descontamina 
Colombia (OACP-DC).







Below the age of 18 191,149 38%







Emergency situations 171,674 34.9%
Table 2. Characteristics of EORE beneficiaries in Colombia between 2012 and 2019. 
Table courtesy of (OACP-DC).
Background photo: During 2019 and 2020, more than 197 thousand people have benefited from awareness-raising and training processes in Explosive Ordnance Education (EORE).
Image courtesy of OACP-DC.
communities’ relationships with mine action operators and facilitates 
information gathering during non-technical survey.5 The Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database has been 
used to officially record EORE in Colombia since 2010, although 
there is evidence of some previous EORE activities.6 The development 
of EORE has been progressive and one of the major achievements is 
the implementation of three different operational models in various 
regions of the country that respond to specific needs. These models 
are (a) EORE in the educational field, which was the first model to be 
implemented; (b) EORE during emergency situations, including rapid 
response EORE;7 and (c) EORE within the humanitarian demining 
and land release framework.8 Currently, the information management 
(IM) department of OACP-DC has advanced toward a more systematic 
and strategic use of the information provided by EORE organizations.
 This study, funded by The Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement in the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs (PM/WRA), aims to provide a characterization of EO victims 
and EORE activities between 2012 and 2019 in Colombia, and to iden-
tify the lessons learned and challenges faced. 
METHODS
The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) carried out data analy-
sis from 2012-2019 using the organization’s statistics repository and 
the EORE activities and EO-victims’ databases.9 Only direct beneficia-
ries were included in this analysis and included the number of people 
receiving EORE safety messages through interpersonal EORE, mass 
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and digital media EORE, and training of trainers in EORE delivery. 
The analysis included descriptions of the main characteristics of vic-
tims, the density of EO victims, and EORE beneficiaries by depart-
ments in the ten most strongly affected municipalities. Additionally, 
FSD carried out a correlation analysis between EORE activities and 
the annual number of victims. Challenges encountered and lessons 
learned were identified by secondary research through a documentary 
review and analysis in collaboration with the OACP-DC EORE team.
RESULTS: EO VICTIMS AND EORE 
STATISTICS
From 2012 to 2019, 1,958 victims were 
recorded, corresponding to 16.5 percent of the 
total 11,828 victims registered in Colombia 
since 1985. According to the sociodemo-
graphic characteristics of the victims (see 
Table 1), the majority were male and gener-
ally over eighteen years of age, and 87 percent 
were injured during the course of the accident 
(13 percent were killed). Accidents most com-
monly occurred during public force10 activi-
ties (51.4 percent), walking near mined zones 
(11.5 percent), and during the manual eradica-
tion of illicit crops (8.8 percent). 
In the period under analysis, the high-
est number of victims (295) was recorded 
in 2012, followed by a progressive decrease 
until 2017 (Figure 2). Six out of the twenty-six 
EO-contaminated departments in Colombia 
presented 70 percent of the total number of victims (Antioquia, 
Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, Caquetá, Cauca, Arauca). 
At the municipality level, victims were recorded in 187 out of 1,222 
municipalities of Colombia, with the following distribution: two to 
nine victims in 55 percent of the municipalities, ten to twenty-nine 
victims in 18 percent, and one victim in 17 percent of the municipali-
ties. The municipality of Tumaco, in the Nariño department, ranked 
first with 11 percent of the total victims.  
With regards to EORE activities, the 
reporting process to OACP-DC by EORE 
organizations, and the subsequent record 
in the IMSMA database, has improved and 
led to more reliable data in recent years 
compared to the beginning of the study 
period. According to IMSMA, 15,797 
activities were reported by forty differ-
ent organizations, with a total of 491,955 
beneficiaries during the study period 
(Figure 3). Eighty percent of EORE activi-
ties were carried out within the last three 
years of the period, with 2019 being the 
year with the highest number of activities 
(7,496 activities and 191,916 direct ben-
eficiaries): more than double compared 
with the previous two years. According to 
the EORE model applied (Table 2), 1,639 
activities (53,156 beneficiaries) corre-
spond to EORE in the educational field; 
5,436 (171,674 beneficiaries) to EORE in 
emergency situations; 5,308 (92,106 ben-
eficiaries) to humanitarian demining 
EORE; and 3,414 (175,019 beneficiaries) 
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Figure 1. Number of victims and number of beneficiaries by department.





































Figure 2. Number of victims per year by department
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The geographical distribution of EORE activities was consistent 
with the official categorization of the municipalities in accordance 
with their EO impact level, from type I (highest impact) to type 
IV (lowest impact), based on the number of victims in the last five 
years, the state of land restitution, the presence of illegal armed 
groups, and the presence of illicit crops. In fact, 93.6 percent of the 
EORE activities targeted type I and II municipalities, which are the 
most heavily affected. Figure 1 shows number of beneficiaries and 
victims by department. 
Figure 4 shows the superposition of the beneficiaries (shades of blue) 
and the victims (red dots) for two periods (2012–2015 and 2016–2019). 
This information was desegregated by departments to show compari-
sons between the two periods (Table 3). The distribution of victims is 
similar in both periods, although in the first period there is a higher 
density of victims in departments such as Antioquia (north) and in the 
southern Pacific region (Nariño and Cauca), Putumayo and Caquetá—
all regions highly-affected by the armed conflict. In the second period, 
there is a decrease in the number of victims and an increase in EORE 
activities, illustrated by areas highlighted in dark blue (higher num-
ber of beneficiaries). Both the proportion of activities in type I and II 
municipalities, as well as the increase in activities in recent years in the 
department of Nariño, show that activities in the most affected areas 
have been prioritized. 
Figure 3. EORE beneficiaries per year (2012–2019).
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Finally, Figure 5 shows the relationship between the number of 
EORE activities and victims, highlighting a change since 2016, where 
the curve flattened and maintained a flat trend. This indicates a 
decrease of the number of victims and an increase of EORE activi-
ties. Unfortunately, it is challenging to confirm a cause-effect relation-
ship between the increase of EORE and the decrease of victims due 
to a lack of systematic monitoring of behavioral changes following 
EORE training. As Durham et al. (2005) pointed out, there are several 
factors (socio-environmental and political)11 that influence human 
behaviors. In Colombia, factors related to socioeconomic disparities 
at the regional level may contribute to civilians engaging in unsafe 
behaviors. Some examples include the lack of equality in accessing 
education (mostly between rural and urban areas), which leads to a 
higher proportion of children not attending school nor receiving edu-
cation on safe behaviors. Indigenous communities (widely affected 
by the conflict and extreme poverty) are often permanently displaced 
and may be difficult to access. Economic activities (rural) can also 
lead to unsafe behaviors as civilians must use the land or move around 
in dangerous areas.
CHALLENGES: 
EORE SCOPE AND 
PRIORITIZATION
The implementation of EORE 
actions in all contaminated areas 
is unfeasible in a country like 
Colombia due to the topography, 
accessibility, security issues, and 
distribution of contamination. 
Therefore, it is necessary to focus 
EORE efforts on the most heavily-
affected and vulnerable zones. 
In this scenario, one option is to 
increase the number of participants 
per EORE activity according to spe-
cific criteria, such as belonging to 
high-risk categories (i.e., farmers 
and manual eradicators).12 Accord-
ing to OACP-DC, municipalities are 
selected for EORE according to one 
of the following three reasons: (1) 
type I and II municipalities not open 
to humanitarian demining opera-
tions, (2) high-vulnerable munici-
palities due to history of significant 
armed conflict, and (3) municipali-
ties where humanitarian demining 
is taking place.
However, in the case of the 
department of Nariño, a high num-
ber of victims correlates with criti-
cal socioeconomic issues. Therefore, 
this must be approached not only 
from a  “number of victims” per-
spective, but also by taking into account aspects such as security issues, 
geographical characteristics that may affect mobilization, access to 
health services, cultural specificities, etc. This enables more context-
specific interventions, acknowledging why current unsafe behaviors 
exist and what limitations can affect the expected behavioral change in 
the communities.  
CHALLENGES: MONITORING AND EVALUATION
The NMAA has established EORE internal and external quality 
monitoring procedures. According to the current EORE national 
mine action standard (NMAS), a two-step accreditation process 
for EORE organizations is defined as (1) a preliminary accredita-
tion called “authorization,” which enables operations to start and (2) 
a full accreditation after having acquired a pre-defined minimum 
experience. In order to comply with the EORE NMAS, EORE orga-
nizations need to carry out an initial evaluation of their capacity, 
define an improvement plan, and then monitor the progress against 
that plan. The external quality assurance (QA) is carried out peri-
odically by the NMAA.
Department 2012-2015 2016-2019 Total
Victims % Beneficiaries % Victims % Beneficiaries % Victims % Beneficiaries %
Antioquia 286 19 14,064 17 55 13 37,279 9 341 17 51,343 10
Nariño 217 14 3,754 5 106 24 87,217 21 323 16 90,971 18
Putamayo 164 11 4,797 6 7 2 20,871 5 171 9 25,668 5
Caquetá 156 10 4,267 5 13 3 14,678 4 169 9 18,945 4
Cauca 105 7 9,754 12 14 3 35,075 9 119 6 44,829 9
Norte de 
Santander 105 7 5,689 7 88 20 51,898 13 193 10 57,587 12
Meta 90 6 5,483 7 3 1 14,546 4 93 5 20,029 4
Auauca 82 5 4,889 6 41 9 42,178 10 123 6 47,067 10
Tolima 63 4 1,527 2 4 1 8,993 2 67 3 10,520 2
Chocó 59 4 3,488 4 36 8 37,082 9 95 5 40,570 8
Huila 54 4 1,023 1 4 1 8,517 2 58 3 9,540 2
Córdoba 45 3 1,633 2 7 2 8,287 2 52 3 9,920 2
Valle del Cauca 39 3 3,427 4 5 1 8,374 2 44 2 11,801 2
Guaviare 19 1 2,627 3 28 6 3,422 1 47 2 6,049 1
Bolívar 8 1 3,625 4 16 4 11,057 3 24 1 14,682 3
La Guajira 6 0 550 1 0 0 295 0 6 0 845 1
Vichada 6 0 34 0 0 0 140 0 6 0 174 0
Boyacá 5 0 658 1 1 0 2,066 1 6 0 2,724 1
Magdalena 4 0 36 0 0 0 142 0 4 0 178 0
Amazonas 3 0 0 0 0 0 414 0 3 0 414 0
Casanare 3 0 783 1 0 0 2,674 1 3 0 3,457 1
Bogatá DC 2 0 375 0 0 0 1,679 0 2 0 2,054 0
Santander 1 0 3,234 4 0 0 5,193 1 1 0 8,427 2
Vaupés 1 0 0 0 0 0 769 0 1 0 769 0
Atlántico 0 0 12 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 13 0
Caldas 0 0 3,072 4 0 0 2,956 1 0 0 6,028 1
Cesar 0 0 299 0 3 1 946 0 3 0 1,245 0
Cundinamarca 0 0 518 1 0 0 375 0 0 0 893 0
Guainía 0 0 0 0 0 0 68 0 0 0 68 0
Quindío 0 0 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 0
Risaralda 0 0 466 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 466 0
Sucre 0 0 573 1 4 1 4,039 1 4 0 4,612 1
Table 3. Comparison indicating number of victims and beneficiaries between departments over two periods.
Table courtesy of OACP-DC.
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One of the issues identified in the current QA process relates to the 
variety of organizations providing EORE (humanitarian NGOs, dem-
ining organizations, private foundations, and citizen organizations), 
resulting in very different capacities. Therefore, the standardized 
evaluation is currently applied with some flexibility according to each 
organization type, especially pertaining to community-based organi-
zations (survivors, indigenous, and afro-descendant). As soon as all 
organizations are authorized to conduct EORE, monitoring shall take 
place to ensure the standardization of minimum practices in accor-
dance with the implemented EORE model. 
Finally, a clearly defined monitoring and evaluation strategy must 
be identified. Currently, this task is not being performed in a system-
atic manner. Therefore, standardized indicators at both strategic and 
operational levels should be defined, in addition to the construction of 
the baseline, and all data should be consistently gathered and reported 
to the National Authority. This data should help clarify how local 
populations are affected by EO and inform programs about trends 
or changes impacting the vulnerability of communities. Finally, the 
implementation of an evaluation system should be established in order 
to measure the real impact of activities, including an effective ethnical 
and gender-sensitive approach. 
EORE MESSAGES AND DISSEMINATION METHODS
In addition to standard face-to-face EORE meetings, OACP-DC 
implemented alternative dissemination methods during the study 
period. Specifically, radio advertisement broadcasts were released 
in thirty-four municipalities of thirteen departments in 2015. In 
addition, a strategy named “Safe Steps” was implemented by the 
Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco in collaboration with Discovery 
Channel, resulting in a mini-series with video-informative capsules 
and virtual strategies that were used to promote safe behaviors in 
EO-affected regions. Moreover, in order to 
overcome the challenge of defining standard-
ized messages, a national technical board was 
arranged in February 2020 to review the peda-
gogical roadmap with adjusted and updated 
EORE messages, where inputs made by the 
involved organizations were discussed. Finally, 
the NMAA is currently working on the inclu-
sion of a multicultural approach for EORE. This 
last aspect is necessary, considering that one of 
the objectives for 2020 is the construction of a 
guideline document for the implementation of 
EORE with an ethnically sensitive approach, 
which will be translated or adapted to native 
languages to facilitate its implementation in the 
field.13 
LESSONS LEARNED 
EORE activities in Colombia are performed 
in a coordinated manner between OACP-DC 
and EORE partners, technically supported by 
UNICEF. Technical support includes updating 
messages of the EORE pedagogical route and designing guidelines 
and other materials; updating the EORE standard and EORE models 
(educational field, humanitarian demining, and emergencies); and 
construction and implementation of the EORE Quality Management 
System (accreditation, certification, and quality control). Under this 
coordination, an EORE National Standard was constructed and 
updated, and EORE models were standardized. This understand-
ing permitted experienced organizations, in accordance with the 
Colombian context, to use and implement proven experiences from 
other countries.
Since 2006, the NMAA conducted periodic technical meetings 
with all stakeholders performing, advising, monitoring, funding, or 
investigating EORE activities and educational institutions. This activ-
ity allowed all stakeholders to share best practices and innovative 
approaches, identify shortcomings, and reach agreements in order to 
standardize and continuously improve EORE in Colombia.
 In Colombia, several areas highly affected by the conflict do not 
have stable security conditions necessary for the implementation of 
humanitarian demining operations. In these areas, EORE represents 
the first approach to reduce the risk of EO accidents, enable liaison with 
the community, and help to create the conditions for future humani-
tarian demining. Additionally, the presence of illicit crops, which is 
usually related to critical security issues, highlights the importance of 
delivering EORE sessions to manual crop eradicators and identifying 
the numerous risks they face, including a higher risk of accidents. 
CONCLUSION 
In the last few years, there has been a significant increase in EORE 
activities in Colombia, supported by an important standardization 
effort on all EORE models implemented in the country. Although 
information management of EORE data has improved, there is still 
Figure 5. Correlation between accumulative number of victims and EORE activities.
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room for more systematic and consistent data gathering, recording, 
and analysis at both an operational and strategic level. Similarly, the 
lack of a monitoring and evaluation system prevents the quantification 
of the impact of the different EORE programs.
Evaluation of the correlation between EORE activities and the 
number of victims cannot be a quantitative task alone. Qualitative 
studies are also required to ascertain whether the expected change of 
behaviors has been achieved through methodologies previously 
implemented in countries like Afghanistan and Somalia.14 Finally, the 
definition of a context-specific prioritization methodology for target-
ing specific areas and beneficiary groups is one of the main remaining 
challenges, strongly affected by the continually changing security 
conditions. 
See endnotes page 67
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PROOF: How Small Drones Can Find Buried 
Landmines in the Desert using Airborne 
IR Thermography 
By John Fardoulis [ Mobility Robotics ], Xavier Depreytere, Pierre Gallien, Kheira Djouhri, Ba Abdourhmane, and Emmanuel 
Sauvage [ Humanity & Inclusion ]
Hypotheses and speculation have circulated for at least three decades regarding how IR thermography could be viable as a technique for locating buried landmines in arid environments. 
However, there has been a lack of proof under actual field conditions.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no previous research occur-
ring before October 2019 validated how temperature anomalies could 
be identified under field conditions by small unmanned aircraft sys-
tems (i.e., drones) using thermal/long wave infrared (IR or LWIR) 
imaging, also known as thermography, to indicate the location of 
buried anti-personnel and anti-tank landmines in legacy desert 
minefields. Evidenced-based and field driven, Mobility Robotics and 
Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International, HI) estab-
lished new, state-of-the-art knowledge in October 2019 regarding the 
use of small drones in humanitarian mine action (HMA). Airborne 
data collected via drones indicated the position of more than 2,500 
legacy, in-situ landmines in Chad. 
Addressing many overall questions regarding small drones in 
HMA, the Odyssey2025 Project—led by HI and Mobility Robotics—
closely collaborated with the national mine action center in Chad, 
the Haut Commissariat National au Déminage (HCND), to complete 
activities and objectives. As part of a holistic approach, the primary 
objective was to determine how small drones could add value in HMA 
field operations and augment other assets at both simple and advanced 
perspectives. This research is from an advanced perspective, following 
on from the work previously published in The Journal of Conventional 
Weapons Destruction outlining how low-cost consumer drones can 
augment HMA operations at a simple level using visual imagery and 
GIS/cartography/photogrammetry.1
This article aims to advance the field’s understanding of drones and 
their ability to indicate the location of buried objects. Elements that 
set this work apart from other drone and thermal/LWIR research over 
recent years include:
1. a concentration on buried objects;
2. the capturing of in-situ airborne data at active, legacy mine-
fields; 
3. the burying of production landmines containing real explosives 
to capture high temporal resolution data at a controlled field test 
site;
4. an onus on proof in a harsh, remote, real-world environment—
incorporating local weather and environmental influences—that 
Image 1. An onus on proof—moving the needle under actual field conditions at 30-year-old legacy desert minefields in Chad.
All graphics courtesy of authors.
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
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provides validation under actual field conditions; and 
5. the applied activities that took place with HMA actors to develop 
a practical, real-world methodology that achieves a humanitar-
ian impact.
HYPOTHESIS
Buried landmines interfere with how temperature is stored in and 
travels through the ground, creating hot or cold patches on the sur-
face above buried objects. The different surface temperature above the 
buried landmine is an anomaly, an indicator of where contamination 
exists beneath. The strength and timing of when a hot or cold patch 
appears during the day or night depends on many complex weather 
and environmental variables at the time.2–6
HMA SCOPE
Presently, the scope of thermal-camera-equipped drones in HMA is 
to use them as a survey tool and during planning and evaluation phases, 
to better define the types of landmines present, locations of mine rows, 
and contamination densities in arid (and perhaps semi-arid) environ-
ments. Operating from a safe distance outside of the minefield, users 
can leverage drone technology to pinpoint where buried landmines 
exist in order to more effectively and efficiently use ground assets such 
as manual deminers and animal/mechanical assets. By first mapping 
patterned minefields, operators can apply lessons learned to deal with 
more complex minefield layouts. Drone technology is a survey tool, 
which does not work in isolation, so missing some landmines is accept-
able as the missing objects will be found by ground teams when they 
undertake technical survey or clearance work. 
A challenge in HMA is pinpointing where contaminated areas are 
located within larger suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). Systematic 
approaches across a general area are necessary for safety but can mean 
that millions of dollars are spent sending ground assets to areas where 
landmines do not exist. Starting clearance from where landmines 
exist and working from the inside of a minefield outward, operators 
can potentially reduce the size of work areas where ground assets are 
deployed. Hence, there is potential for drone technology to reduce 
costs, accelerate land release, and improve safety in arid and perhaps 
semi-arid environments.
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The Odyssey2025 Project included the following field validation and 
data collection elements:
1. Field validation regarding the viability of airborne IR thermog-
raphy involved remotely collecting in-situ landmine data via 
drone over legacy minefields during the hot and cold seasons of 
October 2019 and March 2020 respectively.
2. High temporal and spatial resolution data was captured at a con-
trolled field test site using production landmines recovered from 
surrounding minefields (minus fuzes). These mines were bur-
ied at known depths inside the perimeter of actual minefields 
(Figure 3b). The controlled field test site continuously captured 
data at one-minute intervals over more than four 24-hour daily 
cycles during the cold season in March 2020.
TEST LOCATIONS
Fieldwork took place at minefields in the Sahara Desert, north-
ern Chad, 280 km from the southern Libyan border (Figure 3a). The 
three main landmine types present at these locations were all mini-
mum metal types: PMA-3 anti-personnel, PPM-2 anti-personnel, and 
PRB-M3A1 anti-tank landmines. Additionally, NR-109 trip flares and 
a smaller number of metallic NR442 bounding anti-personnel land-
mines were present. 
AIRBORNE DATA
In October 2019, most flights over minefields started before 4:00 a.m. 
and continued until sunrise. Flying at night was preferred during the 
Figure 1. In-situ minefield data captured by a small drone from a height of 35 m 
above ground level (AGL) in Chad. Anomalies from twenty-seven legacy buried 
landmines are visible in this thermal/LWIR image. Thirteen PRB-M3A1 anti-tank 
landmines are in rows at the top and bottom. Fourteen PMA-3 anti-personnel 
landmines are in the two middle mine rows.
Figure 2. Above, anomalies from nine PMA-3 anti-personnel landmines can be 
seen from a flying height of 25 m AGL in this thermal/LWIR image. The PMA-3 is 
cold when on the surface at night (darker surface dot above), whereas the PRB-
M3A1 and PPM-2 are warm when interfacing with the air at night.
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colder March 2020 period, an hour after sunset, until 10:00 p.m. This 
was because variability in seasonal conditions seemed to determine 
when anomalies would appear strongest to the thermal cameras.
Data was captured from ten different legacy minefield locations to 
cover a variety of natural conditions and landmine types. Several of 
these locations were revisited at different times of the day and night 
during both seasons. 
A form of minefield ground-truthing methodology was developed 
using visual and thermal/LWIR imagery together. Mine rows were 
laid using traditional military tactics and often appeared in linear 
patterns. To validate that anomalies were from landmines, research-
ers flew drones over locations where rows of surface mines were visible 
from erosion and then directed the drone flight left or right along that 
line, where buried landmines were not visible to the naked eye. This 
method provided confidence that anomalies captured in thermal/
LWIR data represented buried landmines (Figure 4). Mine row pat-
terns were followed by flying along thermal anomalies using a scout-
ing methodology (following the anomaly dots in real time) to make 
judgement calls regarding the extent of contamination and where 
minefield borders may be located. MAG (Mines Advisory Group) also 
provided researchers with data from past clearance operations, which 
noted the models of landmines found in the area and how they were 
laid in patterns, at set distances from each other.
CONTROLLED FIELD TESTING
A grid of 80 x 80 cm boxes was established at the field test site, where 
production landmines, landmines free from explosives (FFE), and a 
range of different simulant designs were buried for comparison. 
A thermal/LWIR camera7 was mounted on a 7-meter-high mast, 
with a field of view of sixty-six boxes, which captured images every 
minute. Thermocouple probes with data loggers that captured infor-
mation at two-minute intervals were buried at different depths above, 
away from, attached to, and inserted inside landmines. 
EQUIPMENT AND SOFTWARE
Commercially available equipment and sensors were utilized. A 
DJI FLIR Zenmuse XT8 thermal/LWIR camera with a 13 mm lens, 
640 x 512 pixel resolution, and radiometric data capture capabilities 
was attached to the drone. An additional thermal/LWIR camera/sen-
sor with almost identical capabilities, the FLIR Duo Pro R,7 was also 
purchased for the controlled test site. The small drone used was an 
industrial (not consumer) model: an off-the-shelf DJI Matrice M210 v2 
quadcopter9 (Image 3). The same software and similar procedures were 
utilized for data processing and storage as those for visual imagery.1
Figure 3(a). The arrow and red marker show the location of the minefields where 
work took place in the Sahara Desert, 280 km south of the Libyan border with 
Chad. 
3(b) The minefield perimeter area and ten different f lying, field validation loca-
tions. Also the location of the test site, within a 10 km radius of active, in-situ 
legacy minefields.
Buried PMA-3 AP landmine (a)
Buried PRB-M3A1 AV landmine (b)
PMA-3 AP mine row (ii)
PMA-3 AP mine row (i)
PRM-M3A1 AV mine row (iii)
Surface PMA-3
Surface PRB-M3A1 Mine row spacing
Thermal/LWIR image
Active Minefield-Image No: 00502 Landmine Type(s): PMA-3, PRB-M3A1
Figure 4. Above shows an example of ground-truthing or visual validation from 
outside of the minefields. A thermal/LWIR image from the small drone is joined 
to a high-resolution daylight image. The same pattern continues in mine rows (a) 
and (b), after surface landmines are no longer seen from mine rows (ii) and (iii). 
Sub-surface anomalies maintained the same horizontal spacing and object size as 
for landmines exposed on the surface (from erosion). With high-resolution, small-
drone daylight imagery, we could identify the type and model of each mine on 
the surface in mine rows (i)–(iii). This taught us how to interpret thermal anomaly 
signatures and identify specific local patterns then progress in finding anomalies 
from buried mine rows without the need for patterns on the surface as a starting 
point.
Image 2. Setting up the controlled field test site to bury: production, FFE, and sim-
ulant landmines from where IR thermography data was automatically captured at 
one-minute intervals, 24-hours a day.
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RESULTS
Characterizing Thermal Anomalies. The sand surface was nois-
ier during the day from the effect of sunshine when anomalies from 
buried landmines were warmer than the surrounding sand. Hence, 
colder thermal anomalies are presented in airborne IR thermography 
data captured at night. 
Different in-situ signatures were recorded via drone-mounted ther-
mal cameras for the three main types of landmines present. At night, 
each produced a cooler buried anomaly, with the PPM-2 and PRB-
M3A1 appearing warmer than the sand when exposed to the surface. 
However, the PMA-3 was cooler than the surrounding sand when 
exposed to the surface (Figure 2, Figure 4). 
The cylindrical pressure plate (PP) of the PRB-M3A1 displayed dif-
ferent thermal characteristics than its square plastic body containing 
6 kg of explosives. The PP was colder than the body area when buried 
but warmer than surrounding sand if very close to the surface or par-
tially exposed (Figure 5, Figure 6).
Natural objects such as stones and manmade objects did not create 
too much noise in competing with anomaly signatures from buried 
landmines (Figure 9). Airborne IR thermography was effective in also 
locating secondary indicators, such as metal posts which were internal 
minefield reference markers indicating how mine rows were laid. 
Image 3. Fieldwork at remote, in-situ Sahara Desert minefields using a small indus-
trial model, off-the-shelf, DJI Matrice M210 v2 quadcopter with advanced sensors.
Image 4. The PRB-M3A1 landmine, which showed different thermal anomaly char-
acteristics from the pressure plate than the square plastic body filled with 6 kilo-
grams of explosives.
Optimal Flying Height. Data was captured from heights of 3 m 
(Figure 5) above ground level (AGL) to 100 m AGL. The maximum 
effective range at which these anomalies could be identified was from a 
flying height of 80 meters AGL for buried PRB-M3A1 anti-tank land-
mines, and at 30–35 m AGL for PMA-3 anti-personnel landmines. 
Greater efficiency is gained by flying higher because a larger footprint 
is captured in each image and the drone can fly faster, covering more 
ground per unit of energy. Figure 7 shows anomalies from nine buried 
landmines in a footprint captured from the sensor at 20 m AGL, com-
pared to Figure 1 showing twenty-seven anomalies in a footprint cap-
tured by the sensor at 35 m AGL. A more extreme example can be seen 
in Figure 8 at a height of 55 m AGL. Twenty-four anti-tank landmine 
anomalies appear across the top and bottom rows. From the pattern in 
that location, we know that there are two anti-personnel mine rows in 
the middle with similar spacing. Hence it is not unreasonable to infer 
that around forty-eight anomalies exist in this thermal/LWIR image. 
Optimal flying heights would need to be reviewed by season or per-
haps on individual days according to the strength of anomalies.
Controlled Field Testing. The controlled field test site captured 
quantitative data regarding the impact of a diurnal cycle, weather, and 
the local environment. One of our main objectives was to determine 
Figure 5. Small drone flying data showing thermal signature characteristics of a 
PRB-M3A1 AV landmine (Image 4). Thermal characteristics of an in-situ partially 
buried PRB-M3A1 can be seen in (a). At night, a ring around the pressure plate 
is hotter when interfacing with the air. See (b) for a cross section of a pressure 
plate to understand why. In (a), parts of the plastic body exposed to the air are 
warmer, and sections of the body interacting with the sand, including 6 kilograms 
explosives are cooler. Different thermal anomalies from another two buried in-
situ PRB-M3A1 landmines are shown in (c) and (d), where (c) is deeper because the 
pressure plate anomaly is colder than for the square body of the landmine, and (d) 
is shallower and very close to the surface as the pressure plate anomaly is warmer 
than from the body. However, (d) is not exposed very much because a hotter ring 
around pressure plate like (a) would be evident if interacting with the air.
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which times to fly the small drone. The following are some of the high-
lights based on a reference PMA-3 anti-personnel landmine (Image 5). 
The reference landmine provided a trackable benchmark over time to 
provide observable differences that weather and environmental vari-
ables made on anomaly signatures captured by the thermal/LIWR cam-
era. It also provided a benchmark to compare against anomalies from 
other landmine models and simulants buried at different depths.
Optimal Timeframe. Table 1 is a summary of anomaly strengths 
captured by the thermal/LWIR cameras over eleven different time slots 
during more than four 24-hour diurnal cycles. Captured under actual 
field conditions, the fifty-two data points presented in Table 1 take 
into account every single variable at the time. Sunrise was at around 
Figure 6. Proof that the tool works. Above is an airborne thermal/LWIR image of 
anomalies from a height of 10 m AGL. This indicates the location of three buried 
in-situ PRB-M3A1 anti-tank landmines. Close examination will show different ther-
mal responses from cylindrical pressure plates in the middle of each anomaly. This 
is different to how the square plastic body containing 6 kg of explosives reacts 
with the environment.
Figure 7. The thermal/LWIR image above was captured over active, legacy mine-
fields from a height of 20 m AGL. Anomalies from five PRB-M3A1 anti-tank land-
mines can be seen at the top, and four PMA-3 anti-personnel landmine anomalies 
at the bottom. Nine landmines are in this footprint.
Figure 8. Above, a thermal/LWIR image from a height of 55 m AGL. It is too high to 
see the anti-personnel landmine thermal anomalies in the middle two rows but 
enough resolution exists to see twelve anti-tank anomalies in each of the top and 
bottom rows. Assuming a similar number of anti-personnel landmines exist in the 
two middle rows, that makes around forty-eight anomalies in this thermal/LWIR 
image. It provides a good idea regarding where the edges of mine row borders 
are located.
Figure 9. above is an example of how stones appear from airborne in-situ 
thermal/LWIR data. In this case, surface and buried landmines could still be identi-
fied at night.
Image 5. Our reference PMA-3 anti-personnel landmine was buried at a depth of 1 
cm. It is shown above after excavation at the end of the study. The type of sandy 
environment can also be seen.
6:00 a.m., with sunset at around 5:30 p.m. The test site data in Table 1, 
Figure 10, and Figure 11 confirmed that a 2.5-hour period pre-dawn 
and up to 4 hours post-dusk were the best operating times, meaning 
night was the optimal time to search for anomalies. 
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Influence of the Clouds, Sun, and Wind. 
Cloud cover seemed to reduce how noisy the sand 
surface appeared to the sensor during the day, 
likely because of diffused reflectance from the sun. 
Data in Figure 12 from 9:00 a.m. on Day 3 and 9:00 
a.m. on Day 6 indicates that the anomony from the 
reference landmine is noisier on a sunny day com-
pared to a cloudy day. However, there was more 
wind on the sunny day, which could have a com-
bined effect. 
We found that the wind had an impact on the 
strength of thermal anomalies from buried land-
mines captured by the sensor. Figure 11 shows 
more detailed examples from the Table 1 sum-
mary, quantifying the strength of the thermal 
anomaly captured from our reference PMA-3 anti-
personnel landmine at 10:00 p.m. each night, over 
Time Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6
2:00 a.m. Weak Weak Weak Weak Medium
3:30 a.m. Strong Strong Weak Medium Medium
5:00 a.m. Strong Strong Weak Weak Medium
9:00 a.m. Medium Strong Weak Medium Strong
12:00 p.m. Weak Not Visible Not Visible Not Visible
2:00 p.m. Weak Not Visible Not Visible Not Visible
4:00 p.m. Weak Not Visible Not Visible Weak
6:00 p.m. Strong Strong Medium Medium Medium
8:00 p.m. Strong Strong Medium Weak Strong
10:00 p.m. Strong Strong Weak Not Visible Strong
12:00 a.m. Medium Strong Weak Weak Medium
Table 1. PMA-3 reference landmine anomaly strength over eleven time slots during more than four 
24-hour diurnal periods.
Figure 10. Above is data showing thermal anomalies during different times of the day and night (diurnal cycle) from Day 2 (Table 1) of our PMA-3 reference landmine. 
Thermal anomalies at night: pre-dawn at 5:00 a.m. (b) and post dusk at 8:00 p.m. (e) are stronger and clearer, which supports findings in Table 1 and Figure 11 that a few 
hours pre-dawn and post-dusk are the best operating times. Anomalies captured by the test site sensor at 2:00 a.m. (a), 12:00 p.m. (c) and 4:00 p.m. (d) are weaker and 
not very clear. Graphs show a surface cross section of the difference in temperature between the anomaly, and plain sand around it (driving force).
Figure 11. Above is test site data showing the impact of wind: using anomalies captured from the PMA-3 reference landmine, as an example at 10:00 p.m. each night over 
five consecutive nights. Conditions were calm on Days 1 and 2, with the wind picking up at 12:00 p.m. on Day 3 and dropping off at 8:00 p.m. on Day 5 (Table 1, Figure 
10). Hence, it was calm on the first, second, and fifth nights (a), (b), and (e), but windy during the third and fourth nights (c) and (d). The data shows that the strength of 
the anomaly was affected by the wind, with the clarity of the anomaly captured by the sensor dropping or disappearing at windy times. This proves that the viability 
of such a potential new tool can vary by day, depending on the local weather and environmental conditions. Graphs show a surface cross section of the difference in 
temperature between the anomaly, and plain sand around it (driving force).
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five nights. The anomaly was clearly visible during calm times but was 
weak or not visible to the sensor when the wind increased (Figure 11). 
Table 1 shows the anomaly strength over many other time slots, with 
variability being affected by the wind on Days 4 and 5. 
Impact of Depth. Figure 13 shows that the strength of anomalies 
reduces by landmine burial depth. The 3-cm-deep anomaly can be seen 
in the raw thermal/LWIR image but the anomaly from a 5 cm depth 
cannot be seen in the original thermal/LWIR image. A weak anomaly 
from the 5 cm depth can be seen in data exported in Figure 13(d), which 
might be improved with post-processing. 
Overall, landmines at in-situ legacy minefield locations seemed to cre-
ate more significant anomalies than the test site, which could be intensi-
fied after a much longer settling time in the ground and if an optimal 
Figure 12. Anomalies from our PMA-3 reference landmine at 9:00 a.m. when it 
was sunny (a) and cloudy (b). Numbers in the driving force graph (c) look better 
for (a) than the image suggests, as data seemed noisiest when it was sunny. There 
was also a combination of less wind, plus clouds in (b), meaning compounded 
variables.
Figure 13. Above is test site anomaly data from three different PMA-3 AP land-
mines buried at 1 cm (a), 3 cm (b), and 5 cm (c) depths during one of the better 
nights. (d) graphs the strength of each of (a)-(c) anomalies compared to sand’s 
natural surface temperature.
Image 6. Camping and working at night in the desert, surrounded by minefields is not an easy feat. At least ten skilled HMA personnel were required to 
support each campaign in the field and to ensure safety.
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amount of moisture had built up. More fieldwork data, ideally including 
simultaneous in-situ excavation at legacy minefields (covering every vari-
able) is required for better estimates of the maximum viable depth.
DISCUSSION
The emphasis of this article is to prove how small drone IR thermog-
raphy was an effective HMA tool in the Sahara Desert, northern Chad. 
Data collection and validation occurred under actual field conditions, 
in one of the most extreme environments on the planet—working in 
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), in a red zone, with the challenges 
of camping and operating reliably in extreme conditions, in between 
sandstorms, offline, at night, and with minimal infrastructure. At least 
ten skilled HMA personnel were required to support each campaign in 
the remote locations visited, and to ensure operational safety. 
We have shown evidence of how anomalies from anti-personnel and 
anti-tank landmines captured using IR thermography from a small 
drone at legacy minefields can be used as an effective survey technique 
to estimate the location of such buried objects. Proof can be seen in ten 
examples of airborne thermal/LWIR data: Figures 1, 2, and 4–9. 
We have shown that performance-affecting factors are flying height, 
physical properties of individual landmines, diurnal elements, burial 
depth, the sun, the wind, and possibly cloud cover. Ground water con-
tent and moisture are variables to consider in the future. Anecdotally, 
seasonal differences (hot vs. cooler season) appeared to make a differ-
ence. We suspect that temperature is the driving force causing this, so 
the time of the year with the greatest differences between day and night 
temperatures is most likely to give the greatest visualization. 
We have shown that in the field, multiple environmental and weather 
parameters are at play, each with different traits. Variability in weather 
conditions can affect an individual site by day. We found that high-
resolution off-the-shelf sensors7,8 were effective in capturing thermal 
anomalies from buried landmines. A micro drone with an integrated 
lower-resolution thermal sensor10 was tested and found to be inadequate. 
We have summarized findings to suggest that optimal operating 
times at locations in the Sahara Desert are at night. During optimal 
operating times, anomalies from buried landmines at locations visited 
in northern Chad were quite clear and did not require post-processing 
or deep-learning techniques for data to be useful. More information is 
required, ideally including simultaneous excavation at legacy in-situ 
minefields to determine the maximum landmine burial depth at which 
thermal anomalies can be identified.
A review of existing knowledge regarding IR thermography for 
locating buried landmines was made, ascertaining what was consid-
ered to be state-of-the-art. Our applied research built upon this to 
generate a new state-of-the-art in thermal/LWIR knowledge, which 
is hoped to become an initial starting point for future researchers. 
Mobility Robotics and HI learned practical lessons, with additional 
datasets in hand that will enable more specialized studies, extending 
beyond the scope of this introductory article.
We have visualized fifteen different anomalies in Figures 6-13 and 
analyzed fifty-two different anomalies in Table 1 from production 
landmines buried at our field test site. We have seen that thermal 
anomaly signatures can vary by each model of production landmine 
located at in-situ, legacy minefields, meaning that generalizations may 
not be accurate. We have also learned how to interpret nuances associ-
ated with each anomaly.
Lessons from the field suggest a weakness in general knowledge 
regarding landmine materials analysis from a thermographic perspec-
tive, particularly regarding the impact of materials such as rubber 
coatings and mechanical construction differences. Past work requires 
updating in the area of landmine simulant design.11–14 The use of air-
borne IR thermography could be extended to locate buried unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) and explosive remnants of war (ERW), utilizing the 
same test site methodology to verify optimal operating parameters by 
depth, object properties, diurnal cycle, environmental, and weather 
conditions. Such methodology could also be adapted for use in other 
sectors, such as archaeology, to define optimal operating parameters in 
finding buried objects.
CONCLUSIONS 
This project proved that airborne IR thermography can be used to 
locate buried landmines from small drones in Sahara Desert mine-
fields. We found that the strength of thermal anomalies can vary by 
day, indicating that generalizations cannot be made without more field 
data to substantiate claims. Ideally, this would be undertaken across 
many arid and semi-arid locations in different countries contaminated 
with landmines. Regarding IR thermography research for HMA in 
general, the first, second, and third priorities should be more data col-
lection under actual field conditions either at or within a close proxim-
ity to legacy minefields.
Based on lessons learned from mapping more than 30 linear km 
from small drones with regular daylight cameras in the same region, 
IR thermography is not the only option. It can be a less effective tool 
in some circumstances such as in mapping surface landmines in an 
arid environment. 
FUTURE WORK
Priority areas regarding future work include different opportunities:
1. Dissemination, advocacy, and greater analysis to capitalize on 
the tens of thousands of data points captured and help the HMA 
sector gain confidence in such a tool; and 
2. Leveraging new, state-of-the-art knowledge in IR thermography 
as a launch pad for real-world trials in other locations.
Opportunities regarding automated data processing such as deep 
learning and machine vision will also be investigated in order to lever-
age the impact of data in-hand from legacy minefields. Real-world 
minefield data is required to train algorithms with accurate thermal/
LWIR anomalies from specific models of production landmines, cap-
tured under local environmental and weather conditions. A lack of 
accurate real-world training data is currently a limiting factor for auto-
mated data processing research. 
Ideally, a range of HMA actors joining the research effort to accelerate 
momentum in moving the needle even further would substantially bene-
fit the field’s knowledge of thermal/LWIR techniques for HMA, as dupli-
cative work will only delay gains in community expertise. Additional 
follow-on articles could be authored to leverage the impact of an 
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unprecedented amount of field data captured in Chad. Themes include 
1. a more technical discussion of the underlying science and more 
granular anomaly analysis, comparing theory and reality in more 
detail; 
2. a step-by-step guide on how to set up a controlled field test site to 
determine the feasibility of IR thermography for locating buried 
landmines, ERW, and other objects in each region; 
3. a more detailed review of individual variables: natural, weather, 
object materials, diurnal cycle and geophysical elements from an 
extensive amount of data in-hand; 
4. theory and reality in simulant and surrogate landmine design: 
based on real-world thermal anomaly signatures from the field; 
and
5. sharing lessons learned regarding risk-mitigation and operating 
procedures, e.g., extreme fieldwork conditions, and reliably oper-
ating small drones at minefields at night.
If funding, logistics, and permissions can be secured, an ideal sup-
plementary project to accelerate momentum in moving the needle 
even further would be to develop a standard field test kit and establish 
controlled test sites in arid and semi-arid environments with a range of 
HMA partners in many other regions. For more information, includ-
ing flying videos and sample data see www.mr-au.com/chad. 
See endnotes page 67
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Weapons Marking and Registration in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Model for a Re-
gional Approach to SALW Life-Cycle Management in the Western Balkans by Newton 
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10. UN General Assembly A/CONF.192/15, International Tracing Instrument, IV Record-
keeping, Paragraphs 11–13.
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South East Europe, SEESAC, 2016, p 38.
Improving Security in the DRC Through Weapons and Ammunition Management by 
Seiwoh, Fabry, de Nantes, and Pineda [ from page 31 ]
1. As documented by the GoE, assisting the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
Sanctions Committee pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the DRC, 
2014, https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1533(2004) [accessed 10 June 2020]. See 
e.g. UN GoE reports: S/2018/ 1133 p. 4 para. 6 S/2018/531, pp. 32-34, paras. 
182-191; S/2017/1091, p. 19, para. 98; S/2016/466, p. 45, para. 229; S/2015/797, 
p. 12, para. 46; S/2015/19, p. 33, para. 154; S/2014/42, pp. 30-31, paras. 128 and 
132; S/2012/843, p. 36, paras. 139-140; S/2011/738, pp. 141-142, paras. 563-565; 
S/2009/603, pp. 9-11, paras. 23-29; pp. 13-14, paras. 40–43.
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Arms in the Great Lakes Region, 2018, https://recsasec.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/08/DRC-FRAGILITY-pdf.pdf [accessed 10 June, 2020]
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Bank, 2014. “Africa Development Bank Group strategy for addressing Fragility and 
building resilience in Africa.” Abidjan: Africa Development Bank.
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6. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are sometimes placed temporarily in host com-
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https://undocs.org/en/A/CONF.192/15(SUPP) [accessed 10 June 2020].
10. Arms Trade Treaty, regulating the international trade in conventional arms – from 
small arms to battle tanks, combat aircraft and warships–entered into force, 2014, 
https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/
English7.pdf [accessed 10 June 2020].
11. As mandated by Security Council Resolutions 2098 (2013), and subsequently 2409 
(2018), 2463 (2019), and 2502 (2019). 
12. Impact Evaluation Report, SA/LW project, UNMAS DRC, Katrin Stauffer, external 
M&E specialist provided by the Swiss Armed Forces, 2019
13. Data collected by UNMAS as of November 2020.
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10 June 2020].
15. United Nations Mine Action Service, DRC SA/LW project impact evaluation report, 
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Landmines in America’s Backyard by Rutherford [ from page 35 ]
1. “Command-detonated” and “victim-activated” landmines are modern terms not 
used during the Civil War.
2. In the 19th century, the term “torpedo” was used to define a type of explosive de-
vice that was deployed covertly, either on or just under the soil, or fixed to a river 
bank or bottom hidden by the water from unsuspecting ships. In today’s terms, 
these torpedoes are now referred to as landmines, sea mines, IEDs, or booby 
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traps. In this article, I use the terms “torpedoes” and “landmines” interchangeably 
when referring to an explosive device designed to be placed under, on, or near the 
ground and to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and 
that will incapacitate, injure, or kill one or more persons.
3. Jack Kelly, Gunpowder: Alchemy, Bombards and Pyrotechnics: The History of the 
Explosive that Changed the World (New York, NY, 2004), 202.
4. These landmines are also referred to in the literature as self-detonating devices. S. 
W. Gross, “On Torpedo Wounds,” The American Journal of the Medical Sciences, 
Isaac Hays, MD, ed., vol. 51 (April 1868), 370.
5. To a lesser extent, Confederate landmines also employed the Girardey percussion 
fuse, which was fabricated for the contact detonation of artillery shells. The fuse 
worked by placing a “serrated piece of a common artillery primer in the front of the 
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South Carolina. See Charles H. Jones, Artillery Fuses of the Civil War (Alexandria, 
VA, 2001), 129. 
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targeting civilians for retribution and burning their homes, would also have been 
prohibited under today’s international law. Moreover, the Federals also used 
marksmen as another counter-landmine measure to “clear a torpedo by shooting 
the fuse and exploding it.” Schneck, “Foreword,” in Michael P. Kochan and John C. 
Wideman, Civil War Torpedoes: A History of Improvised Explosive Devices in the 
War Between the States, 2nd ed. (Paoli, PA, 2011), xiv–xv.
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Sherman, 1860–1865, Jean V. Berlin and Brooks D. Simpson, eds. (Chapel Hill, NC, 
1999), 731.
9. President Jefferson Davis to Col. William M. Browne, Aide-de-Camp, Augusta, Geor-
gia, November 22, 1864, United States War Department. The War of the Rebellion: 
A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Volume 
44, 880–881.  Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880–1901.
10. G. T. Beauregard to Maj. Gen. S. Jones, December 6, 1864, United States War 
Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, Volume 44, 934. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1880–1901.
11. William Tecumseh Sherman, The Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman by Himself 
(Bloomington, IN, 1957), 194.
12. Fired artillery shells did not always detonate for a wide variety of reasons. “Field 
recoveries,” in North South Trader’s Civil War, vol. 35, no. 6, 17. Jack W. Melton, Jr., 
“Accurate Projectile Names,” in North South Trader’s Civil War, vol. 35, no. 6, 56.
13. Jack W. Melton, Jr., “Accurate Projectile Names,” in North South Trader’s Civil War, 
vol. 35, no. 6, 56. 
14. Notable exceptions include landmine use in Jackson, Mississippi; Williamsburg 
and Yorktown, Virginia; and on the roads around Goldsboro and Kinston, North 
Carolina.
15. John R. Weaver II, A Legacy in Brick and Stone: American Coastal Defense Forts of 
the Third System, 1816–1867 (McLean, VA, 2001), 33.
16. Robert Knox Sneden, Eye of the Storm: A Civil War Odyssey, Chares F. Bryan Jr. and 
Nelson D. Lankford, eds. (New York, NY, 2000), 283. More recently, in 2008, a relic 
restorer in Chester, Virginia, was killed in his driveway working on a live artillery 
round.
17. Chester G. Hearn, Mobile Bay and the Mobile Campaign: The Last Great Battles of 
the Civil War. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1998). 200; Nineteenth-cen-
tury newspaper headlines in the Mobile area regarding the finding of unexploded 
ordnance and landmines, included “Old Shells Unearthed Here at Civil War Battery 
Site,” “Civil War Munitions Dump Found in Mobile,” and “Old Shell Found in Yard.”
18. According to the leading publication for Civil War relic hunters, “There have been 
scant few other explosions and injuries, most recently the July 2006 incident that 
injured Lawrence Christopher of Dalton, Georgia.” Stephen W. Sylvia, “Publisher’s 
Forum: Look Out for Baseballs,” in North South Trader’s Civil War, vol. 33, no. 2, 7.
19. United States Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Hidden Kill-
ers: The Global Landmine Crisis (Washington, DC, 1994). This was the first report to 
estimate the magnitude of the landmine threat in terms of numbers of mines laid 
and numbers of mine-related deaths and injuries.
20. At Battery Wagner, Union engineers breached the Confederate minefields by dig-
ging trenches and saps toward the fortifications.
21. “Landmine Monitor 2019,” The Landmine Monitor, May 2019, https://bit.
ly/3bdlMKR, accessed 31 August 2020.
Table 1
i. Although inadvertent and unnoticed by Union forces at the time, artillery fire 
proved the undoing of the minefields at Fort Fisher when it severed electric lines or 
destroyed the torpedoes.
ii. Fort McDermott is considered an extended fortification of Spanish Fort’s defenses, 
where Confederates had also deployed nuisance mines. Specifically, they were 
located at a watering hole distant from the fort’s immediate defensives. To avoid 
double counting, the deployment of these nuisance landmines are placed in the 
column for Spanish Fort rather than Fort McDermott.
iii. While General Sherman wrote that he believed the landmines that took the leg of 
one of his officers during their “March to the Sea” were “nuisance landmines,” they 
are not listed as such in this chart, as most likely the Southern defenders used them 
as a delaying weapon so that they could recalibrate their own defensive strategy 
and gain additional time.
iv. Port Hudson is the only known American Civil War location where command-
detonated and victim-activated landmines were used simultaneously.  It is also the 
first time in the world’s history, as far as the author knows, that both command and 
victim activated landmines were used in the same location.
Strengthening a Sustainable National Capacity for Gender and Diversity Mainstream-
ing in Mine Action by Biscaglia, Sophal, Sochenda, and Sabeeh [ from page 39 ]
1. “Goal 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies.” Sustainable Development 
Goals, United Nations. Accessed 18 September 2020.  https://bit.ly/2Ec9wy6 
2. "Supporting Capacity Development: The UNDP Approach." United Nations Develop-
ment Programme Bureau for Development Policy. n.d.
3. “Goal 10: Reduced inequality within and among countries.” Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals, United Nations. Accessed 18 September 2020. https://bit.ly/3myp4h8 
4. Bourke, Julie and Andrea Espedido. “The Key to Inclusive Leadership.” Harvard 
Business Review, 6 March 2020. Accessed 18 September 2020. https://bit.
ly/3hQdvhS 
5. Notably, the CMAA, with the support of the CFR-Project/UNDP, is contracting a 
national consultant to address these challenges.
6. As of July 2019, the ToR is pending approval by the CMAA Secretary-General.
7. “Oslo Action Plan Draft.” 4th Review Conference Mine Free World, Oslo, Norway, 
25-29 November 2019. Accessed 18 September 2020. https://bit.ly/2RCWFYO
Assessing Ukraine’s Victim Assistance Capacities by Mashchenko, Shymanchuk, 
Stoiev, and Vovk [ from page 43 ]
1. Government of Ukraine, Request for an Extension of the Deadline for Completing 
the Destruction of Anti-Personnel Mines in Accordance with Article 5 of the Con-
vention: Executive Summary [sic], (Geneva: AP Mine Ban Convention Implementa-
tion Support Unit, 2020), https://bit.ly/3izQn8A. 
2. International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2019: Twenty Year Review, Geneva: ICBL-
CMC, 2019, https://bit.ly/2CspuDx. 
3. Referring to the terminology of IMAS 13.10 and to avoid ambiguity with legal 
jargon, the article uses ‘EO victims’ as an expression for both injured survivors and 
those killed by EO accidents. 
4. United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), IMAS 13.10 Victim Assistance (First 
Edition), New York: UNMAS, 2020, https://bit.ly/32iFsKO. 
5. Danish Refugee Council-Danish Demining Group (DRC-DDG), Assessment Report: 
Mine Victim Assistance Needs, Ukraine: DRC-DDG, 2018, https://bit.ly/3foXXRB.
6. Due to the absence of a nationally held EO casualty database, DRC-DDG has been 
compiling this information via open source data; it is, therefore, not a conclusive 
dataset. Available at: https://bit.ly/2Zj2Y8D. 
7. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Special Monitoring Mission 
to Ukraine (OSCE: SMM), Thematic Report: The Impact of Mines, Unexploded Ord-
nance and Other Explosive Objects on Civilians in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions 
of Eastern Ukraine, Ukraine: OSCE SMM, 2019, https://bit.ly/3jiYHKk. 
8. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 
Humanitarian Needs Overview: Ukraine, Ukraine: UN OCHA, 2020, https://bit.
ly/2CfVV8g. 
9. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Special Monitoring Mission 
to Ukraine (OSCE: SMM), Thematic Report: The Impact of the Conflict on Educa-
tional Facilities and Children’s Access to Education in Eastern Ukraine, Ukraine: 
OSCE SMM, 2020. https://bit.ly/2GLAz4f.
10. National VA-related regulations include: Constitution of Ukraine (article 27 – right 
to life; article 46 – right to social protection; article 49 – right to healthcare; and 
article 50 – right to safe environment) and other laws related to social protection 
depending on the context (law no. 875 – basics of social protection of individu-
als with disabilities; law no. 2402 – on protection of childhood; law no. 1706 – on 
ensuring rights and freedoms of internally displaced persons (IDPs), etc.). Ukraine 
signed certain applicable international treaties (e.g. Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mine and on 
Their Destruction, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol, etc.) and plans to ratify more 
in the near future (i.e. European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of 
Violent Crimes).
11. The amendment is designed to address some of the concerns outlined in this 
article. However, at this moment it is impossible to predict the scope and the effect 
of its implementation, as they rely on the Cabinet’s development of the related 
by-laws, budget allocations, and the quality of their enforcement by the local 
authorities and other actors. Therefore, this article is written based on the still valid 
edition of MAL, adopted on 6 December 2018, and amended on 25 April 2019.
12. United Nations, The United Nations Policy on Victim Assistance in Mine Action. 
2016 Update, n.p.: United Nations, 2016, https://bit.ly/2WjAh9W. 
13. Kasack, Sebastian, “Assistance to Victims of Landmines and Explosive Remnants 
of War: Guidance on Child-focused Victim Assistance,” New York: UNICEF, 2014, 
https://bit.ly/3exTNpj. 
14. United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “IMAS 13.10 Victim Assistance: First 
Edition,” New York: UNMAS, 2020, https://bit.ly/3ehUcO3.
15. The Likert scale is a five (or seven) point scale that is used to allow the individual to 
express how much they agree or disagree with a particular statement.
16. The term “snowball sampling” refers to a recruitment method in which participants 
assist researchers in identifying additional potential subjects.
17. At the national level, DRC-DDG conducted interviews with ministries of Reinte-
gration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, Social Policy, Health, and 
Education; State Service for War Veterans’ Affairs; Commissioner for Observance 
of the Human Rights of the Verkhovna Rada; State Emergency Services of Ukraine 
(SES); and two national experts on child protection. In Luhansk and Donetsk re-
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gions, interviews were held with Child Affairs Services; Center for Social Services 
for Families, Children, and Youth; national and juvenile police; regional SES and 
departments of education, health, social and civil protection. Interviews were 
also conducted with local social protection units, administration representatives, 
Child Affairs Service, Inclusive Resource Center, rehabilitation center for children 
with disabilities, four (children’s) hospitals, four village councils, and three schools. 
Other interviewed stakeholders included (inter)national NGOs and international 
entities (ICRC, Education Cluster, WHO, and the OSCE).
18. The term “purposive sampling” is an intentional selection of informants based on 
their ability to elucidate a specific theme, concept, or phenomenon.
19. For the sake of accuracy, the initial draft law was titled Law 9080/01 of 6 December 
2018. The final adopted version was Law 2642-VIII. The only amendment adopted 
so far was No. 2706-VIII of 25 April 2019. DRC-DDG is currently advocating for the 
adoption of draft amendment No. 2618.
20. Underage victims are additionally entitled to a one-time monetary compensa-
tion; annual healthcare assistance; free medical and psychological rehabilitation 
in specialized centers and compensation of travel costs; and a monthly disability 
assistance (until full age).
21. Chernysh Vadym, Interview with Chernysh Vadym, Minister of the Ministry for 
Reintegration of Temporary Occupied Territories of Ukraine, Chernysh Vadym: 
Population Warning About Mine Contaminated Areas and Assistance for Affected 
Persons – What is Needed and Can be Done Right Now, First National TV Channel, 
13 June 2019, https://bit.ly/2ZnSo0a.
22. Constitution of Ukraine, article 19, https://bit.ly/2Wlepel. 
23. Fiederlein, Suzanne and SaraJane Rzegocki, “The Human and Financial Costs of 
the Explosive Remnants of War in Afghanistan, Costs of War,” Watson Institute for 
International and Public Affairs, Brown University, 2019, https://bit.ly/3ilfRpP. 
24. Center for International Stabilization and Recovery, “Landmine Casualty Data: Best 
Practices Guidebook,” Global CWD Repository, 12, 2008, https://bit.ly/33keLo7. 
25. Durham, Jo, Peter S. Hill, and Damian Hoy, “The Underreporting of Landmine and 
Explosive Remnants of War Injuries in Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic and Viet Nam,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 91, 2013: 234-6, 
https://bit.ly/33cfWG2.
26. World Health Organization (WHO), “ICD-11 for Mortality and Morbidity Statistics,” 
WHO, version 04, 2019, https://bit.ly/2OsUwgY. 
27. REACH, Protection Assessment of Isolated Settlements in Government-Controlled 
Areas Along the Contact Line, Ukraine: REACH, 2019, https://bit.ly/3kf8NMe.
28. It is noteworthy that DRC-DDG, together with partners from the Working Group 
on MAL of the MA Sub-Cluster in Ukraine, have recently succeeded to incorporate 
a provision on compensation of housing costs for EO victims during the rehabilita-
tion. As for the provision of EO victim status and VA data collection, they are antici-
pated to be fixed at the level of by-laws once the amendment is adopted.
29. Ferguson, Angela D., Beth Sperber Richie, and Maria J. Gomez, “Psychological 
Factors After Traumatic Amputation in Landmine Survivors: The Bridge between 
Physical Healing and Full Recovery,” Disability and Rehabilitation 26 (2004): 14-5, 
931-8, https://bit.ly/3bV7AGY.
Explosive Ordnance Victims and Risk Education: Lessons Learned from Colombia 
2012–2019 by Valencia, De Santis, Wilson, Jaramillo, Sánchez, Alfonso [ from page 
49 ]
1. OACP is a dependency of the Administrative Department of the Presidency of the 
Republic of Colombia. Within its structure is the Action Against Antipersonnel 
Mines - AICMA working group. The aim is to assist the National Government in the 
design, formulation, and coordination of plans, programs, and activities related to 
mine action (humanitarian demining, education on the risk of antipersonnel mines, 
and comprehensive assistance to victims).
2. Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. Descontanima Colombia. http://www.
accioncontraminas.gov.co/Paginas/aicma.aspx.
3. International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC). 
Landmine Monitor 2020. 22nd ed. http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3168934/
LM2020.pdf.
4. Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining. GICHD - Risk Education. 
cited 2020 Apr 28. Available from: https://www.gichd.org/en/our-response/risk-
education/.
5. “Imas Mine Risk Education Best Practice Guidebook 1. An Introduction To Mine Risk 
Education.” Geneva, 2005.
6. There is evidence of EORE activities before 2010. Work was carried out in the 
affected communities through mobile classrooms, where EORE training and basic 
life support were given. Through agreements with the coordinating entity of Na-
tional Parks (NP)of Colombia, workshops were held for NP staff and the population 
surrounding the parks; talking maps to collect information on the impacts to the 
community; design of prevention cards for NP staff; and the inclusion of prevention 
messages within their risk action plans. Training was also carried out for municipal 
civil servant and other territorial entities. In addition, the EORE standard was pre-
pared, as well as the guidelines for the construction of EORE materials. This work 
was done in coordination with UNICEF and other EORE partners. Likewise, before 
2010 the National EORE technical tables were held. In 1996, the strategy "We all 
have the right to have our feet on the Earth" was launched by UNICEF, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, the Colombian Campaign against Antipersonnel 
Mines, among other partners.
7. Rapid response EORE is a strategy to assist early alerts, which was designed by the 
Ombudsman's Office of Colombia to identify and evaluate risk situations for the 
civilian population resulting from the armed conflict (among which are the pres-
ence of EO) and informs the OACP.
8. Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. Descontamina Colombia. [cited 2020 May 
8]. http://www.accioncontraminas.gov.co/Paginas/aicma.aspx.
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11. J Durham, S Gillieatt, B Sisavath. “Effective Mine Risk Education in War-Zone Areas-
-A Shared Responsibility.” Health Promot Int. 2005;20(3):213-220. doi:10.1093/
heapro/dai014
12. Manual eradication is a program that was implemented due to the critical increase 
of illicit crops in areas of peasant economy, areas belonging to the national system 
of natural parks and / or close to water bodies, streams and human settlements. 
It consists of the elimination of illicit crops in an artisanal way, through the physi-
cal force of a person. The plants are held and pulled, producing the detachment 
of their roots. https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/
Documentos/descargas/Documentos_Descargables/espanol/Erradicacion%20
manual%20de%20coca.pdf.
13. Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas. Educación en el Riesgo De Minas, Una Estrate-
gia Que Salva Vidas [Internet]. 2015 [cited 2020 Feb 15]. Available from: https://
colombiasinminas.org/accion-contra-minas/educacion-en-el-riesgo-de-minas/
educacion-en-el-riesgo-de-minas-una-estrategia-que-salva-vidas/.
14. Durham, Jo & Gillieatt, Sue & Sisavath, Bounpheng. (2005). “Effective mine risk 
education in war-zone areas - A shared responsibility.” Health promotion interna-
tional. 20. 213-20. 10.1093/heapro/dai014.
Proof: How Small Drones Can Find Buried Landmines in the Desert using Airborne IR 
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